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Zusammenfassung
Das Teilen von Daten bildet die Grundlage fu¨r nahezu jede IT-gestu¨tzte Zusammen-
arbeit im gescha¨lichen und privaten Kontext. Typische Realisierungen der Auto-
risierung und der Durchsetzung von Zugrisrechten auf den gemeinsam genutzten
Daten erfordern, dass die Benutzer, die Daten miteinander teilen, hinsichtlich der
Vertraulichkeit und Integrita¨t der Daten auf Dritte vertrauen mu¨ssen. Solche Rea-
lisierungen bergen also im speziellen das Risiko, dass Daten durch einen Insider-
Angri auf den vertrauenswu¨rdigen Dritten gefa¨hrdet werden. Mit Hilfe clientsei-
tig ausgefu¨hrter kryptographischer Operationen ko¨nnen die Autorisierung und die
Durchsetzung von Zugrisrechten fu¨r beliebige Speicherdienste in weiten Teilen von
den Benutzern selbst durchgefu¨hrt werden, was in einemEnde-zu-Ende-gesicherten
System zumTeilen vonDaten (End-to-End Secure Data Sharing, E2E-SDS) resultiert.
E2E-SDS-Systeme werden jedoch nur dann von potenziellen Anwendern akzeptiert,
wenn die ihnen bekannten Autorisierungsprozesse weitgehend unvera¨ndert bleiben,
und die Leistungseinbußen fu¨r die Autorisierung und denDatenzugri nicht zu gra-
vierend sind.
Das Hauptziel dieser Arbeit ist die Bewertung der Leistungseinbußen, die auf ei-
nem Benutzer-Client mit einem gegebenen E2E-SDS-Protokoll in der Realita¨t zu
erwarten sind. Fu¨r bestehende E2E-SDS-Protokolle ist das asymptotische Verhal-
ten in Bezug auf Leistungsmetriken wie Rechenzeit oder Netzwerkverkehr in der
Regel bekannt. Das asymptotische Verhalten la¨sst jedoch nur schwache Schlussfol-
gerungen auf die absolute Ho¨he der Leistungseinbußen zu. Neben dem E2E-SDS-
Protokoll selbst ha¨ngt die reale Leistung von der eingesetzten Hardware, den Si-
cherheitsparametern und dem konkreten Freigabe- und Nutzungsszenario ab, al-
so vom Freigabe- und Nutzungsverhalten der Benutzer im System. Die Bewertung
der realen Leistungseinbußen bringt im wesentlichen zwei Herausforderungen mit
sich: Erstensmuss das zu untersuchende E2E-SDS-Protokoll unter Einbeziehung der
vorgenannten Einussfaktoren auf die Leistung modelliert werden, wobei Imple-
mentierungsdetails nach Mo¨glichkeit im Modell einfach austauschbar sind. Zwei-
tens mu¨ssen realistische Freigabe- und Nutzungsszenarien vorliegen, die entweder
auf Beobachtungen basieren, oder mit Hilfe von Scha¨tzungen generiert werden.
Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist die detaillierte Bewertung der realen Leistung von E2E-
SDS-Protokollen. Der Fokus der Arbeit liegt auf E2E-SDS-Protokollen, die ein grup-
penbasiertes Autorisationsmodell realisieren, die es also ermo¨glichen, Datenmit be-
nannten Benutzergruppen zu teilen, die von beliebigen Benutzern verwaltet werden.
Diese Funktion wird von weit verbreiteten verteilten Dateisystemen wie NFSv4 oder
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CIFS angeboten.
In dieser Arbeit werden Methoden zur Bewertung der realen Leistung von E2E-
SDS-Protokollen vorgestellt. Aus der Beobachtung realer Speicherdienste gewonne-
ne Freigabe- und Nutzungsszenarien werden charakterisiert und eine Methode zur
Erzeugung synthetischer Freigabe- und Nutzungsszenarien eingefu¨hrt. Unter Nut-
zung dieses Instrumentariums wird die Leistungsfa¨higkeit sowohl bestehender als
auch neuartiger E2E-SDS-Protokolle evaluiert und mo¨gliche Maßnahmen zur Ver-
besserung der Leistung auf Seiten des Anwenders vorgeschlagen.
Um realistische Freigabe- und Nutzungsszenarien zu erhalten, wurden die Mit-
glieder, Aktivita¨ten und Berechtigungen von Benutzergruppen auf zwei produktiven
Speicherdiensten beobachtet. Die daraus resultierenden Szenarien werden hinsicht-
lich ausgewa¨hlter Parameter charakterisiert.
Fu¨r die Leistungsbewertung von E2E-SDS-Protokollen in realistischen Szenarien
wurden zwei Methoden entwickelt: Die analytische Methode liefert in vielen Fa¨llen
hinreichend genaue Ergebnisse. Die simulative Methode ist erforderlich, wenn die
Leistung komplexer E2E-SDS-Protokolle detailliert analysiert werden soll. Fu¨r die
simulative Methode wird ein Simulationsmodell vorgestellt, das einen Vergleich von
E2E-SDS-Protokollen auf einer einheitlichen Abstraktionsebene ermo¨glicht.
Um die Performance von E2E-SDS-Protokollen auch dann bewerten zu ko¨nnen,
wenn keine aus Beobachtungen resultierende Freigabe- undNutzungsszenarien vor-
liegen, werden synthetische Szenarien erzeugt, die auf Scha¨tzungen bestimmter Pa-
rameter des Szenarios basieren. Dazu wird ein Erzeugungsverfahren vorgestellt, das
Abha¨ngigkeiten zwischen den vorab spezizierten Parametern beru¨cksichtigt. Die
NP-Schwere des zugrundeliegenden Problems der Erzeugung von Szenarien wird
fu¨r bestimmte Kombinationen von vorab spezizierten Parametern bewiesen.
Die vorgestellten Methoden zur Leistungsbewertung werden einerseits auf E2E-
SDS-Protokolle angewandt, die auf traditioneller Kryptographie basieren, die also
mittels symmetrischer und asymmetrischer Kryptographie Chirate erzeugen, die
nur mit einem einzigen Schlu¨ssel dechiriert werden ko¨nnen. Andererseits werden
die vorgestellten Methoden auf E2E-SDS-Protokolle angewandt, die auf Attributba-
sierter Verschlu¨sselung (Attribute-Based Encryption, ABE) basieren, mit deren Hilfe
eine Gruppe von Benutzernmit nur einem einzigen Chirat adressiert werden kann.
Die Leistungsbewertung des traditionellen E2E-SDS-Protokolls zeigt, dass in den
betrachteten Nutzungs- und Nutzungsszenarien fu¨r die meisten Autorisierungsope-
rationen nur geringe Leistungseinbußen zu erwarten sind. Betra¨chtliche Leistungs-
einbußen sind fu¨r Benutzer zu erwarten, die Gruppenmitgliedschaen in großen
benannten Benutzergruppen verwalten, d.h. Benutzergruppen mit einigen tausend
oder mehr Mitgliedern. Diese Leistungseinbußen ko¨nnen durch die Integration ei-
nes Group KeyManagement-Ansatzes deutlich gesenkt werden, also eines Ansatzes,
der auf eine eziente Verteilung und Erneuerung von kryptographischen Schlu¨sseln
innerhalb von Benutzergruppen abzielt.
Ein aufABEbasierendes E2E-SDS-Protokoll wird realisiert, indembestehendeABE-
Verfahren hinsichtlich ihrer Eignung fu¨r E2E-SDS evaluiert, und das attributbasierte
Autorisationsmodell eines geeigneten ABE-Verfahrens auf das gruppenbasierte Au-
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torisationsmodell abgebildet wird. Eine Leistungsbewertung verschiedener Varian-
ten dieser Abbildung zeigt, dass das ABE-basierte Protokoll eine etwas schlechtere
Leistung als das auf traditioneller Kryptographie beruhende Protokoll bietet.
Schließlich wird ein neuartiges E2E-SDS-Protokoll vorgestellt, das auf kooperative
Autorisierungsoperationen verzichtet. Diese Operationen erfordern, dass die End-
gera¨te der Benutzer zu jedem Zeitpunkt erreichbar und bereit fu¨r die Ausfu¨hrung
rechenintensiver kryptographischer Operationen sind. Diese Anforderungen sind
insbesondere beim Einsatz mobiler Endgera¨te nicht immer sichergestellt. Ein we-
sentlicher Vorteil des vorgeschlagenen Protokolls liegt darin, dass es den praktischen
Einsatz von Hierarchien benannter Benutzergruppen in E2E-SDS ermo¨glicht. Die
damit verbundenen, potenziell hohen Leistungseinbußen werden detailliert ausge-
wertet. Weiterhin wird gezeigt, dass die Unterstu¨tzung von Gruppenhierarchien oh-
ne kooperative Autorisierungsoperationen grundsa¨tzlich gewisse Einschra¨nkungen
hinsichtlich der Aktualita¨t der Zugrisberechtigungen impliziert, was die Grenzen
der Anwendbarkeit von E2E-SDS aufzeigt.
iii

Abstract
Data sharing forms the basis for almost any IT-based collaboration in both busi-
ness and personal contexts. Typical realizations of authorization and access control
enforcement on the shared data require the group of sharing users to trust third par-
ties to protect data condentiality and integrity. Such realizations of data sharing
bear the specic risk of data being compromised by an insider attack on the trusted
third party. By means of client-side cryptography, major parts of the authorization
and access control enforcement for arbitrary storage services can be carried out by
the sharing users themselves, resulting in an End-to-End Secure Data Sharing (E2E-
SDS) system. However, such systems will only be accepted by potential users if the
authorization processes they are familiar with remain largely unaltered, and if the
performance penalties for authorization or data access are not too heavy.
e main objective of this thesis is to evaluate the real-world performance penal-
ties that have to be expected on a user client with a given E2E-SDS protocol. For
existing E2E-SDS protocols, the asymptotical behavior is usually known with regard
to performancemetrics such as computation time or network trac volume, but this
does not oer much insight into how big the performance penalties are in absolute
terms. Besides the E2E-SDS protocol itself, the real-world performance depends on
the employed hardware, the security parameters, and the concrete sharing and us-
age scenario, i.e., the sharing and usage behavior of the users in the system.us, the
challenges of a real-world performance evaluation of E2E-SDS protocols are twofold:
First, the protocol under study has to be modeled with regard to the aforementioned
performance inuencing factors while factoring out implementation details. Sec-
ond, realistic sharing and usage scenarios have to be observed, or generated based
on partial estimated scenarios.
e objective of this work is to evaluate the real-world performance of E2E-SDS
protocols in depth. e focus is on E2E-SDS protocols that realize a group-based
authorization model, i.e., that allow to share data with named user groups that are
managed by arbitrary users.is feature is supported by the authorization model of
widely deployed distributed le systems such as NFSv4 or CIFS.
In this work, methods for the evaluation of the real-world performance of E2E-
SDS protocols are presented. Realistic usage scenarios taken from real-world storage
services are characterized, and a method for the generation of synthetic sharing and
usage scenarios is introduced. Based on these instruments, the performance of both
existing and novel E2E-SDS protocols is evaluated, and possiblemeasures to improve
the performance on the user’s side are proposed.
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To get realistic sharing and usage scenarios, the members, activities and permis-
sions of user groups were observed on two real-world storage services.e resulting
scenarios are characterized with regard to selected parameters.
For the performance evaluation of E2E-SDS protocols in real-world scenarios, two
methods were developed: e analytical method yields results that are suciently
accurate in many cases. e simulative method is required when the performance
of a certain operation is to be analyzed in more detail while studying more complex
E2E-SDS protocols. For the simulative method, a simulation model is presented that
enables a comparison of E2E-SDS protocols on a unied layer of abstraction.
To be able to evaluate the performance of E2E-SDS protocols when no observed
sharing and usage scenarios are available, synthetic scenarios are generated that ad-
here to estimations of certain parameters of the scenario. For this purpose, a gener-
ation method is presented that takes dependencies between predetermined param-
eters into account. e NP-hardness of the scenario generation problem is proven
for certain combinations of predetermined parameters.
e presented performance evaluation methods are applied to E2E-SDS protocols
based on traditional cryptography, i.e., symmetric and asymmetric cryptography that
produces ciphertexts dedicated to a single recipient only, and based on Attribute-
Based Encryption (ABE), which enables to address a whole group of users with just
a single ciphertext.
e performance evaluation of the traditional E2E-SDS protocol shows that in the
considered sharing and usage scenarios, only minor performance penalties have to
be expected for most of the authorization operations. Major performance penal-
ties hit users that manage group memberships in large named user groups, i.e., user
groups with a few thousand or more members. ese performance penalties can
be decreased signicantly by integrating a Group Key Management approach, which
aims at an ecient distribution and renewal of cryptographic keyswithin user groups.
An E2E-SDS protocol that leverages ABE was realized by evaluating existing ABE
schemes with regard to E2E-SDS properties, andmapping the attribute-based autho-
rization model of a suitable ABE scheme to the group-based authorization model.
A performance evaluation of dierent mapping variants shows that the ABE-based
protocol oers a slightly worse performance than the protocol based on traditional
cryptography.
Finally, a novel E2E-SDS protocol is presented that omits joint authorization op-
erations. Such operations require user devices to be reachable and ready to carry
out computationally intensive cryptography at arbitrary points in time, which might
be problematic especially when mobile devices are used. A major benet of the pro-
posed protocol is that it enables the employment of hierarchies of named user groups
in E2E-SDS.e potentially heavy performance penalties that come with these hier-
archies are evaluated in detail. Furthermore, it is shown that the support of group hi-
erarchies without joint authorization operations fundamentally implies certain lim-
itations regarding the freshness of access permissions, which indicates the limits of
the applicability of E2E-SDS.
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1Introduction
Data sharing forms the basis for almost any IT-based collaboration in both busi-
ness and personal contexts. It comprises personal use cases like sharing pictures
with Facebook friends, but also institutional use cases like working on a document
in a closed user group. In many cases, data is shared over a group-external storage
provider, i.e., a storage provider that is notmaintained by the user group itself, as this
usually brings advantages in terms of usability, availability, access speed or amount
of available storage. Examples for the use of an external storage provider are the user
group that leverages a commercial photo gallery service to share pictures, as well as
the organization department that manages documents on the organization’s central
groupware server or even on an outsourced groupware service.
Typical realizations of authorization and access control enforcement on the shared
data require the group of sharing users to trust third parties to protect data con-
dentiality and integrity. Such realizations of data sharing bear the specic risk of
data being compromised by an insider attack on the trusted third party, but it also
renders the trusted third party a potentially valuable target for external attackers. In
consequence, a group of sharing users has to balance the advantages that a group-
external storage provider oers against the condentiality and integrity of the shared
data, and they may decide to avoid using a group-external storage provider if they
evaluate the risk of data corruption as too high, which might be true when the data
is sensitive and the trust in the group-external storage provider is low.
By means of client-side cryptography, major parts of the authorization and access
control enforcement for arbitrary storage services can be carried out by the sharing
users themselves, which is denoted as End-to-End Secure Data Sharing (E2E-SDS) in
this thesis. erefore, in an E2E-SDS system, no party outside the group of sharing
users has to be trusted with regard to the condentiality and integrity of the shared
data. For this purpose, the data has to be encrypted and digitally signed by the users
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before it is uploaded to the storage provider.e encryption ensures that the storage
provider is not able to inspect the shared data, and the use of digital signatures al-
lows at least to detect unauthorizedmodications of the data. In summary, E2E-SDS
leverages client-side cryptography to protect the condentiality and integrity of the
shared data without the need for a trusted third party.
e challenges arising in the design of E2E-SDS protocols are addressed by the re-
search community for almost two decades. Early protocols, such as Cepheus [Fu99],
SiRiUS [GSMB03] or Cryptree [GMSW06] are based on “traditional” cryptographic
primitives, i.e., symmetric and asymmetric encryption. Since then, the set of avail-
able E2E-SDS protocols has been continuously growing, striving for more secure
protocols that support more expressive access control models. is goal was ap-
proached, e.g., by employingmore recent cryptographic primitives such asAttribute-
Based Encryption [SW05], which allows to dedicate a single ciphertext to multiple
recipients. However, despite a broad attention in research, E2E-SDS systems still do
not experience wide-spread adoption in reality: For example, a survey from 2016
showed that while about 70% of the participating large enterprises are concerned
about the security of data outsourced to cloud service providers, only 24% of the
enterprises encrypt the data before outsourcing1.
One barrier that hinders the adoption of E2E-SDS systems in practice is the loss in
comfort that these systems usually bring about. For example, the initial key exchange
that is required by every E2E-SDS systemmay be cumbersome, and facilities for key
exchange that are both usable and secure are still subject to research (e.g., [KW14]).
As another example, losing a cryptographic keymay lead to a loss of data, so the keys
should be stored redundantly without compromising their condentiality.ere are
plenty of aspects that are crucial to users’ acceptance of E2E-SDS.is thesis focuses
on two of these aspects: the authorization models the users are familiar with have
to remain largely unaltered, and the performance penalties for authorization or data
access should not be too heavy.
e authorization models for data sharing strongly dier, dependent on the con-
crete data sharing system and scenario. e diversity of authorization models does
not only originate from the diverse nature and purpose of the shared data, but also
from the dierences in users’ expertise. As diverse as the authorization models are,
a feature that many of them have in common is that they oer facilities to share data
not only with single users, but with groups of users.is feature is exhibited by tra-
ditional distributed le systems, such as NFSv4 or CIFS, but was also retained in
more recent data sharing systems. For example, user groups are supported in some
Sync&Share services, such as Dropbox, or in some online social networks, such as
Facebook. e essential property of these user groups is that they are not existing
only in the context of permissions on some data, but are independent entities that
can be granted data access via a group handle. us, these user groups are denoted
as named user groups in this thesis. is thesis focuses on E2E-SDS systems that
implement an authorization model with support for named user groups.
1https://www.vormetric.com/campaigns/datathreat/2016/pdf/
cloud-big-data-iot-2016-vormetric-dtr-deck-v2.pdf
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e support for named groups bears some special challenges in combination with
E2E-SDS.ese challenges lie in the required collaboration between the group owner,
i.e., the usermanaging themembers of a group, and the resource owner, whomanages
permissions for her resources. For some sharing operations, these two entities have
to carry out cryptographic operations in a concerted way. For this purpose, some ex-
isting E2E-SDS protocols employ joint authorization operations, which require that
the involved users are reachable in the network and able to allocate the necessary
computational resources immediately upon request. is severely impacts the us-
ability of E2E-SDS when devices with low computational power and unstable net-
work connections are used. Alternatively, group and resource owners can exchange
information over an untrusted storage provider if the condentiality, integrity and
especially the freshness of the exchanged information are cryptographically ensured.
However, this poses a fundamental challengewhen no trusted third party is available.
e challenge of collaboration between group and resource owners in an E2E-SDS
system is addressed in this thesis.
For the performance of E2E-SDS, it is obvious that client-side cryptography implies
performance penalties, e.g., in terms of computing time and network trac volume:
Besides the computation time that is needed to encrypt and decrypt the data to be
shared, the system has to support several key management tasks that make up the
key lifecycle, starting from the creation of data encryption keys, to their distribu-
tion to the group of legitimate accessors, to the invalidation and replacement of a
key whenever a user leaves the group of legitimate accessors. e impact on the
performance depends on the role a user acts in, i.e., does a user only up- and down-
load encrypted data, or does she also manage named user groups, which involves
key management tasks.
It is an open issue whether the performance overhead that is induced by the client-
side cryptography employed by E2E-SDS is signicant in reality. On the one hand,
the bandwidth of wired and wireless networks and the computing power of mobile
and desktop processors grow—many new mobile processors even support encryp-
tion in hardware2. On the other hand, the size of “cloud data” that can potentially be
shared also grows3, and the recommended key length—and therewith the computing
time required—increase for symmetric and asymmetric ciphers4.
1.1 Challenges and Objectives
e objective of this thesis is to evaluate the real-world performance of E2E-SDS pro-
tocols. Besides the concrete cryptographic primitives that are required for the dier-
ent protocol operations, the real-world performance also depends on the concrete
implementation of these primitives, and the hardware the primitives are carried out
2https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
3http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/
service-provider/global-cloud-index-gci/Cloud_Index_White_Paper.
html
4http://www.keylength.com/en/4/
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on. Anothermajor inuence factor for the protocol performance is the sharingmodel
that underlies the E2E-SDS system. e sharing model formalizes the sharing be-
havior of the users, i.e., it describes the number and size of the named user groups,
the permissions of these groups and so on. All of these factors have to be consid-
ered when designing a performance evaluation method that reects the real-world
performance.
Evaluating the real-world performance of E2E-SDS protocols is substantially dier-
ent from the performance evaluations that are usually carried out for these protocols
in literature, as these evaluations focus on the asymptotical behavior of the perfor-
mance. Asymptotical analyses are a good starting point to identify factors that are
relevant for the performance, but they do not oer much insight into how big the
performance penalties of E2E-SDS are in absolute terms.is is due to the very high
abstraction level that asymptotical analyses strive to achieve. In contrast, measure-
ments of the performance of a given protocol implementation on a given hardware
with a given sharingmodel yield precise results in absolute terms. On the other hand,
measurements obviously lack generality, as they only provide results for one combi-
nation of protocol implementation, hardware and sharingmodel.us, the challenge
addressed in this thesis is to nd methods for performance evaluation that allow to
estimate the performance in absolute terms, but also allow tomake statements about
the performance on a more abstract level. e transition from asymptotical anal-
yses to methods that estimate the performance in absolute terms bears two major
challenges, which are discussed in the following.
e rst challenge is that an asymptotical analysis abstracts from constant factors
and constant terms, which may be highly relevant for the performance in reality.
With asymptotical analyses, the performance of secure data sharing operations of
dierent types, e.g., uploading data or adding a member to a sharing group, is ex-
pressed in terms of asymptotical behavior of some performance metric in relation
to some input parameter N . Especially when N is small, and a single operation is
expensive, these constants might be the dominant inuence factor for the perfor-
mance.us, a performance evaluation method is required that is based on a more
ne-grained representation of the E2E-SDS protocol, which also models the con-
stant factors and terms. At the same time, as the objective of this work is to evaluate
and compare the performance on an E2E-SDS protocol level, the method should ab-
stract from implementation details. For this purpose, an abstraction level has to be
identied that enables tomodel the relevant dierences between the protocols, while
yielding results that are accurate enough for practical purposes.
As second challenge, the knowledge about the sharing and usage model that un-
derlies the E2E-SDS system is usually incomplete.us, it is unclear which values the
parameter N typically takes in reality. While it might be possible that certain aspects
of the sharing or usage model, i.e., certain sharing model parameters, can be approx-
imated roughly, others may be much harder to estimate, even by a domain expert.
For example, there may be some rough idea of the range of sharing group sizes or
the overall size of data shared in the sharing model. However, other sharing model
parameters that may be relevant for the performance are harder to determine, e.g.,
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the average number of les accessible per sharing group. One possibility to deter-
mine realistic values for sharing model parameters is to observe real-world E2E-SDS
systems. While the observation might only provide a small and non-representative
set of realistic parameter values, these values can nonetheless be used to get a rough
indication of the real-world performance of a given protocol. However, observation
requires that the E2E-SDS system under study is already in place. If the E2E-SDS
system doesn’t exist, or the observed sharing or usage model is expected to change
in the future, a performance evaluation based solely on observed parameter values
will not be sucient.
If the observation of realistic values for the sharing and usage model parameters is
impossible, it can be tried to approximate the values of required, but unknown shar-
ingmodel parameters based on estimable sharingmodel parameters. In this context,
estimable sharing model parameters refer to parameters for which a domain expert
could provide an estimation regarding the E2E-SDS system under study. However,
to the best of our knowledge, the dependencies between dierent sharing model pa-
rameters are not discussed systematically in literature.
In summary, the challenges of evaluating the real-world performance of E2E-SDS
protocols that were discussed in this section lead to the following research question,
which will be addressed in this thesis:
How can the real-world performance of E2E-SDS protocols be
evaluated, both based on observable and on estimated sharing models?
As stated before, the motivation for identifying or constructing such performance
evaluationmethods is to provide concrete and absolute numbers for the performance
penalties of E2E-SDS, with a focus on E2E-SDS protocols that support named user
groups. While the application of the performance evaluation methods obviously has
to be limited to some chosen E2E-SDS protocols and sharingmodels, it can nonethe-
less provide a tendency whether the performance penalties hinder the adoption of
E2E-SDS in practice. erefore, the following research question will be addressed
in this thesis:
Which performance penalties have to be expected in reality using
E2E-SDS protocols with support for named user groups?
1.2 Contributions
e contributions of this thesis can be classied into methodic contributions, com-
prising sharing models and methods that are required for the evaluation of the real-
world performance, and applied contributions, where the developed methods are ap-
plied to evaluate the performance of chosen E2E-SDS protocols.
e main methodic contributions of this thesis are:
– Tracing and characterization of real-world sharingmodel instances: To get
realistic sharing model instances, the members, activities and permissions of
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user groups are tracked on real-world storage services. For this purpose, shar-
ing operations are traced in e-learning and groupware services running in pro-
duction with a user base of around 40000 users, and these traces are trans-
formed into a set of about 100 replayable workloads. e sharing model in-
stances are characterized with regard to selected parameters. To the best of
our knowledge, no such characterization of sharing model instances has been
published before.
– Synthetic sharing model generation method: To be able to carry out perfor-
mance evaluations based on an estimated sharingmodel instances, the sharing
model parameters that inuence the performance have to be derived from a
set of sharing model parameters that can be estimated by a domain expert for
the system under study. e derivation of sharing model parameters can be
implicitly achieved by generating synthetic sharing model instances that ad-
here to predetermined parameter assignments. For this purpose, a generation
method is presented, which takes into account that predetermining depen-
dent parameters might lead to conicting requirements on the resulting shar-
ing model instance. Furthermore, it is proven that the generation of sharing
model instances is an NP-hard problem when certain combinations of param-
eters are predetermined.
– Simulative performance evaluation method: For the performance evalua-
tion of E2E-SDS systems based on realistic sharing models, two methods are
presented.e analytical method yields results that are suciently accurate in
many cases. However, the method can hardly be applied if the performance
of a certain sharing operation depends on more than one sharing model pa-
rameter. To cope with this issue, a simulative performance evaluation method
was developed. e simulative method species a uniform abstraction layer
for all modeled E2E-SDS protocols. It supports all cryptographic primitives
that are common in E2E-SDS protocols today, i.e., encryption with symmetric
and asymmetric ciphers and digital signatures.e method was implemented
by building a simulator.
e sharing models and methods just introduced are applied in this thesis in the
following ways:
– Performance evaluation of E2E-SDS protocols based on traditional cryp-
tography: e real-world performance of a set of E2E-SDS protocols that
leverage only traditional cryptography is evaluated in depth. In the context
of this thesis, the term traditional cryptography refers to symmetric and asym-
metric cryptography that produces ciphertexts dedicated to a single recipient
only. e performance evaluation is carried out based on the results of cryp-
tography benchmarks that were performed on low-end and mid-range user
client devices.
e performance evaluation of a common E2E-SDS protocol shows that ma-
jor performance penalties hit users that manage group memberships in large
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user groups, i.e., user groups with a few thousand or more members. Possible
solutions to decrease the performance penalties of group membership man-
agement are oered by the research area of Group Key Management that aims
at an ecient distribution and renewal of cryptographic keys within groups.
For this reason, the common E2E-SDS protocol is enhanced with a promis-
ing Group Key Management approach. e performance evaluation shows
that with this enhancement, the performance penalties for the management of
group memberships in large user groups are decreased signicantly.
– Performance evaluation of E2E-SDS protocols based on Attribute-Based
Encryption: Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) allows to dedicate a single ci-
phertext to multiple recipients which, at the rst glance, promises to enable
resource-saving SDS systems in terms of ciphertexts that have to be generated
and distributed. However, many of the ABE schemes proposed so far are cen-
tralized, i.e., they rely on a central party that is able to decrypt any ciphertext in
the system. To achieve E2E-SDS using ABE, an ABE approach was identied
that oers end-to-end security.is approach was transformed to an E2E-SDS
system that is capable of supporting named user groups, resulting in dierent
implementation variants.e performance of these variants was evaluated in
depth, again based on real-world sharing model instances. A part of the per-
formance evaluation was the implementation and benchmarking of the ABE
protocol on mid-range user client devices based on Android.
– Design and performance evaluation of an E2E-SDS protocol without joint
authorizationoperations:e E2E-SDSprotocols proposed in literature lever-
age joint authorization operations, which require that the involved users are
reachable in the network and able to allocate the necessary computational re-
sources immediately upon request. In this thesis, an E2E-SDS system is pre-
sented that realizes the support for named user groups without joint autho-
rization operations. e performance of this protocol is simulatively evalu-
ated based on real-world sharing models. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the
performance of the most computing-intensive operations is assessed based on
synthetic sharing model instances.
e contributions of this thesis have partially been presented before in the follow-
ing publications:
Holger Ku¨hner and Hannes Hartenstein. Schlu¨sselverwaltung fu¨r sichere Grup-
peninteraktionen u¨ber beliebigen Speicheranbietern : ein U¨berblick. In 6. DFN Fo-
rum Kommunikationstechnologien, pages 119–129, 2013
Holger Kuehner and Hannes Hartenstein. Spoilt for Choice: Graph-based Assess-
ment of Key Management Protocols to Share Encrypted Data (poster paper). In
Proceedings of the 4th ACMConference on Data and Application Security and Privacy
(CODASPY ’14), pages 147–150, 2014
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Holger Kuehner and Hannes Hartenstein. On the Resource Consumption of Se-
cureData Sharing. InProceedings of the 2015 IEEE International SymposiumonRecent
Advances of Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (RATSP
’15), pages 880–889, 2015
Holger Kuehner andHannes Hartenstein. Decentralized Secure Data Sharing with
Attribute-Based Encryption: A Resource Consumption Analysis. In 4th ACM Inter-
national Workshop on Security in Cloud Computing (SCC ’16), pages 74–81, 2016
KevinKoerner,HolgerKuehner, JuliaNeudecker,HannesHartenstein, andomas
Walter. Bewertungskriterien und ihre Anwendung zur Evaluation und Entwicklung
sicherer Sync&Share-Dienste. In 8. DFN-ForumKommunikationstechnologien, pages
71–82, 2015
1.3 Thesis Outline
In Chapter 2, necessary fundamentals on authorization models, SDS protocols and
performance evaluation are provided. Chapter 3 introducesworkloads as a formaliza-
tion of sharing models. Workloads constitute the basis for the analytical and simula-
tive performance evaluation methods, which are introduced in Chapter 4. In Chap-
ter 5, the performance of E2E-SDS protocols that demand joint authorization op-
erations is evaluated. e evaluation comprises protocols that are based on tradi-
tional cryptography, as well as protocols based on Attribute-Based Encryption. A
novel E2E-SDS protocol that works without joint authorization operations is pre-
sented in Chapter 6.e thesis is summarized and concluded in Chapter 7.
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In this chapter, the challenges that arise in the design and performance evaluation
of End-to-End Secure Data Sharing (E2E-SDS) protocols are discussed in detail. For
this purpose, existing E2E-SDS protocols are presented, their limitations with re-
gard to the support of certain authorization models are shown, and the challenges in
evaluating their real-world performance are analyzed.
In Section 2.1, the basic entities within a sharing system are introduced, and vari-
ous authorization models for data sharing are discussed. An analysis of the autho-
rization model of some exemplary sharing systems motivates the support for named
user groups, which are an essential feature of the authorization model that is pre-
dominantly used in this thesis.
Section 2.2 introduces the notion of SDS protocols, which is further rened by
the notion of E2E-SDS protocols. SDS protocols are presented that are based on
traditional cryptographic primitives, and these protocols are analyzed with regard to
the support of named user groups. Basic mechanisms used in these protocols serve
as building blocks for the protocols that are evaluated in this thesis.
In Section 2.3, the novel cryptographic primitive of Attribute-Based Encryption is
introduced, which enables to build ciphertexts that are dedicated to multiple recip-
ients instead of a single one. e evolution of SDS approaches based on Attribute-
Based Encryption is sketched, and open issues are identied.
In Section 2.4, performance evaluation methods are discussed in the context of
SDS protocols. Amajor requirement for an evaluation of the real-world performance
are realistic sharing and usage scenarios that reect the behavior of the users in the
system. Dierent approaches tomodel the sharing and usage behavior are presented,
especially workloads as a basic model that combines sharing and usage models. As
realistic workloads cannot be built from traces of real-world systems in any case, the
challenges of generating synthetic workloads are discussed.
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2.1 Authorization Models for Data Sharing
Sharing data is always related to some concept of who should be able to access the
data, and who should not. Sometimes this conception might be rather fuzzy, when
data is shared publicly with some target audience like “potential customers” in mind.
In other cases, however, the conception is very specic, with a clearly dened group
of recipients, and the goal to protect the data from inspection by any non-recipient.
In the latter cases, the access to the shared data has to be controlled.
Access control for data sharing can be considered at dierent abstraction levels.
One approach for dierentiating between these abstraction levels is provided by the
OM-AM framework [San00].e acronymOM-AM denotes the four layers that are
incorporated by the framework:e most abstract layer is the objective layer, which
describes recipients and non-recipients in non-technical terms as a high-level pol-
icy. Access controlmodels dene how the group of recipients can be specied [Ben06].
While these two upper layers specify what should be achieved, the lower layers ar-
chitecture and mechanism state how the access control objectives are achieved, i.e.
how access control is enforced. E2E-SDS protocols are located at the architecture and
mechanism layer. In this section, some access control models will be discussed that
can build the basis for SDS protocols.
In the recent decades, a plethora of access controlmodels was presented that can be
used for data sharing. Among the most popular and widely deployed access control
models for data sharing are Discretionary Access Control (DAC), Mandatory Access
Control (MAC), Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), and Attribute-Based Access
Control (ABAC), which will be discussed in the following. Note that the scope of
these access control models is not restricted to data access, but these models can be
applied to control access to resources in a broader sense, including, e.g., access to
services or hardware.
Before a discussion of the dierent access control models, some related terms have
to be claried. An entity is “a person, organization, soware program, machine, or
other thing making a request to access a resource” [Win05]. A digital identity is a
digital representation of a real-world entity in the context of a certain access control
domain. In this thesis, the term user is used as a synonym for digital identity. A
user is described by a set of attributes [DH08]. e attributes can be naturally re-
lated to a user or the entity behind, respectively, such as date of birth, but can also
be assigned by an authority, such as “is student at a certain university”. Typically,
at least one attribute constitutes an identier, i.e., it “unambiguously distinguishes
one entity from another one in a given domain” [ISO11a]. Note that an entity might
hold a multitude of corresponding users, even within one access control domain.
e objects of the access control model are resources. In the context of this thesis,
a resource represents the smallest chunk of data that access can be granted to inde-
pendently from other resources.
Discretionary Access Control (DAC, cf. [Ben06]) is based on two main principles:
First, any resource in the system ismanaged by one ormore dedicated users, denoted
as resource owners. e resource owner is responsible for granting access to the re-
source for other users. Second, permissions can be assigned to other users in a ne-
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Figure 2.1: Entities and their relations in the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
model. Roles are assigned to users and permissions. Permissions describe operations
on objects. Source: [SCFY96]
grained manner by specifying direct relations between users and resources [TCS85].
ese resulting permissions are typically abstracted as an access controlmatrix, where
a row represents a user, a column represents a resource, and a cell contains the set of
permissions that the associated user is granted on the associated resource.ere are
two general implementation alternatives for the access control matrix: Access control
lists represent the subjects that are allowed to access a resource from the perspective
of a resource, while capabilities list the accessible resources from the perspective of
a subject. DAC is in widespread use today, for example, in commodity operating
systems, such as Windows and Linux, but also in recent Sync&Share services.
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [TCS85] is oen thought of as counterpart of
DAC, aswhen facilitatingMAC, the access permissions are determined by the system
administrator rather than by the users. For this purpose, the administrator assigns
sensitivity labels to each subject and object in the access control domain.e labels
are usually ordered in a hierarchy, constituting classication levels. One instantiation
of MAC is the famous Bell-LaPadula model [BP76]. is model stipulates that a
user is allowed to read a resource if her classication level is greater than or equal
to the classication level of the resource. On the opposite, a user is only allowed
to write a resource if the classication level of the user is less than or equal to the
classication level of the resource.is principle is oen summarized as “read down,
write up” [Ben06], and should prevent a user from leaking sensitive information by
moving the information from a sensitive resource to a less sensitive one.
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) was proposed by Ferraiolo et al. [FBK92] and
rened by Sandhu et al. [SCFY96] in the 1990s. RBAC is based on the concept
of roles, which link a set of users to a set of permissions these users are granted.
e objective of RBAC is to reduce the management eort that is necessary for the
potentially numerous permissions that DAC might require. Further renements of
RBAC [SFK00, FSG+01] nally lead to aNIST standard [INC04] that species RBAC
as family of access control models with core RBAC as the basic model (cf. Figure 2.1,
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which was extended by two more expressive models: Hierarchical RBAC enables to
build a hierarchy of roles, and permissions are inherited along the hierarchy. Role
hierarchies are typically used to resemble an organizational hierarchies and respon-
sibilities, for example, the manager role might inherit the permissions of the clerk
role. Conditional RBAC allows to express conditions on the assignment of users to
roles.emost prominent applications of Conditional RBAC are Static andDynamic
Separation of Duties [AS99, AS00], which enable to dene restrictions regarding the
role combinations that a user is allowed to possess or activate at the same time.e
deployment of RBAC bears the challenge of dening appropriate roles, which essen-
tially can be done by inspecting the existing responsibilities within the organization,
or by analyzing the existing access control matrix. Both approaches are extensively
discussed in research [LY14]. RBAC is employed today on a broad basis [LO10], and
is part of commodity le systems like NFSv4 or CIFS, which are presented later in
this section.
Attribute-BasedAccess Control (ABAC, cf. [HFK+14]) is amore recent development.
In ABAC, authorization decisions are based on the attributes of users and resources,
and possibly also on attributes of the environment, such as time of day. ABAC can
be considered as generalization of DAC or RBAC, since attributes can be used to
represent identities or roles. ABAC allows to construct complex access policies out
of attributes and Boolean operators, and is thus considered a exible and expressive
access control model, especially in distributed environments [YT05]. However, the
comparatively high expressiveness may render the analysis of eective user permis-
sions problematic [KCW10]. As of its strength with regard to distributed environ-
ments, ABAC is employed, for example, for sharing research data within scientic
communities [Sch15].
In summary, the “big four” access control models form the basis for many concrete
sharing systems. In many cases, sharing systems do not implement one of these ac-
cess control models in its pure form, but combine, extend and adapt these models
for their purposes.ere are more access control models that describe or inuence
current sharing systems. An exemplary one is presented in the following.
Group-Centric Secure Information Sharing (g-SIS) [KSNW09, KNSW11] was intro-
duced as a framework that species access control semantics based on the notion of
groups. In the context of g-SIS, a group comprises users and resources. An impor-
tant aspect of g-SIS is time: Users join and leave a group at certain points in time,
and the same applies for resource additions and removals. Each of these actions can
be carried out in a liberal or a strict variant. To decide whether a certain group user
is authorized to access a certain group resource, the history of join, leave, add and re-
move actions of the user and the resource, as well as the respective variant, are taken
into account. Figure 2.2 shows some exemplary sequences of these actions for only
one user and one resource. A thick line visualizes the time frame the user is allowed
to access the resource. When comparing, e.g., the second and third line of Figure 2.2,
it can be seen that a user that was strictly joined is not allowed to access a resource
that was added to the group before. However, if the user was joined liberally, she
may access the resource if the resource was also added liberally. Some extensions for
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Figure 2.2: Exemplary sequences of g-SIS actions for a single user and a single re-
source. Time frames in which the user has access to the resource are highlighted.
g-SIS were proposed, e.g., a generalization for multiple groups and relations between
these groups was discussed [SKNW10]. Furthermore, data structures necessary to
save and look up the operation history [KS11] as well as enforcement mechanisms
for g-SIS [KS09] were proposed. It was shown that g-SIS might not strictly be more
expressive than RBAC, but be more ecient in group-centric sharing scenarios re-
garding, e.g., the size of the access control state [GQL14].e advantage of g-SIS in
the context of E2E-SDS is that it represents a unied framework for describing and
comparing the access control models that underlie many E2E-SDS protocols.
An access control model can only be employed in combination with an adminis-
trative model. Administrative models can be considered special instances of access
control models that exclusively deal with administrative permissions, i.e., with per-
missions regarding changes of the access control state. In other words, an adminis-
trativemodel species formalisms that are used to dene the subjects that are allowed
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to change certain parts of the access control state. WhileDAC andMACare bound to
administrative models adhering to certain paradigms by their very denition, RBAC
and ABAC are not restricted to certain administrative models. As a consequence, a
bunch of administrative models was introduced especially with regard to RBAC, for
example, ARBAC97 proposed by Sandhu et al. [SBM99]. A major challenge in the
design of administrative models is to “provide a mechanism for dening adminis-
trative domains” [SBM99], i.e., to dene subsets of the access control state in a man-
ageable way. ARBAC97 addresses this challenge by distinguishing between the man-
agement of user-role assignments and the management of role-permission assign-
ments, which is reected in the denition of two separate partial models,URA97 for
user-role assignments and PRA97 for permission-role assignments.is distinction
is also an important aspect of the authorization model used in this thesis (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1). e term authorization model denotes the combination of access control
model and administrative model.
To show some concrete instantiations of the authorizationmodels described above,
the respective models of the le systems NFSv4 and CIFS are presented in the fol-
lowing. NFSv4 is a distributed le system that is widely deployed in Unix-based IT
environments. It is usually implemented on top of an existing local le system. In
NFSv4 [HN15], les anddirectories can be protected usingAccess Control Lists (ACLs).
An entry in this list (Access Control Entry, ACE) either allows or explicitly denies the
execution of a set of operations, such as read, write, add or delete, for a certain sub-
ject. Subjects can be both users and named user groups, which will be introduced
shortly. NFSv4 also supports inheritance of access permissions along the directory
structure, i.e., an ACE on a directory can be agged to be valid for all les in the
directory, or recursively for all subdirectories. In addition, NFSv4 oers traditional
UNIX access control, where the access control subjects are constituted of the resource
owner, the resource owner’s primary group, and everyone. In summary, NFSv4 di-
rectly implements DAC, and the support for user groups enables a combination of
NFSv4 and RBAC.
Another popular distributed le system is CIFS [Mic11a], which can be considered
theWindows analog to NFS. CIFS shares its access control model with its extensions
SMBv1 [Mic11b], SMBv2 and v3 [Mic11c]. Similar to NFSv4, access permissions are
stored within an ACL, which is part of the so-called security descriptor (cf. [Mic14]).
e content of a CIFS ACE is very similar to that of an NFSv4 ACE, containing fa-
cilities to dene a set of allowed or denied operations for a certain subject, where
subjects can be users or named user groups. Inheritance of access permissions is
supported as well. Opposed to NFSv4, CIFS does not oer facilities for a traditional
UNIX access control. Similar to NFSv4, CIFS supports DAC, and the support for
named user groups allows to combine CIFS with RBAC. When used on recent Win-
dows versions, CIFS includes a MAC implementation, which is restricted to a pre-
dened set of security labels though.
Both the authorization models of NFSv4 and of CIFS show strong similarities to
the authorizationmodel that is used in this thesis (cf. Section 3.1). A central feature of
this authorizationmodel is the support for named user groups.e essential property
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of these user groups is that they are not existing only in the context of permissions
on a set of resources. erefore, named user groups are not implicitly dened by
the associated permissions. Instead, named user groups are independent entities
that can be granted data access via a group handle. e user that manages group
memberships is referred to as group owner in this thesis.
e concept of named user groups is closely related to that of roles in RBAC:ey
are similar in that they exist even without any assigned permissions, and that in gen-
eral, access for either named user groups and roles can be granted to arbitrary re-
sources. e dierence between named user groups and roles is a rather seman-
tic one: While roles are thought to comprise a set of users and a set of permis-
sions, named user groups describe only the set of users, but not the assigned per-
missions [San96].
e need to control the usage of data aer sharing lead to a recent shi in the re-
search area of access control towards usage control. Usage control essentially extends
access control with a continuous control of access permissions.us, access permis-
sions are not only checked at the time of the access request, but are continuously
checked during resource usage. e UCON [PS02, PS04] model formalizes usage
control. Essential parts of UCON are Authorizations, Obligations and Conditions:
While authorizations reect traditional access control rules based on the attributes
of subjects and objects, obligations require a subject to take some action before ac-
cessing the resource. Conditions are subject- and object-independent properties of
the environment that impact the usage control decision. Each of these parts can
be evaluated or enforced at access time or at usage time. A usage control model
might support only a subset of these parts or evaluation options, resulting in a vari-
ety of possible usage control models. Models for usage control in distributed envi-
ronments [PHB06, Pre09] were also proposed. An important application for usage
control is Digital Rights Management (DRM) [PHS+08].e enforcement of usage
control is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.2 SDS Protocols Using Traditional Cryptography
In this section, the necessary terminology regarding the context of Secure Data Shar-
ing (SDS) is introduced, and existing SDS protocols are presented.
In existing literature, no denition of Secure Data Sharing (SDS) could be found
that is both precise and comprehensive. Nonetheless, the prevalent meaning of SDS
can roughly be paraphrased with “using cryptography to enable data sharing over
a storage provider while the storage provider is prevented from inspecting the data
or from tampering with the data”. us, the central security objectives of SDS are
condentiality, which is dened as “Property that information is not made available
or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes.” [ISO14], or integrity,
which is dened as follows: “Integrity of data is ensured if it is impossible to insert,
manipulate or delete data without authorization and detection” [Eck12].
e object of study of this thesis are cryptographic protocols that enable SDS. In gen-
eral, “a cryptographic protocol is dened as a series of steps and message exchanges
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between multiple entities in order to achieve a specic security objective” [Sch03].
us, in this thesis, a cryptographic protocol is considered an SDS protocol if it strives
to protect the condentiality or integrity of the shared data with regard to a storage
provider that is not fully trusted.
In this context, a storage provider is considered as network-reachable service that
allows to store and retrieve opaque data. From the perspective of an SDSprotocol, the
internal organization of the storage provider is usually transparent, i.e., the storage
provider might be realized as a single server, as a cloud of virtual machine instances,
or even as a distributed storage service that is maintained by a large number of peers.
An important part of each SDS protocol is the accompanying trust model. e
trust model species the amount of trust that entities put into one another regarding
a specic security objective. Typically, SDS protocols assume that users’ trust in the
storage provider is limited with regard to a security objective, such as condentiality
or integrity. An example for an entity with limited trust is an honest but curious entity,
which is assumed to carry out each step of the cryptographic protocol honestly, but
is suspected to inspect data without authorization.
e denition of End-to-End Secure Data Sharing (E2E-SDS) protocols further re-
stricts the denition of SDS protocols in terms of trust in parties external to the group
of sharing users: E2E-SDS protocols leverage cryptography to ensure that “no-one,
other than the data owner and the members of the [sharing] group, should gain
access to the data, including the Cloud Service Provider” [TCNC14] 1. Note that
this denition implies the enforcement of both condentiality and integrity by cryp-
tography, thus, the enforcement of just one of these two security objectives is no
longer sucient.
From a trust perspective, the denition of E2E-SDS stipulates that only the mem-
bers of the sharing user group are trusted with regard to condentiality and integrity
of the shared data. As a consequence, not only the storage provider must be pre-
vented by technical means from inspecting or altering the data, but anyone apart
from the sharing user group must be prevented.is requires that the authorization
is carried out solely by users who are allowed to access the data anyway, without the
help of any additional entity that has to be trusted. e access control enforcement
also has to be carried out solely by the users by means of cryptography, as in any
other case, the additional entity that is to enforce access control could collaborate
with some non-authorized user to grant access to this user.
Note thatwhile E2E-SDSprotocols exist that guarantee condentiality and integrity
in such “low-trust” environments, practical SDS systems usually strive to achieve full
data security [Shi00], which additionally includes availability of the data shared over
the storage provider. Availability is dened as “property of being accessible and us-
able upon demand by an authorized entity” [ISO14]. Availability of the data on the
storage provider can hardly be guaranteed bymeans of cryptography.us, all of the
E2E-SDS protocols presented and discussed in this thesis are based on the assump-
1As this denition refers to Secure Data Sharing in the original publication, it excludes many
protocols that are referred to as Secure Data Sharing protocols by their designers. us, it can be
considered more appropriate for End-to-End Secure Data Sharing, which is the case in this thesis.
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tion that the users put trust in the storage provider with regard to availability.
Because of the relaxed denition of SDS compared to E2E-SDS, many of the SDS
protocols presented in this section do not constitute E2E-SDS protocols in a strict
sense. e presented SDS protocols can nonetheless be used as a basis that can be
enhanced to an E2E-SDS protocol, or provide valuable building blocks that can be
composed to E2E-SDS protocols.
While condentiality and integrity are essential security objectives for both SDS
and E2E-SDS, there are a lot more security objectives that are neither required by
SDS nor by E2E-SDS, according to the denitions given above. Nonetheless, many
SDS protocols put a focus on such additional security properties, which oen consti-
tutes the major dierentiator to other SDS protocols. One example for an additional
security properties is privacy as “the right of individuals to control or inuence what
information related to themmay be collected and stored and by whom and to whom
that information may be disclosed” [Shi00]. A further example is accountability as
“the property of a system (including all of its system resources) that ensures that the
actions of a system entity may be traced uniquely to that entity, which can be held
responsible for its actions” [Shi00]. Security objectives apart from condentiality
and integrity are beyond the scope of this thesis.
From an access control perspective, SDS protocols can be classied as architec-
ture or enforcement mechanism within the OM-AM framework (cf. Section 2.1). In
a broader scope, unauthorized access to shared data can be seen as an information
security risk [ISO11c].erefore, from a risk management perspective, an SDS pro-
tocol constitutes a measure to mitigate a risk, i.e., to reduce the likelihood of risk
occurrence.
e employment of SDS protocols for providing condentiality or integrity of the
shared data is recommended in various guidelines for a secure usage of cloud re-
sources. For example, the Cloud Security Alliance proposes end-to-end encryption
of data as preferred method to protect data that is to be moved to the cloud [All14].
e German “Bundesamt fu¨r Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik” (BSI) demands
that “to store, process and transport sensitive information in a secure manner, ade-
quate cryptographic methods and products should be employed.” [BSI11]. As a nal
example, theUS-American “National Institute of Standards and Technology” (NIST)
states with regard to data protection: “A guiding principle is for employees of the or-
ganization to be in control of the central keying material and to congure the key
management components for cloud-based applications” [JG11].
2.2.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Cryptographic primitives are the basic building blocks of any E2E-SDS protocol.
e protocols presented in this section essentially employwell-known cryptographic
primitives, such as symmetric and asymmetric encryption, digital signatures and
Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Codes, which are briey introduced in this
subsection. ese cryptographic primitives are referred to as traditional cryptogra-
phy in this thesis. Protocols based on the more recent cryptographic primitive of
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Attribute-Based Encryption are presented in Section 2.3.
For using symmetric ciphers, all parties that exchange encrypted information share
a common cryptographic key.is key is employed both for encryption and decryp-
tion. Apopular symmetric cipher is theAdvancedEncryption Standard (AES) [AES01],
which was standardized by NIST in 2001. AES is a block cipher, i.e., it requires that
plain text data is fragmented into blocks of equal size before encryption. e block
size supported by AES is 128 bits, while keys with a length of 128, 192 or 256 bits
are allowed. At least up to 2015, no practical attacks that enable to decrypt AES-
encrypted data without knowledge of the symmetric key were known, apart from
so-called “related-key attacks” against AES with key lengths of 192 or 256 bit [BK09].
Hardware implementations of AES are broadly discussed in research [HHH07], and
realized in commodity consumer devices2.
Asymmetric ciphers employ a key pair for both the encrypting and the decrypting
party [Eck12]. A key pair consists of a public key that can be published freely and is
required for encryption, and a private key that has to be kept secret and is used for
decryption. A widely deployed asymmetric cipher is RSA, which is named aer its
designers Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman[RSA78]. e combination of RSA and the
OAEP padding was proven to yield indistinguishable ciphertexts under an adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2 secure) in the random oraclemodel and under
the RSA assumption [FOPS01], which in turn relies on the wide-spread assumption
that factoring integers is a hard problem [vTJ11].
Many of the SDS protocols introduced in this section are based on hybrid encryp-
tion, i.e., the shared data is symmetrically encrypted, and the symmetric encryption
key is asymmetrically encrypted for condential distribution.
Digital signature schemes are used to protect the authenticity and integrity of data.
ese schemes employ asymmetric cryptography, where the private key is used for
data signing, and the public key is required for the verication of the signature. While
digital signatures schemes strive to make even the smallest changes on the data de-
tectable in general, some existing schemes allow for a set of dened and controlled
changes to the data without invalidating the signature. For example, with sanitizable
signatures [ACdMT05], designated blocks of the signed data can be changed by cer-
tain parties without invalidating the signature, while redactable signatures [JMSW02]
are valid even when dened parts of the signed data are removed. RSA can be used
as a signature scheme as well. Some more recent signature schemes, such as the El-
liptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [ANS05], leverage the assumption
that the discrete logarithm problem is hard to solve in elliptic curves, which are a
special kind of algebraic groups. EC-DSA achieves a security level similar to RSA
with shorter key lengths [BSI16], and requires less computation time to generate and
validate signatures [GGCS02]. While a growing number of applications of Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) can be observed, such as the German electronic pass-
port [BSI15], the USNational Security Agency does not recommend tomigrate exist-
ing cryptography solutions to ECC, claiming that the advent of quantum computers
renders ECC vulnerable [KM15].
2https://www.apple.com/business/docs/iOS_Security_Guide.pdf
18
2 Fundamentals and RelatedWork
e integrity of data can also be protected using Keyed-Hash Message Authentica-
tion Codes (HMACs) [KBC97]. HMACs are based on symmetric cryptography, and
the symmetric key is required for both generation and verication. Opposed to a
digital signature, an HMAC cannot be veried by the public.
e combination of encrypting and signing data to protect data condentiality
as well as data authenticity and integrity is a common use case. However, crypto-
graphic primitives have to be combined with caution to form more sophisticated
security mechanisms, as the security mechanism might not provide security prop-
erties that each cryptographic primitive provides in isolation (cf. [Can01]). In the
case of encryption and signing, the order of applying encryption and signature, i.e.,
encrypt-then-sign or sign-then-encrypt, has some security implications. For example,
encrypt-then-sign can render a cipher that is IND-CCA2 secure in isolation unse-
cure [ADR02]. As another example, encrypt-then-sign does not prevent an eaves-
dropper from replacing the original signature of the ciphertext by a self-generated
one, thus, impersonating the originator of the data. On the other hand, sign-then-
encrypt allows the recipient to encrypt the signed data with another key and forward
the data to a third party, which might be tricked into believing that it is the recip-
ient that was intended by the originator [Dav01]. Whether one of these scenarios
is regarded a security issue, depends on the concrete application. Some public key
schemes were proposed that combine encryption and signing [PSST11].
2.2.2 SDS Protocols with Focus on Confidentiality
SDS protocols that are based on traditional cryptography as introduced in the pre-
vious subsection require an initial exchange of cryptographic keys. e initial key
exchange is typically not specied within the SDS protocol itself, but is considered
as prerequisite for all protocol steps. As a consequence, the specication of an SDS
protocol usually only includes a set of requirements on the initial key exchange, but
does not dene mechanisms or processes to achieve these requirements. For the
initial key exchange, well-known mechanisms are widely deployed in an organiza-
tional or enterprise context: Kerberos [NYHR93] enables the pairwise exchange of
symmetric keys, while Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) (cf. [Eck12]) facilitate an au-
thentic distribution of public keys. e design of key exchange mechanisms that
might be accepted by users also in rather personal use cases is ongoing research.
Recent approaches allow, for example, to exchange keys by means of QR codes in a
peer-to-peer fashion [KW14].
e basic working principle of almost any SDS protocol that strives to ensure con-
dentiality is to encrypt the shared data with a data encryption key, and to enable
each authorized user to “infer” this data encryption key by means of the keys that
resulted from the initial key exchange.e process of key inference might span sev-
eral “intermediate” keys, resulting in key cascades that start at an initially exchanged
key and nish at a data encryption key.
As these key cascades are interconnected, the totality of key cascades can be con-
ceptually considered as directed graph, where the keys constitute the graph nodes,
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Figure 2.3: Visualization of a key graph. k-nodes correspond to cryptographic keys,
u-nodes to users. Source: [WGL98]
and an edge connects one key to another i the key at the end of the edge can be
inferred from the key at the edge start. Users can be brought in as further node type,
where a user node is connected to a key node i the user knows the key. is type
of graph was introduced as key graph in [WGL98]. An exemplary instance of a key
graph is depicted in Figure 2.3. From a key graph perspective, the technical objective
of an SDS protocols is to build and maintain the key graph in a way that the target
authorization state is preserved at every point in time.
ere are dierent ways for SDS protocols to implement key inference based on
cryptographic primitives. Basically, there are mechanisms that enable one key to be
inferred from another one without the need for any additional information, e.g., by
applying a hash function to the key [HBB07]. In other cases, additional informa-
tion is required to infer one key from another, e.g., the public key of the resource
owner [KRS+03, FKK06] or a public “broadcast” [CC89, ZDB08, SNPB10]. Many
of these key inference mechanism use cryptographic primitives that go beyond tra-
ditional cryptography as presented in the previous subsection. However, key in-
ference can be implemented based on traditional cryptography by leveraging so-
called lockboxes.
Lockboxes enable key inference by encrypting one key with another one. us,
the encrypted key can be retrieved with the knowledge of both the encrypting key
and the lockbox. A lockbox can be generated by a symmetric encryption of either a
symmetric key or an asymmetric key pair, and also by an asymmetric encryption of a
symmetric key.e asymmetric encryption of an asymmetric key pair is not possible
in any case: With padded RSA, for example, a plaintext of a given size cannot be
encrypted with a key of the same size. From a key graph perspective, a lockbox can
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be considered as a realization of a key graph edge.
A comparatively simple and introductory example of a lockbox-based SDS proto-
col is the Encrypted File System (EFS) [Cro02]. is protocol demands the resource
owner to encrypt the resource with a symmetric key, and then generate a lockbox by
encrypting this symmetric key with her personal public key.ereaer, both the en-
crypted resource and the lockbox are uploaded to the storage provider.e resource
owner grants access to the resource for another user by generating another lockbox
that encrypts the symmetric encryption key with the public key of this user. One
shortcoming of EFS is that it does not protect the integrity of lockboxes. is pro-
tection is necessary to prevent an attacker from replacing genuine lockboxes with
forged ones that provide attacker-chosen keys to potential writers of the resource.
is attack will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.2. In the following, it is
described how this vulnerability and further issues are addressed by more sophis-
ticated SDS protocols.
One of the earliest lockbox-based SDS protocols is SiRiUS [GSMB03].e protocol
protects both the condentiality and integrity of the shared data. SiRiUS will be pre-
sented in detail, asmany building blocks of SiRiUS are incorporated into other proto-
cols.
Using SiRiUS, each resource owner manages a dedicated resource tree, i.e., the re-
sources are organized in a hierarchical structure, and access permissions are prop-
agated along the hierarchy (cf. NFSv4 and CIFS as described in Section 2.1). e
resource owner is the only user that grants or revokes access to her resources, i.e.,
SiRiUS implements a discretionary access control model.
SiRiUS requires an authentic and integer distribution of asymmetric public keys,
which could be carried out, e.g., by leveraging a PKI.is requires that each user
generates a personal asymmetric key pair up front.e basic working mechanism of
SiRiUS is that the resources itself are symmetrically encrypted and digitally signed,
and the encrypted resource and the signature are uploaded to the storage provider.
Both the symmetric encryption key and the asymmetric private signing key are en-
crypted with the public key of each permitted user, and these lockboxes are also
uploaded to the storage provider. In the following, the required steps will be pre-
sented in more detail.
Figure 2.4 visualizes the status of the storage provider (le) and the client of the
resource owner (right), who is denoted as User A, aer the initial upload of a re-
source.e encrypted resource is stored on the storage provider as data le, the dig-
ital signature is appended. Each data le is accompanied by a metadata le, which
forms the container for all lockboxes that are related to the encrypted resource, and
for the public signing key. As SiRiUS is implemented as an overlay for an existing
le system, from the storage provider’s view, both data le and metadata le con-
stitute regular les.
On the user client of the resource owner, the personal key pair UA, the le en-
cryption key FEK, and the le signing key pair FSK are stored. e metadata le
contains two lockboxes: Both the le encryption key and the private part of the le
signing key pair are encrypted with the public part of the personal key pair of the
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Figure 2.4: Visualization of keys and lockboxes generated by the SiRiUS protocol
aer an encrypted data le was uploaded.
resource owner.is allows the resource owner to retrieve the respective keys when
the resource should be read or written at a later point time, thus omitting the lo-
cal caching of these keys. In addition, the public part of the le signing key pair is
contained within the metadata le, as this key is required by any reader of the re-
source to validate the signature.
e status of the storage provider aer read and write permissions are granted to
User B is shown in Figure 2.5. For granting read access, the le encryption key is
encrypted with the personal public key ofUser B, and the resulting lockbox is added
to the metadata le. Additional write access is granted by encrypting the private part
of the le signing key pair with the personal public key of User B.
To revoke the access rights of a user, all resource-specic keys that are known to
this user have to be renewed, i.e., the keys have to be replaced by newly generated
ones.e consequence of renewing the le encryption key is that each lockbox that
encrypts this key must be recreated. e same applies for the le signing key pair.
Moreover, to immediately revoke read access, the encrypted data itself must also be
re-encrypted with the new le encryption key. is means that the data le must
be downloaded from the storage provider, decrypted with the old le encryption
key, then encrypted with the new le encryption key, and nally uploaded to the
storage provider. is cumbersome mechanism for revocation enforcement is de-
noted as eager revocation in this thesis. A more resource-saving, yet less strict revo-
cation enforcement mechanism is known as lazy revocation and will be introduced
in a moment.
SiRiUS protects not only the integrity of the data le, but also the integrity of the
metadata le, bymeans of digital signatures. Although this prevents an attacker from
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Figure 2.5: Visualization of keys and lockboxes generated by the SiRiUS protocol
aer an encrypted data le was shared with another user.
simply replacing genuine lockboxes by forged ones, it still allows an attacker to “roll
back” the metadata le to a previous version, which is known as rollback attack. A
rollback attack could be carried out, e.g., by a user that formerly had write access,
with the objective to restore the write access. Rollback attacks can be fought by in-
corporating an expiration date into the signatures, and periodically refreshing the
signature before expiration.is way, a rollback attack is only possible as long as the
rolled back signature is not yet expired. For reasons of eciency, SiRiUS creates a
hierarchy of signatures along the directory hierarchy by leveraging a Merkle Hash
Tree [Mer80]. With this construction, a signature related to a directory also guaran-
tees the integrity of each le in this directory, and recursively of each subdirectory.
In summary, SiRiUS fullls all the requirements on an E2E-SDS protocol.
From a performance perspective, SiRiUS is not intended for use in large-scale sce-
narios [GSMB03], as the number of necessary lockboxes grows linearly with both
the number of les, and the number of users that are allowed to access these les.
Given that n users are allowed to read m les, a total number of n × m lockboxes
have to be generated by the resource owner. In addition, when a user is revoked read
access to all of these les, the resource owner has to recreate (n − 1) ×m lockboxes.
More recent SDS protocols strive to lower the number of required lockboxes by in-
troducing auxiliary keys for resource groups. is allows to grant a user access to
the whole resource group by generating just one single lockbox. Two examples for
such protocols are presented in the following.
Plutus [KRS+03] exhibits a feature set that is very similar to SiRiUS: Plutus supports
a discretionary authorizationmodel, oers to grant read-only access, and protects the
integrity of data and metadata. For performance reasons, Plutus enables to assemble
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les with identical permissions to legroups. Each user with read permission on the
legroup is provided with a le-lockbox key, which enables to get the encryption keys
for each le in the legroup.
To further improve performance, Plutus leverages a mechanism denoted as lazy
revocation. When lazy revocation is used, a resource owner only renews the re-
source encryption key aer user revocation. e re-encryption of the resource is
delayed until the next time the resource is written.is way, a potentially resource-
consuming re-encryption of a resource is omitted.e drawback of lazy revocation
is that from a cryptographic point of view, a revoked user can continue reading the
resource as long as its contents have not been changed.
e Cryptree [GMSW06] protocol is also based on the idea of grouping les with
identical permissions. Cryptree relies on the assumption that les within one direc-
tory tend to be accessible by the same set of users. For this reason, each directory
is related to a set of keys, which allow to derive the encryption keys for all the les
in the directory. Moreover, a directory key can be used to derive the directory keys
of each subdirectory, which makes it possible to recursively retrieve the encryption
keys for all the les in all the subdirectories.
2.2.3 Named User Groups and Joint Authorization Operations
e SDS protocols presented in the previous subsection—EFS, SiRiUS, Plutus and
Cryptree—implement a discretionary access controlmodel, i.e., neither of these pro-
tocols supports named user groups. In this section, some SDS protocols are pre-
sented that oer to grant access permissions to named user groups.
e support for named user groups bears a challenge. To support named user
groups, authorization operations are required to manage group memberships, i.e.,
to add a user to and remove a member from a group.ese authorization operations
are initiated by the respective group owner. However, the operations might require
the renewal of keys that are managed by a resource owners, which means that these
keys are clearly related to one or more resources instead of a user or a named user
group. As an example, when a member is removed from a group, the encryption
keys of all resources the group is allowed to access have to be renewed. is brings
up the question who should be responsible for renewing resource-related keys aer
a group member removal.
In existing SDS protocols, the support for named user groups was implemented
essentially in one of two ways: Either the renewal of resource-related keys aer a
group member removal was simply skipped.is obviously weakens security, as the
removed user is cryptographically able to access the data until the resource-related
key is renewed for another reason.
e alternative way to implement support for named user groups are joint autho-
rization operation. In this thesis, the term indicates that a single authorization op-
eration is carried out by at least two dierent entities in a collaborative manner. An
operation is only considered as joint operation if every entity that is involved car-
ries out some cryptographic operations that lead to changes in the key graph. is
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restriction prevents that, e.g., the generation and upload of a lockbox is considered
as joint authorization operation, although it involves two parties: the lockbox cre-
ator and the storage provider.
Joint authorization operations require that all involved entities are reachable in the
network, and are ready to carry out possibly computation-intensive cryptographic
operations. Both aspects can be problematic especially when mobile devices are in-
volved.e reachability of a mobile device can be limited in many situations, e.g., if
the device is located inside a train or an airplane. Potentially computation-intensive
cryptographic operations might inuence the responsibility of the device.erefore,
in this thesis, only protocols are considered that strive for minimizing the employ-
ment of joint authorization operations.
Cepheus [Fu99] is an SDS protocol that uses joint authorization operations to sup-
port named user groups. Cepheus is based on the traditional Unix owner-group-
world access control model (cf. Section 2.1), i.e., Cepheus does not enable the re-
source owner to share datawith arbitrary groups. To remove amember from a group,
Cepheus requires the group owner to renew the group-related keys rst.ereaer,
all resource owners who granted access to the group have to be informed about the
revocation. Each of these resource owners has to renew the resource-related keys of
any resource that the group is allowed to access.
Other SDS protocols also support named user groups, but skip the renewal of
resource-related keys altogether. For example, the Secure File System (SFS) [HF01]
supports data sharingwith an arbitrary number of named user groups. SFS requires a
trustworthy group server, which stores all of the le-related keys, and provides them
upon authenticated request. However, a renewal of le-related keys is not discussed
at all. As another example, SNAD [MLFR01] also allows for sharing datawith an arbi-
trary number of groups, but does not oer means for a groupmember removal at all.
A further challenge that the support for named user groups brings along is the
performance of group member removal operations. A named user group is typi-
cally assigned a group key that has to be renewed when a member is removed from
the group. Using a trivial implementation, the group key is encrypted with the pub-
lic key of each group member, i.e., the number of necessary lockboxes grows lin-
early with the size of the group. In consequence, renewing the group key requires
to replace each of those lockboxes, except the one that was related to the removed
group member.
To improve the performance of renewing the group key of large groups, [GLHW12]
proposed to leverage key management approaches from domain of secure multicast,
which are known asGroup KeyManagement (GKM) approaches. A plethora of GKM
approaches was proposed in the last decades. An overview of GKM approaches and
an evaluation of such approaches with regard to their asymptotic performance is
provided in [KH13].
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2.2.4 Applications of More Enhanced Cryptography
To conclude this section, some exemplary applications of cryptographic primitives
beyond those discussed as “traditional cryptography” are introduced.
A rst application of enhanced cryptographic primitives are SDS protocols that fo-
cus on integrity.e major challenge that is addressed by many of these protocols is
data freshness, i.e., preventing an attacker from replacing the most recent state of the
data by an older state. As long as only a single user is allowed to alter the data, fresh-
ness can be achieved by a periodic refreshment of the data signatures. As already de-
scribed, this mechanism is leveraged by SiRiUS to protect the integrity of metadata.
For periodic refreshment, the refreshing user has to store a ngerprint of the most
recent state of the data on her local user client. However, when multiple users are
allowed to alter the data, a periodic refreshment of the data signatures cannot be
leveraged. is is due to the fact that none of the writing users can be sure that her
local copy of the ngerprint is still up-to-date.
In fact, it is a fundamental problem to prevent any kind of rollback attack when
multiple writing users share data without at least one trusted storage provider. It
was shown in [LKMS03] that under these conditions, the best consistency guarantee
that can be given is fork consistency, which is intuitively described as follows: “A le
system with fork consistency might conceal users’ actions from each other, but if it
does, users get divided into groups and the members of one group can no longer see
any of another group’s le system operations” [MS02].
Approaches were proposed that leverage enhanced cryptographic primitives to en-
sure fork consistency. However, these approaches exhibit major limitations. For ex-
ample, the SUNDR protocol [LKMS03] causes a potentially huge amount of network
trac that quadratically grows in size with the number of clients that share a cer-
tain resource. While the protocols introduced in [CSS07] only cause the network
trac size to grow linearly with the number of clients, they require that all users are
honest. A further limitation of these protocols is that every user has to store some
information on her local client in order to check the validity of the data on the stor-
age provider.is may especially by an issue if a user employs multiple client devices
for data sharing, as the validation information has to be synchronized between these
clients. Other protocols employ client-to-client communication to periodically syn-
chronize the most recent ngerprint of the data [SCC+10], or rely on a trusted entity
that is always reachable in the network [KWM15].
A plethora of more recent SDS protocols employ novel cryptographic primitives to
outsource some of the required cryptographic eort to the storage provider. For this
purpose, lots of protocols use proxy re-encryption [BBS98]. Given a storage provider
that stores a ciphertext decryptable with private key KA, this primitive enables the
storage provider to re-encode the ciphertext to be decryptable with another private
key KB. Protocols such as [AFGH06] use proxy re-encryption, e.g., to have the stor-
age provider distribute an encrypted resource encryption key to authorized users
without knowing the key itself. ese protocols exhibit the property that the access
control enforcement is partially delegated to the storage provider, which clearly con-
tradicts the denition of an E2E-SDS protocol. For this reason, this class of SDS
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protocols is not further considered in this thesis.
2.3 SDS Protocols Using Attribute-Based Encryption
Many SDS approaches proposed in the last few years are based on Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE) for condentiality protection. One important reason for this is
that ABE allows to dedicate a single ciphertext to multiple recipients which, at the
rst glance, promises to enable resource-saving SDS systems in terms of ciphertexts
that have to be generated and distributed. For this reason, ABE-based SDS protocols
are an object of study in this thesis.
In ABE approaches in general, both ciphertexts and secret keys are bound to at-
tributes. A set of attribute matching rules determine whether a key can be used to
decrypt a ciphertext. e expressiveness of possible matching rules depends on the
concrete ABE scheme, and may allow for simple threshold rules where k out of n
attributes have to match, as well as for arbitrary Boolean functions.
Most ABE schemes come in one of two avors: Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE)
or Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE). With CP-ABE, the ciphertext encodes an access pol-
icy, which therefore has to be dened by the encrypting party. An access policy is
typically formalized as Boolean term over attributes. An example for an access pol-
icy is “IsCIO ∨ (IsManager ∧ ITDepartment)”. e secret key corresponds
to a plain set of attributes, which is not further structured in any way.e following
procedure is used to evaluate whether the secret key satises the access policy of the
ciphertext: Assign true to an attribute in the access policy exactly if the attribute is
part of the secret key attribute set. If the access policy evaluates to true, decryption
is possible; in any other case, decryption will fail.
Key-Policy ABE can be considered the opposite of CP-ABE: Keys encode access
policies, and ciphertexts correspond to plain sets of attributes. With KP-ABE, the
access policy is dened by the party that issues secret keys. Note that no matter
whether CP-ABE or KP-ABE is used, the access control decision is based on both an
access policy and a plain set of attributes. For this reason, the authorization process
cannot be clearly assigned to a single party, but has to be considered as distributed
and collaborative process.
e binding of users to attributes are managed by an attribute authority (AA),
which issues secret keys encoding a user’s attributes upon authenticated request.
When using CP-ABE, the attributes within one secret key are oen “glued together”
with a user-dependent value to prevent dierent users from pooling their attributes,
a property known as collusion resistance. is user-dependent value is oen gener-
ated by a central fully-trusted entity.
In this section, rst a short introduction on the mathematical background of ABE
is given. ereaer, the evolution of ABE schemes is sketched.
2.3.1 Mathematical Background
ABE schemes are typically based on bilinear pairings, which are dened as follows:
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Denition 1 (Bilinear pairing [ZSNL03]). LetG1 be a cyclic additive group generated
by P, whose order is a prime q, and G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same
order q. A bilinear pairing is a map e ∶ G1 ×G1 → G2 with the following properties:
P1 Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab;
P2 Non-degenerate:ere exists P,Q ∈ G1 such that e(P,Q) ≠ 1;
P3 Computable:ere is an ecient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
Bilinear pairings can help to solve the discrete logarithm (DLOG) problem in a cyclic
group.e DLOG problem is dened as given g and h as elements of a cyclic group
G, nd a such that h = ga [CS11]. e existence of a bilinear pairing G1 × G1 → G2
implies that solving the DLOG problem in G1 is no harder than solving the DLOG
problem in G2: From the bilinearity property, it follows that e(aP, P) = e(P, P)a.
erefore, to get the DLOG of aP in G1, it is sucient to calculate the DLOG of
e(P, P)a to the basis e(P, P) in G2.
For this reason, bilinear pairings were originally used in cryptanalysis. e secu-
rity of some cryptography schemes, such as theDigital Signature Algorithm [DSS13],
relies on the assumption that it is not feasible for an attacker to calculate the DLOG
within the cyclic group G1 that is employed in the concrete implementation. How-
ever, even if there are no ecient algorithms known to calculate the DLOG within
G1 directly, it might still be possible to construct a bilinear pairing fromG1 to a cyclic
group G2, in which the DLOG can be calculated more eciently. is attack can
be leveraged in practice to reduce the DLOG problem within elliptic curves, which
is assumed to be intractable, to the DLOG problem within nite elds, for which
subexponential algorithms are known [MOV93].
e security of ABE schemes is usually based on the Decisional Bilinear Die-
Hellman (BDH) assumption, which is dened as:
Denition 2 (Decisional BilinearDie-Hellman (BDH)Assumption [SW05]). Sup-
pose a challenger chooses a, b, c, z ∈ Zp at random.e Decisional BDH assumption
is that no polynomial-time adversary is to be able to distinguish the tuple (A = ga,B =
gb,C = gc,Z = e(g , g)abc) from the tuple (A = ga,B = gb,C = gc,Z = e(g , g)z) with
more than a negligible advantage.
In the context of this denition, g is a generator of a multiplicative cyclic group,
which was denoted as G1 in the previous paragraphs. e BDH assumption obvi-
ously relies on the assumption that the DLOG problem is intractable in G1, as in
any other case, the BDH challenge could be solved easily by calculating a, b, c, and
nally e(g , g)abc. As already mentioned, the calculation of the DLOG is assumed
to be infeasible in elliptic curves. erefore, in existing ABE schemes, G1 is oen
proposed to be an elliptic curve.
A basic example for an application of bilinear pairings is the three-party key ex-
change proposed by Joux [Jou00]. is protocol is an extension of the well-known
Die-Hellman key exchange.e protocol has party A choose a random group ele-
ment a, and send ga to parties B and C. B and C calculate and distribute gb and gc
in the same way. e common secret key e(g , g)abc can consequently be calculated
by each user. For example, party A calculates the common secret key as e(gb , gc)a.
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2.3.2 Evolution of Attribute-Based Encryption Schemes
e foundation for Attribute-Based Encryption was laid in [SW05], which intro-
ducesABE as a special application of Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption. Identity-Based
Encryption (IBE) allows to encrypt data for a certain recipient by using the recipients’
identier as public key [JN09]. is identier might be, for example, an e-mail ad-
dress.us, by using IBE, a PKI can be omitted, as there is no longer a need to retrieve
a public key that is bound to the identier in an authentic way. A fully functional IBE
scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [BF01].
e main intention behind Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption is to enable a decryp-
tion to users even if their identier does not exactly match the identier that was tar-
geted in the encryption process. For this purpose, the identier is decomposed into
a set of binary-valued attributes. In consequence, both the user key and the cipher-
text are related to a set of attributes. With Fuzzy IBE, a key can be used to decrypt a
ciphertext if they have at least d attributes in common, where d is a system-wide
security parameter.
e challenge that was addressed by Fuzzy IBE is to prevent users from collusion.
is means that users should not be able to combine their keys in a way that the
combined key encodes a comprehensive set of attributes, which neither of the col-
luding users holds alone. To achieve this, each secret key consists of components that
encode an attribute each, and the components are “personalized” for the secret key
holder by binding them to a user-dependent part.
Fuzzy IBE involves four operations: In the Setup operation, the trusted key center
generates and distributes public system parameters. e Key Generation operation
is carried out by the key center for each user. e operation yields a secret key that
is bound to the user’s attributes, which are managed by the key center.
For the Encryption operation, the encrypting user rst has to specify a set of at-
tributes, from which at least d have to be encoded by a secret key to enable decryp-
tion.is attribute set has to be larger than the system-wide threshold d.e public
parameters that correspond to the attribute set have to be retrieved from the key
center, and are part of the input of the encryption process.
For the Decryption operation, the decrypting user identies d attributes that both
her secret key and the ciphertext have in common.e secret key components that
correspond to these attributes, together with the ciphertext, form the input for the
decryption operation.
On the one hand, Fuzzy IBE shows somemajor limitations: a limited access control
model, the necessity of a central key center that has to be fully trusted, the lack of
revocation capabilities, and performance issues. On the other hand, one goal of this
thesis is to identify an ABE scheme that oers E2E-SDS and supports named user
groups, and to evaluate the real-world performance of this scheme. us, each of
the limitations of Fuzzy ABE might prevent an ABE scheme from being used for
E2E-SDS. For this reason, more recent ABE schemes that address these limitations
are presented in the following.
e rst limitation of Fuzzy IBE is the rather limited access controlmodel, as Fuzzy
IBE only oers a matching of plain attribute sets with a system-wide threshold. Pos-
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sible extensions are CP-ABE [BSW07] and KP-ABE [LCLS08], which support access
policies as Boolean terms over attributes. Many of CP-ABE or KP-ABE approaches
support only monotonic access structures. In the case of CP-ABE, this means that
given a secret key that comprises a superset of the attributes of another secret key,
the former can be used to decrypt any ciphertext that is decryptable by the latter. In
consequence, adding an attribute to a secret key always extends access permissions,
and never limits access permissions. However, the limitation of monotonic access
structure was overcome by some ABE approaches [OSW07].
ABE schemes generally implementAttribute-BasedAccessControl, whereas named
user groups are a feature closely related to Role-Based Access Control.us, to im-
plement SDS with named user groups based on an ABE scheme, a mapping between
ABAC and RBAC is required. A few papers elaborate on this mapping, e.g., Zhu et
al. [ZMHH13, ZHHW14] propose the specication of attribute hierarchies to be able
to map role hierarchies to ABAC in a natural fashion.
Another limitation of Fuzzy IBE is that it relies on a central key center that has to be
fully trusted. is limitation was addressed by many ABE schemes by distributing
the key center functionality on multiple authorities, a property denoted as multi-
authority. For example, an early approach proposed by Chase [Cha07] in 2007 en-
ables to partition the attribute space, such that each partition is managed by another
attribute authority (AA). However, a central key center still generates the private key
of every user and AA in the system. e rationale behind this architecture is that
the key center generates the aforementioned user-dependent value that is required
for collusion resistance. While, e.g., in [MKE08], a scheme is presented that sup-
ports more exible access policies than [Cha07], a central key center is still required.
In [LW11], a multi-authority ABE scheme was proposed that does no longer rely on a
central key center.emain challenge addressed in this work is collusion prevention
without a central party that generates the necessary user dependent values.
Furthermore, Fuzzy IBE does not oer any revocation capabilities. More recent
ABE schemes propose dierent approaches and mechanisms to support revocation.
Some schemes leverage an additional trusted party that holds a part of the neces-
sary decryption key [XM12, IPN+09, YWRL10b, LLYY14]. is approach allows
for immediate attribute revocation by adapting the access control list on the addi-
tional trusted party. Other schemes attach an expiration date to secret keys [BSW07],
which consequently have to be renewed periodically. e revocation capabilities
of ABE schemes further dier in granularity: While the schemes described so far
support attribute revocation, i.e., a user is revoked from holding an attribute, some
schemes only provide user revocation, where a user is excluded from the system
completely [OSW07, LLLS11].
A nal limitation of Fuzzy IBE are performance issues with regard to the com-
putation time required for the typically expensive bilinear pairing operations, and
the length of secret keys and ciphertexts. All of these performance metrics linearly
depend on the number of attributes involved. For this reason, ABE schemes were
proposed that work with constant computation costs and ciphertexts of constant
size [DJ14, ZZC+15]. e performance of an ABE scheme can also be increased by
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outsourcing cryptographic operations to the storage provider[LDGW13, QDLM15].
For eachmajor limitation of FuzzyABE, amultitude of ABE schemeswas proposed
that addresses this limitation. However, early schemes tended to address only one or
two of the discussed limitations, while retaining all other limitations. More feature-
rich ABE schemes that tried to combine an expressive access control model, multi-
authority and revocation capabilities with acceptable performance only came up in
recent years. Nonetheless, it is hard to identify ABE schemes that fulll the whole set
of requirements onE2E-SDS. In Section 5.4.1, a detailed evaluation ofmulti-authority
ABE schemes with regard to their applicability for E2E-SDS is presented.
2.4 Performance Evaluation of SDS Protocols
In this section, existing work on the performance evaluation of SDS protocols will
be discussed. An important inuence factor for the performance is the sharing and
usage behavior of the users, which have to be operationalized as sharing and usage
model.erefore, dierent types of sharing and usage models are presented. One of
the presentedmodels are workloads, which constitute a combined sharing and usage
model that can serve as a basis for performance evaluation. Finally, the challenges
that arise in the generation of synthetic workloads are discussed.
2.4.1 Performance Evaluation Methods
e performance of a technical system is always dened in terms of a performance
metric. According to [Le 15], “a performance metric is a measurable quantity that
precisely captures what we want to measure—it can take many forms. ere is no
general denition of a performance metric: it is system dependent, and its denition
requires understanding the system and its users well.” Performance metrics typically
quantify system aspects such as the time behavior, the resource utilization, or the
capacity of the system [ISO11b].
e process of quantifying the service delivered by a computer or communication
system, i.e., to obtain certain performance metrics that describe the system, is re-
ferred to as performance evaluation (cf. [Le 15]).e purpose of a performance eval-
uation is typically “to compare design alternatives when building new systems, to
tune parameter values of existing systems, and to assess capacity requirements when
setting up systems for production use” [Fei14].
Basic methods to carry out performance evaluations are measurements, simula-
tion, and analytical approaches. While measurements yield realistic and compara-
tively accurate results, they require that the sharing system is already in place, and
that the client hardware under study is available. Furthermore, measurements do not
provide any hints on the performance of the sharing system if the SDS protocol, the
users’ sharing behavior, or the hardware changes, thus, measurements lack general-
ity. For these reasons, measurements are only used to estimate the performance of
cryptographic primitives on a small set of client devices, but a measurement of the
performance of the whole system is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Discrete Event Simulations (DES) are the most wide-spread method for perfor-
mance evaluation [Le 15]. A DES “concerns the modeling of a system as it evolves
over time by a representation in which the state variables change instantaneously at
separate points in time” [Law06]. A simulation of a system usually requires less ef-
fort than performance measurements. e drawback of a simulation model is that
major inuence factors on the system performance usually cannot be derived from
themodel easily, but have to be identied in a systematic way, e.g., bymeans of a sen-
sitivity analysis. A sensitivity analysis is carried out to assess “how uncertainty in the
output of a model (numerical or otherwise) can be apportioned to dierent sources
of uncertainty in the model input” [STCR04]. In other words, a sensitivity analysis
assesses how changes in the input of a model inuence the output of the model.
Analytical performance evaluation methods are based on “a mathematical model of
the system [that] is analyzed numerically” [Le 15].ese methods can be categorized
into empirical models that are derived from analyzing the correspondence between
system inputs and outputs in a black-box fashion, and mechanistic models that are
inferred from at least a basic understanding of the system as a white box [Eec10].
Analytical approaches are typically much faster than simulations. Furthermore, an
analytical performance evaluationmodelmightmake fundamental inuence param-
eters of the system performance emergent, i.e., it might provide more fundamental
insights. e drawback of analytical approaches is that the usual tendency for sim-
plication comes with a loss in accuracy.
Analytical methods for performance evaluation were proposed that leverage es-
tablished modeling formalisms, such as petri nets (cf. [Mur89]) or queuing net-
works [Kel76] etc. (cf. [BKR09]).e main reason for using such formalisms is that
theorems exist that make one property of the model deductible from another prop-
erty. However, using such a formalism requires to abstract the system under study
to make it “t” the formalism. Since this thesis mainly focuses on the real-world per-
formance of SDS protocols, such formalisms were avoided in favor of more exible
and accurate analytical performance evaluation methods.
Performance evaluations for existing SDS protocols are usually related to the per-
formance metrics computation time, network trac volume, and storage. Existing
evaluations were carried out almost exclusively based on two methods: either by
describing the asymptotic behavior of some performance metrics with regard to a
growing input parameter N , or by means of micro-benchmarks based on measure-
ments of prototypical implementations.
An evaluation of the asymptotical behavior of some performance metrics is part of
manypublications introducing an SDSprotocol (e.g., [HN11], [YWRL10a], [AHL+12],
[LXZZ13], [DJ14]) . As already discussed, while this performance evaluationmethod
indicates whether the protocol scales with a growing parameter N , it fails to provide
hints on the real-world performance of the protocol in absolute terms. e reason
for this is the very high abstraction level of asymptotic analyses, which by deni-
tion omit constant terms and factors in the calculation of the performance. A major
challenge addressed in this thesis is to nd an abstraction level for the performance
evaluation that takes constant terms and factors into account, while abstracting from
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implementation issues or hardware.
Another restriction of the evaluation of the asymptotical performance is that the
values which the parameter N takes in reality are usually unclear. e concrete pa-
rameter that is encoded as N depends on the context, but the parameter value is
typically determined by the sharing and usage behavior of the users in the SDS sys-
tem. A discussion of approaches to model and operationalize the sharing and usage
behavior with regard to performance evaluation follows in the next subsection.
Micro-benchmarks were also leveraged to evaluate the performance of many SDS
protocols (e.g., [BSW07], [HN11], [YJ14], [ZVH13], [KRS+03]).e purpose ofmicro-
benchmarks is to evaluate the performance of a single sharing operation in isolation,
where input parameters of the operation are systematically varied. An example is
to carry out a micro-benchmark for a removing a member from a named group
with varying group sizes. e results of micro-benchmarks are usually coupled to
a single implementation and a single hardware conguration, thus, the results can
hardly be generalized to other implementations and hardware. Furthermore, the re-
sults can only be interpreted if a realistic range for varying the input parameter can
be estimated, which again depends on the sharing behavior of the users. Micro-
benchmarks are a building block of the analytical performance evaluation method
presented in Section 4.1.
is thesis focuses on the same performance metrics that are targeted in existing
performance evaluations of SDS protocols, especially computation time and network
trac volume. However, performance metrics can be dened for system aspects in
a much broader sense. For example, even the security of an organization can be
quantied in terms of security metrics [CSS+08]. Within the IT security community,
it is broad consent that security and performance are oen conicting goals, and
solutions that are deployed in the real world have to balance these goals (cf. [Ko¨h15]).
In the context of SDS protocols, this trade-o becomes emergent in the choice of
the length of cryptographic keys, where longer keys are generally more secure, but
usually have a negative impact on the time required for the cryptographic operation
in question. e objective of this thesis is to estimate the real-world performance
of SDS protocols, which serves as an input for the process of balancing performance
and security. However, the actual balancing process is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.4.2 Sharing Models and Workloads
As illustrated in the previous sections on SDS protocols, the performance of an SDS
protocol is heavily inuenced by the users’ sharing and usage behavior. For example,
the number of users who are added to a named user group is a major impact factor
for the performance of a subsequent group member removal, as the performance of
this operation usually depends on the current size of the group. e usage behav-
ior, i.e., the read and write operations on the shared data, should also be considered
when evaluating the performance of an SDS protocol: First, the performance of a
read operation is directly perceived by a user if the shared data should be accessed
or consumed immediately aer it was read. Second, the usage behavior also has an
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inuence on the key graph, as a write operation typically involves the generation
of keys or signatures. ese changes on the key graph impact the performance of
subsequent operations.
To enable an analytical or simulative performance evaluation, the sharing and the
usage behavior have to be operationalized. For this purpose, the sharing behavior is
formalized as a sharing model and the usage behavior as a usage model, respectively.
In the following, rst the sharing model and then the usage model will be discussed.
A sharing model is based on an authorization model. In the context of this thesis,
the sharing model species the way the access control state of a system changes. For
this purpose, the sharing model might involve a notion of time and bind each au-
thorization operation to a certain point in time, or it might at least require a sequen-
tial ordering of operations. In existing literature, the sharing and the authorization
model are oen combined into a common “sharingmodel” (e.g., [TCN+14], [MA11]).
However, for this thesis, the distinction between authorization and sharing model is
important, asmultiple sharingmodels corresponding to a single authorizationmodel
will be presented. A concrete instance of a sharing model will be referred to as shar-
ing scenario in this thesis.
A very basic sharing model can be formalized as a sequence of authorization oper-
ations. More sharingmodels can be built by abstracting from this concrete sequence.
e resulting sharing models can be roughly categorized into constructive and de-
scriptive models: Constructive models focus on the behavior of single elements of the
modeled system, and the resulting behavior of the system has to be derived by anal-
ysis or simulation. On the opposite, descriptive models directly describe properties
of the system as a whole, without trying to reveal the factors that led to these proper-
ties [SF03]. In the context of sharing models, a constructive model rather describes
the behavior of each single user, which in summary results in a certain behavior of
the whole system. A descriptive model rather describes the properties of the au-
thorization state, and the changes of the authorization state over time. Constructive
models will be inspected in more detail in the next subsection.
As already discussed, a major challenge of the evaluation of the real-world per-
formance is that realistic values for dierent sharing parameters are required.ese
values can be provided by descriptive sharingmodels. However, the descriptive shar-
ing models presented in literature are comparatively abstract and high-level. For ex-
ample, an analysis of the friendship relations within social networks (e.g., [LTH11]),
together with the access control semantics of a friendship relation, can be considered
as a sharingmodel. However, such a sharingmodel is relatively implicit, leaving open
many degrees of freedom, such as the size of the shared data, the frequency of au-
thorization operations and so on. More concrete sharing scenarios can be found,
e.g., in [GMSW06], which states the fraction of each sharing operation type on the
whole set of sharing operations. However, the sharing model that is implemented
by those sharing scenarios is not specied explicitly, and it remains unclear whether
these sharing scenarios are realistic.
e notion of a usage model widely varies in literature, depending on the system
under study. For example, a usage model can describe the way graphical user inter-
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faces are used [EWZC11], or the way hardware products are employed [Sim05], or
the way users interact with component-based soware in general [BKR07]. In the
context of data sharing, a usage model species the way shared data is read and writ-
ten over time. Similar to a sharing model, a usage model requires some basic model
that denes the set of possible “usage operations”, which could be as coarse-grained
as read and write, or more ne-grained, such as copy or append. Again, a basic us-
age model is constituted by a sequence of read and write operations. A discussion of
constructive usage models is deferred to the next subsection.
e descriptive usage models that were proposed so far with regard to data shar-
ing cover dierent abstraction levels. For example, rather abstract usage models de-
scribe the usage behavior regarding popular online content on a large scale [SH10,
CKR+07]. Comparatively concrete usage models were presented to characterize the
access patterns for le systems [LPGM08, HH95, And00, HH96]. In [LPGM08], for
example, traces of large-scale le systems running in production were characterized
with regard to the data sizes that are read and written, the frequency of dierent le
operations and so on. Moreover, the SPEC benchmark SFS2014 [SPE14] provides
standardized sequence of le access operations that can be employed to compare the
performance of dierent le systems.
In this work, we carry out performance evaluations based on combined sharing
and usage models.e basic combined model is represented by a sequence of shar-
ing and usage operations, which is denoted as workload in this thesis. Note that this
is a relatively narrow and concrete denition. In literature, oen more general def-
initions can be found, such as “e [work]load characterizes the quantity and the
nature of requests submitted to the system.” [Le 15].
2.4.3 Workload Generation
Realistic workloads as a basis for the performance evaluation of an SDS protocol can
be obtained in two ways: Either the workloads are created from traces of the sharing
system under study, or they are synthetically generated. It can be argued that while
trace-based workloads exactly represent at least one real-world sharing or usage sce-
nario, they may cover only a small sample of the space of interesting scenarios, and
their internal representation is comparatively verbose [Fei14]. Besides these advan-
tages and disadvantages, the generation of workload constitutes the only option to
obtainworkloads if the systemunder study does not exist yet, or if the performance of
the system should be evaluated with regard to a changed sharing and usage behavior.
Synthetic workloads can be generated by means of constructive sharing and us-
age models. Constructive models strive to model the process that leads to a cer-
tain workload, rather than properties of the workload itself [Fei14]. Building such a
model usually involves the analysis of existing real-world traces, and tting assumed
probability distributions to the traced behavior of the system elements.
In literature, no constructive sharing models could be found that are suciently
concrete to serve as a basis for workloads generation. Some work exists that is driven
by an economical view on users, where sharing decisions result in amonetary gain or
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loss (e.g., [PM01], [LvFS14]). However, these sharing models are again very abstract,
leaving open many degrees of freedom, and therefore cannot be used for workload
generation without further renement.
In contrast to constructive sharing models, concrete constructive usage models
were proposed in the context of data access. As an example, [And00] presents a
method to generate workloads for NFS (cf. Section 2.1). In this method, the work-
load generation process is separated into two phases: In the initial creation phase,
a directory tree is generated, according to a set of probability distributions that de-
termines, e.g., the number of les and directories within a directory, the maximum
directory depth within the directory tree, and the popularity and the size of the les.
In the subsequent measurement phase, NFS operations are generated according to
probability distributions for operation types and read and write sizes, and a load
level that species the overall operation rate. Some limitations of this method are
that bursts of operations cannot be modeled, as the inter-arrival time of operations
is xed to be uniformly distributed, and that dependencies between operations can-
not be modeled either.
e generation of workloads that combine sharing and usage behavior would re-
quire both a concrete constructive sharing and a concrete constructive usage model.
It was just shown that while constructive usage models were proposed in literature,
no concrete constructive sharing models could be found. However, the mere iden-
tication or denition of a constructive sharing model would fall short of fullling
an important requirement addressed in this thesis: e resulting workload should
adhere to some parameters that are estimable, i.e., a domain expert should be able to
provide an estimation for these parameters regarding the considered sharing system.
However, it can be assumed that parameters describing some properties of the whole
system tend to be estimated more easily than parameters describing the behavior of
single users. is assumption is supported by the observation that descriptive pa-
rameters can be extracted, e.g., from a series of snapshots of the authorization state.
On the other hand, the extraction of constructive parameters tends to require awhole
“stream” of user sharing operations. Besides the technical eort that is necessary to
capture and persist this stream of operations, privacy issues can arise with this kind
of user behavior tracking.
In summary, a requirement on a workload generation method that can be em-
ployed for the purpose of this thesis—evaluating the performance of an existing or
envisioned sharing system—is that the resulting workload adheres to a descriptive
sharing model. As already mentioned, it is not trivial to build constructive sharing
or usage models in a way that the resulting workload adheres to some descriptive
sharing or usage model. For this reason, one challenge addressed in this thesis is
to design a non-constructive workload generation method that leads to predened
instances of a descriptive sharing model.
In this thesis, a method is presented that allows to generate workloads that adhere
to a set of predened descriptive sharing parameters, such as the distribution of the
size of named user groups. e method is discussed in detail in Section 3.6. Simi-
lar to [And00], the workload generation involves two phases: In the rst phase, an
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initial authorization state is built, which is incrementally altered within the second
phase. As the rst phase boils down to graph generation, a short discussion of graph
generation methods related to our setting concludes this section.
According to [CZF04], graph generation methods can be categorized as either
degree-based or procedural. Degree-based methods strive to generate a graph in
a way that the degree distribution of the resulting graph matches some target distri-
bution. On the opposite, procedural methods focus on simple per-node or per-edge
generation rules. An example for the latter is the Barabasi-Albert method [AB00].
is method incrementally inserts edges in an existing set of nodes, where the prob-
ability that the edge is appended to a given node increases with the number of edges
that are already appended to this node. Procedural graph generation cannot be ap-
plied for the workload generation as required in this work.e reasons for this were
already explained above in the context of constructive models.
A famous descriptive graph generation method is the conguration model [Bol80].
is method involves two steps: In the rst step, the set of nodes is created, and each
node is assigned a target node degree, according to a target probability distribution.
In the second step, edges are inserted by randomly selecting two nodes, and check-
ing whether the edge can be appended to these nodes without violating the target
degree of each node.
e congurationmodel cannot be applied directly in the context of workload gen-
eration for data sharing, because there are certain requirements on the graph that
has to be generated: Both nodes and edges are labeled, and no edges are allowed be-
tween nodes with the same label. With some minor simplications, the generated
graph can be considered a tripartite graph, i.e., a graph comprising three classes of
nodes, where nodes within one class are never connected by an edge. While generat-
ing graphs with a given distribution of node degrees was broadly covered in research
(cf. [MKI+04]), no graph generation method could be found in literature that fo-
cuses on the generation of tripartite graphs.
2.5 Conclusions
A variety of authorization models exists that can be employed for data sharing.is
comprises well-known models, such as Discretionary, Mandatory, Role-Based or
Attribute-BasedAccess Control, but alsomore recentmodels, such asGroup-Centric
Secure Information Sharing. Many common data sharing systems oer the possibil-
ity to grant access rights to named user groups, which do not exist only in the context
of permissions on a set of resources, but are independent entities that can be granted
data access via a group handle.is applies, e.g., to the widely deployed distributed
le systems NFSv4 and CIFS.
A plethora of SDS protocols were proposed in the last decades, targeting dierent
security objectives like condentiality, integrity, privacy or accountability.is thesis
focuses on E2E-SDS protocols, which are dened as a special class of SDS protocols
with essentially two properties: E2E-SDS protocols ensure condentiality and in-
tegrity of the shared data by means of client-side cryptography, and they require that
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authorization and access control for read accesses is carried out solely by the users
who are allowed to access the data.erefore, anE2E-SDSprotocol does not allow for
a “trusted entity” that takes part in authorization or access control of read accesses.
As only few SDS protocols comply with this strict denition of E2E-SDS, the com-
bination of E2E and support for named user groups is rarely oered by existing SDS
protocols. Cepheus was identied as only E2E-SDS protocol that supports named
user groups. For this purpose, Cepheus leverages joint authorization operations,
which means that a single authorization operation is carried out by at least two dif-
ferent users in a collaborative manner. e drawback of joint authorization oper-
ations is that the moment the operation is initiated, all involved users have to be
reachable within the network, and be ready to carry out the required cryptographic
operations immediately. Both aspects can be problematic especially with regard to
mobile devices, as the reachability can be limited in many situations, and the neces-
sary cryptographic computations might have an impact on the responsibility of the
device. An E2E-SDS protocol that supports named user groups while omitting joint
authorization operations will be presented in Chapter 6.
In recent years, lots of SDS protocols were proposed that leverage Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE). ABE-based protocols have the advantage that a single ciphertext
is sucient to target a potentially large number of recipients, which might be advan-
tageous in terms of performance. However, it is challenging to identify ABE schemes
that allow for E2E-SDS, and at the same time provide an authorizationmodel expres-
sive enough to be adaptable for a support of named user groups.
e performance of SDS protocols is usually evaluated by means of asymptotical
analysis, i.e., the behavior of the performance is described with regard to a grow-
ing parameter N .is performance evaluation method intentionally abstracts from
constant factors and terms. However, these terms can be highly relevant for the real-
world performance of the protocol in absolute terms.e challenge in constructing
a more concrete performance evaluation model lies in nding a unied abstraction
layer that allows tomodel performance-relevant dierences between protocols while
abstracting from implementation details.is challenge is addressed by the perfor-
mance evaluation models presented in Chapter 4.
Furthermore, the asymptotical performance analyses typically provide no hints on
the values that parameter N might take in reality.e concrete values depend on the
sharing and usage behavior of the users, which have to be operationalized as sharing
and usage models. If the sharing system under study exists, instances of sharing and
usage models can be built based on traces of the sharing and usage operations. For
this thesis, this was done with regard to a special sharing and usage model that is
referred to as workload. In this context, a workload represents a plain sequence of
sharing and usage operations.
In other cases, the sharing system under study might not exist yet, or the impact of
future changes in the sharing or usage behavior of the users should be assessed. In
these cases, synthetic model instances must be generated.ese synthetic instances
can be built based on an expert’s estimations for a certain subset of the sharing and
usage parameters.e challenge addressed in this thesis is that the estimable param-
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eters are typically related to a descriptive sharing or usage model. On the other hand,
the instance generation methods proposed in literature rely on constructive sharing
or usage models in most cases. Constructive models can hardly be designed in a
way to yield a given descriptive sharing or usage model instance. For this reason,
a generation method that targets a descriptive model was designed for this thesis,
and is introduced in Chapter 3.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the sharing and usage model is an important
factor for the performance of SDS protocols. us, to evaluate the performance of
an SDS protocol, both the sharing and the usage model have to be incorporated into
the performance evaluation method. In this chapter, we describe workloads as the
combined sharing and usage model that is used in this thesis.
Workloads can informally be seen as a sequence of sharing and usage operations.
e set of possible sharing operations is determined by the authorization model im-
plemented by the SDS protocol. Section 3.1 provides a denition of the authorization
model that is considered in this thesis. Based on the authorization model, a deni-
tion of workloads is given in Section 3.2.
e performance evaluations of concrete SDS protocols that are described in this
thesis are mainly based on real-world workloads. To generate those workloads, two
sharing services running in production at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
were monitored for changes in the permission structures. While the resulting real-
world workloads are considered exemplary, they give an indication of the perfor-
mance of an SDS protocol in reality. In Section 3.3, it is shown how these workloads
were generated from traces.
In the last three sections of the chapter, the abstraction of workloads to a set of
workload parameters is discussed.is abstraction becomes necessary, as fully spec-
ied workloads require very detailed knowledge about the sharing and usage scenar-
ios in the system under study, which will be available only rarely in practice. In Sec-
tion 3.4, a set of possible workload parameters is given.is set was designedwith the
contradicting goals of being comprehensive enough to specify a workload to a su-
cient degree, while containing only parameters that are known or at least predictable
by an SDS provider.e real-world workloads are characterized with regard to this
set of workload parameters in Section 3.5.
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In Section 3.6, amethod for the generation ofworkloads based on predenedwork-
load parameters is presented. Workload generation is necessary if the performance
evaluation method requires a fully specied workload, but the workload cannot be
retrieved from the system under study. Some instance of the related optimization
problem are NP-hard, which is shown in the second part of the section.
Parts of this chapter have already been published before in [KH15].
3.1 Authorization Model
As stated before, in this work, we consider SDS protocols that implement an autho-
rization model that is similar to those of NFSv4 or CIFS (cf. Chapter 2).e subjects
of this authorization model are referred to as users.ese can be natural persons, as
well as organizations or processes on machines. e set of all users in the system
is described by U .
e objects of the authorization model are referred to as resources. ese are the
smallest data chunk that users can share independently from other data chunks. De-
pending on the application context, resources may represent, e.g., les or database
entries.e set of all resources that access can be granted to is referred to as R. Each
resource is assigned to exactly one user, referred to as resource owner, that grants and
revokes access permissions on this resource. e permissions on a resource either
allow read access only, or allow read access as well as write access. A resource owner
can manage an arbitrary number of resources.
e resource owner may grant resource access to another user explicitly—referred
to as direct permissions—or to a named user group. A named user group—or simply
group for the remainder of this thesis—is a set of users that is managed by exactly
one user, referred to as group owner, and each resource owner might grant access to
her resources for arbitrary groups. A group owner can manage an arbitrary num-
ber of groups.
e authorizationmodel supports resource and group hierarchies.e resource hi-
erarchy feature allows to arrange resources within a set of resource trees that models
inheritance of permissions, i.e., any user that has access to a resource has implicitly
access to all descendants of this resource in the respective resource tree. Group hier-
archies allow one group to become a member of another group, with the result that
all members of the former group are implicitly also members of the latter group.
e authorization model combines aspects of Discretionary Access Control, in
which the access permissions of each user or each resource are listed explicitly, and
of Role-Based Access Control, where access rights are given to users implicitly by
via roles, which are considered equal to named groups in the context of this work
(cf. Section 2.1).
An instance of the authorization model is formalized as authorization state, which
is dened as follows:
Denition 3. An authorization state is completely described by the set of usersU , the
set of resources R, the set of groupsG, the set of permissions P = {Read,ReadWrite},
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and the following relations on these sets:
– e membership relationMemberUser(U ,G), which indicates that a user u ∈
U is a member of a group g ∈ G.
– e grouphierarchy relationMemberGroup(G,G), which indicates that a group
g1 ∈ G is a member of another group g2 ∈ G. e group hierarchy relation is
asymmetric.
– e access relation HasAccess(U ∪G,R,P), which indicates that a user u ∈ U
or a group g ∈ G has either read access or read and write access on resource r ∈
R. Read and write access implies read access: HasAccess(u, r,ReadWrite) ⇒
HasAccess(u, r,Read)
– e child relation ChildResource(R,R), which marks a resource rchild ∈ R as
child of another resource rparent ∈ R.e child relation is a forest.
is denition implies that a user is allowed to read a resource if the user himself or
a group the user is member of has read access on the resource itself or on an ancestor
of the resource in the resource hierarchy.e same applies for write access.
e authorization state can be represented as authorization graph, which is con-
structed from the authorization state users, resources and groups as nodes, and the
authorization state relations between these entities as edges:
Denition 4. An authorization graph is a directed graph (V,E) with V = U ∪ R ∪G.
An edge betweennodesV1 andV2 exists i (V1,V2) is an element ofMemberUser(U ,G),
MemberGroup(G,G), HasAccess(U ∪G,R,P) or ChildResource(R,R).
e authorization model shows many similarities with those of NFSv4 and CIFS
(cf. Section 2.1). A central feature of the authorizationmodel is the support for named
user groups. For this reason, the authorization model is referred to as group-based
authorization model in this thesis. In the following, the group-based authorization
model will be used as a basis for the denition of a workload.
3.2 Definition of Workloads
Workloads are the combined sharing and usage model that is used in this thesis.
A workload is essentially a sequence of changes in the authorization state, e.g., the
owner of a resource grants read access on one of her resources to a certain user.
ese changes in the authorization state constitute the input of a secure data shar-
ing protocol, together with commands to upload resources to or download them
from the storage provider.
We refer to changes of the authorization state and to upload and download com-
mands as workload events. Each event has one or more parameters, with a manda-
tory parameter actor that states the user that actually carries out the cryptographic
operations required to enforce the authorization state change. us, a workload is
dened as follows:
43
3 SDS WorkloadModeling and Generation
Denition 5. A workload is a nite sequence of changes to the authorization state,
together with upload and download commands, which are referred to as workload
events. A workload event has one of the following types:
– AddUser(uactor, u): adds a user u to the set of users U .
– RemoveUser(uactor, u): removes user u from the set of users U .
– AddGroup(uactor, g): adds a group g to the set of groups G.
– RemoveGroup(uactor, g): removes group g from the set of groups G.
– AddResource(uactor, r, rparent): adds a resource r to the set of resources R and
adds (r, rparent) to relation Child.
– RemoveResource(uactor, r): removes resource r from the set of resources R.
– AddUserToGroup(uactor , u, g): adds user u to group g by adding (u, g) to rela-
tionMemberUser.
– AddGroupToGroup(uactor , g1, g2): adds group g1 to group g2 by adding (g1, g2)
to relationMemberGroup.
– RemoveUserFromGroup(uactor , u, g): removes user u from group g by removing(u, g) fromMemberUser.
– RemoveGroupFromGroup(uactor , g1, g2): removes group g1 from group g2 by re-
moving (g1, g2) fromMemberGroup.
– GrantUserReadAccess(uactor , u, r): grant read access for user u on resource r
(and all child resources of r) by adding (u, r,Read) to HasAccess.
– GrantGroupReadAccess(uactor , g , r): grant read access for group g on resource
r (and all child resources of r) by adding (g , r,Read) to HasAccess.
– GrantReadWriteAccess(uactor , u, r): grant read andwrite access for user u on re-
source r (and all child resources of r) by adding (u, r,ReadWrite) toHasAccess.
– GrantGroupReadWriteAccess(uactor , g , r): grant read and write access for group
g on resource r (and all child resources of r) by adding (g , r,ReadWrite) to
HasAccess.
– RevokeUserReadAccess(uactor , u, r): revokes read access for user u on resource
r (and all child resources of r) by removing (u, r,Read) from HasAccess.
– RevokeGroupReadAccess(uactor , u, r): revokes read access for group g on re-
source r (and all child resources of r) by removing (g , r,Read) fromHasAccess.
– RevokeUserReadWriteAccess(uactor , u, r): revokes read and write access for user
u on resource r (and all child resources of r) by removing (u, r,ReadWrite)
from HasAccess.
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– RevokeGroupReadWriteAccess(uactor , u, r): revokes read and write access for
group g on resource r (and all child resources of r) by removing (g , r,ReadWrite)
from HasAccess.
– WriteData(uactor , r, dataSize): data for resource r is uploaded, the size of the
data is given by dataSize.
– ReadData(uactor , r, dataSize): data for resource r is downloaded, the size of the
data is given by dataSize.
e workload events that change the authorization state, i.e., all workload events
except forWriteData and ReadData, are referred to as authorization operations.
Note that a workload is not bound to some notion of time, in a sense that a work-
load event carries a timestamp, or that a time dierence between consecutive events
could be specied.
e fact that the denition of a workload is based on the authorization state sets
and relations implies that a workload has to adhere to some consistency rules. For
example, a user can only be removed from the set of users if she was added before,
i.e., the event RemoveUser(uactor , u) may only occur if the event AddUser(uactor , u)
has occurred before.
Some further consistency rules are imposed that ensure that read and write events
are always successful, i.e., all read andwrite events are allowed from an access control
point of view. is means that unsuccessful or even malicious read or write events
and their costs cannot be modeled as part of a workload as dened above.
Note that there is no distinct workload event type to ”downgrade“ a user fromread and write access to read-only access. is event has to be modeled by a Re-
vokeUserReadWriteAccess or RevokeGroupReadWriteAccess event, and a subsequent
GrantUserReadAccess or GrantGroupReadAccess event.
ere are two ways to get workloads that adhere to the denition given above: Ei-
ther the workloads are retrieved from real world systems that enable data sharing in
someway, or theworkloads are generated, based on somepredenedparameters. For
this thesis, both methods have been implemented. In the remainder of this chapter,
rst the generation of workloads from traces of real-world systems and the charac-
teristics of these workloads will be discussed. ereaer, a generation method for
synthetic workloads will be presented.
3.3 Generation of Real-World Workloads from Traces
Workloads retrieved from real-world data sharing systems allow to get an indication
whether the performance of certain SDS protocols allows to employ them in reality.
For this thesis, workloads from two systems running in production at KIT were re-
trieved, namely from an e-learning platform based on ILIAS1 and from a groupware
platform based on Microso SharePoint Server 20132. ese workload are referred
1http://www.ilias.de/
2https://products.office.com/en-us/SharePoint/collaboration
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to as real-world workloads for the rest of the thesis. In this section, the process of
generating workloads from traces of real-world systems is described. An overview
of the generation process is shown in Figure 3.1. A characterization of the retrieved
workloads is given in Section 3.5.
To generate real-world workloads, daily snapshots of the authorization structure of
both of these platforms were taken. As the groupware allows to grant permissions to
groups dened inMicroso’s directory service implementation namedActive Direc-
tory (AD)3, daily snapshots were also taken of the KIT AD installation. Essentially,
taking a snapshot provided the current authorization state of the three system, and
by comparing a snapshot to the snapshot taken the day before, a set of workload
events could be calculated as “di” between the two snapshots. e snapshot dis
were collected from the e-learning platform for 118 days, and from the groupware
platform and the directory service for 91 days in summer 2014.
e initial snapshot was compared with an “empty” snapshot, so an AddUser event
was created for each initial user, an AddResource event was created for each initial
resource and so on. As this approach only yields daily granularity, the events occur-
ring within a day have to be ordered, and this is done based on the event type: First,
“constructive events” such as AddUser, AddUserToGroup etc. are added, thenWrite-
Data events, and nally “destructive” events.is ensures workload consistency, as,
e.g., for user u and resource r, rst executing GrantUserReadAccess(uactor , u, r) and
then WriteData(uactor , r, dataSize) ensures that at the time of write access, the user
has write permissions.
A limitation of this workload generation approach is that write events can only be
detected by comparing the “lastmodied” timestampof each resource, and assuming
a write event whenever this timestamp changes between two consecutive snapshots.
is way, if multiple write events occur between two consecutive snapshots, only the
last one can be detected and added to the workload.e same limitation applies for,
e.g., the repeated addition of a certain user to a certain group between two consecu-
tive snapshots, but it is assumed that this case will only occur very rarely in practice.
e generation of workloads from traces might bear some technical challenges in
practice. For example, the ILIAS-based e-learning platform supports resource hi-
erarchies with inheritance of permissions; however, the permissions granted on a
resource are propagated to all descendant resources at the time of the permission
change. is way, the new permission is listed with each resource in the whole re-
source subtree that is rooted in the resource the permission was granted on. us,
a processing step was introduced that “pushes the permissions up the resource tree”
as far as possible, based on the assumption that the authorizing user issued only
one permission grant for the whole resource subtree. More technically, this means
that the whole resource tree is traversed from the leaves to the root. Whenever a
whole set of sibling resources has an identical permission, this permission is moved
to the parent resource instead.
As another example, to generate workloads from traces of the SharePoint-based
groupware platform, a rst, single-threaded version of the generation tool needed
3https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/dd448614.aspx
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Figure 3.1: Overview of the process to generate real-world workloads from traces of
real-world systems.
more than one day to generate one snapshot, and therefore would have decreased
the system performance during working hours. A multi-instance version of the tool
solved this issue, but technically all instances had to concurrently access the same
user and group database, requiring a carefully designed database transaction man-
agement.
In the course of the workload generation process, all user, group and resource
identiers are pseudonymized by replacing them with a salted hash of the origi-
nal identier.
e result of these workload generation steps is one huge “raw workload” per plat-
form. is workload had to be broken down into smaller workloads that represent
a certain logically connected part of the system. For this purpose, the raw work-
load was partitioned along the lines of projects in the case of the groupware and of
faculties in the case of the e-learning platform. For all resources belonging to a cer-
tain part of the system, all permitted users and groups were retrieved, and workload
events regarding one of these entities were compiled to a new workload. For the re-
mainder of this work, the term real-world workloads refers to these pre-processed,
smaller workloads.
Further processing steps included, e.g., removing cycles in the group hierarchy
from the directory service raw workload, and combining the cleaned workload with
the respective groupware workloads. In addition, some SDS protocols are not able to
deal with the full workload feature set as stated in the denition in Section 3.2. For
example, some SDS protocols do not support resource hierarchies, and some do not
support group hierarchies. For this reason, there are optional processing steps that,
e.g., “atten” a resource hierarchy to only contain the leaf resources, while preserving
the eective permissions on these resources. In a similar way, another optional pro-
cessing step allows to replace group hierarchies by eective group memberships, i.e.,
the transitive closure of all group membership relations is calculated, and all entries
in the MemberUser relation are retained, while all entries in the MemberGroup re-
lation are discarded.
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As nal processing step, some consistency checks are performed on the resulting
workloads, e.g., it is checked whether a resource is added before access is granted on
the resource and so on (cf. Section 3.2).
3.4 Workload Parameterization
e denition of workload as given in Section 3.2 requires a very detailed knowledge
about the sharing and usage scenario in the system under study. In practice, such
detailed knowledge will be available only very rarely:e system under study might
not even exist yet, and if it exists, the tracing of the systems requires some eort,
as shown in the previous section. Furthermore, the performance prediction with
consideration of an assumed future sharing or usage scenario is also an important
use case for a performance evaluation.
While in practice, a fully specied workloadmight be unavailable, there might still
exist some knowledge about certain characteristics of the workload.ese workload
characteristics are referred to as workload parameters for the rest of this thesis. An
example for a workload parameter is the average size of a user group.e set of pa-
rameters that can be derived from a workload is huge. Workload parameters may
describe an authorization state at a given time, as well as changes or change rates
over time.e parameters may be sampled each time an authorization event occurs,
or only when an event of a certain type occurs. ey may refer to recursive struc-
tures in an authorization state, such as the child relation Child(R,R). ey may be
frequency distributions, e.g., the number of groups of a given size, or they may be
related statistical measures of frequency distributions, such as average or variance.
e performance evaluation methods presented in this thesis are based on the as-
sumption that the provider of an SDS system knows some parameters of the expected
workload, or is at least able to give a range that the parameter values probably lie
within. It is obvious that the usability of a performance evaluation model depends
on whether the input parameters are known or can be predicted within a tight range.
us, the goal of both the workload characterization in Section 3.5 and the workload
generation method presented in Section 3.6 is to focus on parameters that are likely
to be known or predictable. Unfortunately, it is hard to determine in general whether
a parameter is likely to be known, or even if one parameter ismore likely to be known
than another. As a rough guideline, in this work, workload parameters are consid-
eredmore likely to be known if they can be derived by processing only a subset of the
workload events. For example, the frequency distribution of the group sizes can be
calculated by only consideringAddUserToGroup andRemoveUserFromGroup events.
In this section, a set of workload parameters is described that builds the basis for
both workload characterization and generation (cf. Section 3.5 and Section 3.6). Es-
pecially for workload generation, the set of considered workload parameters has to
be comprehensive enough to specify the workload in sucient detail. us, the
set of workload parameters is considered a compromise between the chance that
the parameters in the set are known, and the comprehensibility of the workload
description.
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parameter name parameter type transitive?
number of users scalar no
number of resources scalar no
number of groups scalar no
groups per user frequency distribution no
users per group frequency distribution no
group members per group frequency distribution no
group memberships per group frequency distribution no
resources per group frequency distribution no
groups per resource frequency distribution no
direct resources per user frequency distribution no
direct users per resource frequency distribution no
group resources per user frequency distribution yes
group users per resource frequency distribution yes
Table 3.1: List of static workload parameters
e parameter set is divided into two parts: static and dynamic parameters. e
intuition behind this is that a workload can be described by a combination of an
initial state, or more exact, and initial authorization graph, and iterative changes to
this initial authorization graph. e static parameters reect the properties of the
initial graph, while the dynamic parameters reect the graph changes.e workload
parameterization and the parameter dependency groups described in this section
were assembled as part of a Bachelor’s thesis [Lei16].
3.4.1 Static Workload Parameters
Static workload parameters describe the number and the degree of the nodes in the
authorization graph. While the number of nodes is described by scalar parameters,
the degrees of the nodes are described by frequency distributions. e static work-
load parameters are listed in Table 3.1.
e static parameters can be further divided into direct and transitive parame-
ters. is distinction will be important for the feasibility of the workload genera-
tion method introduced in Section 3.6. Direct parameters reect the node degrees
of the dierent authorization graph node and edge types. For example, the direct
parameter resources per group reects the number of outgoing HasAccess edges of
the group nodes in the authorization graph. Transitive parameters, however, are re-
lated to transitive edges that are not directly part of the denition of an authorization
graph instance. Instead, transitive edges are redundant “overlay” edges that are cre-
ated by connecting each user node to each resource the user has access to because
of a group membership. us, the transitive outgoing edges of a user represent the
eective permissions of a user that are determined by the user’s groupmemberships,
and the permissions of these groups.
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parameter name transitive?
users users added nousers removed no
groups groups added nogroups removed no
resources resources added noresources removed no
users and groups
groups per user added no
groups per user removed no
users per group added no
users per group removed no
users and direct resources
direct resources per user added no
direct resources per user removed no
direct users per resource added no
direct users per resource removed no
groups and resources
resources per group added no
resources per group removed no
groups per resource added no
groups per resource removed no
users and group resources
group resources per user added yes
group resources per user removed yes
group users per resource added yes
group users per resource removed yes
group hierarchy
group members per group added no
group members per group removed no
group memberships per group added no
group memberships per group removed no
read and write events
write actions per user no
written data size per write action no
read actions per user no
Table 3.2: List of dynamic workload parameters
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3.4.2 Dynamic Workload Parameters
Dynamic workload parameters describe the probability that certain changes occur
from one workload revision to another. For each static parameter, there exist two
related dynamic parameters: one for the addition of nodes or increase of the node
degree, and one for the removal of nodes or decrease of the node degree. All dy-
namic parameters are expressed by frequency distributions.e dynamic workload
parameters are listed in Table 3.2.
3.4.3 Workload Parameter Dependency Groups
Workload parameters depend on each other, i.e., the value of one parameter may be
completely determined or at least bound by a combination of other parameters.is
means that an assignment of values for dependent parameters that does not comply
with these dependencies leads to conicting requirements on the resultingworkload.
In this case, no workload can be generated that adheres to all predened parameter
assignments. For this reason, it is important to take account of workload parameter
dependencies as part of the workload generation process.
e sets of dependent workloads can be formalized as workload parameter de-
pendency groups:
Denition 6. A workload parameter set is a workload parameter dependency group,
or dependency group for short, if there is at least one parameter assignment that can
be fullled in each strict subset of the parameter set, but that cannot be fullled in
the whole parameter set.
Note that this denition contains aminimality condition by requiring that the “un-
fulllable” parameter assignment can be fullled in each strict subset.is minimal-
ity condition prevents that each parameter set that contains a dependency group is a
dependency group itself. To prove this minimality condition for a given parameter
set with size n, it is enough to prove that the assignment can be fullled in each subset
with size n−1, as this implies that the assignment can be fullled in any smaller subset.
In this work, dependency groups between static parameters are introduced and
described. For this purpose, three types of dependency groups were identied: up-
per bounds, bipartite-graph induced dependency groups, and transitive dependency
groups. A complete overview of the identied dependency groups can be found
in Table 3.3.
Upper bounds are the simplest and most obvious type of dependency groups. An
upper bound simply states that a scalar parameter works as an upper bound for the
maximum of a frequency distribution parameter. An example for this is the fre-
quency distribution groups per resource, whose maximum value is bound by the to-
tal number of group nodes in the graph.
Bipartite graph induced dependency groups can be identied wherever a part of
the authorization graph, i.e., an authorization graph comprising only a subset of node
and edge types, forms a bipartite graph. For example, the set of user and group nodes,
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parameter set type
1 number of groups, groups per user upper bound
2 number of groups, groups per resource upper bound
3 number of users, users per group upper bound
4 number of users, direct users per resource upper bound
5 number of resources, resources per group upper bound
6 number of resources, direct resources per user upper bound
7 number of resources, group resources per user upper bound
8 number of users, group users per resource upper bound
9 number of groups, number of users, users per group,
groups per user
bipartite graph
10 number of users, number of resources, direct re-
sources per user, direct users per resource
bipartite graph
11 number of groups, number of resources, groups per
resource, resources per group
bipartite graph
12 number of users, number of resources, group users per
resource, group resources per user
bipartite graph
13 groups per user, resources per group, group resources
per user, groups per resource
transitive
14 groups per resource, users per group, group users per
resource, groups per user
transitive
Table 3.3: List of workload parameter dependency groups
together with all edges related to theMemberUser relation, can be considered as bi-
partite graph. is induces dependency group 9 (cf. Table 3.3) that consists of the
parameters number of groups, number of users, users per group and groups per user.
In this case, the dependency group property can be proven by the unfulllable as-
signment: number of groups = 2, number of users = 2, users per group = 2 for each
group, and groups per user equals 2 for one group and 1 for the other group. As the
sum of users per group for all group nodes diers from the sum of groups per user
for all user nodes, there is no graph that can fulll this assignment. However, it can
be fullled if one of the parameters is omitted.
Transitive dependency groups reect the dependency between one transitive and
three non transitive parameters. As an example, the transitive dependency group
13 consists of the parameters groups per user, resources per group, group resources
per user and groups per resource. e intuition behind this dependency is that the
transitive parameter group resources of a certain user can be calculated by iterating
over this user’s groups, and summingup the number of accessible resources of each of
these groups. However, this calculation only yields exact results if groups per resource
= 1 for every resource in the graph. If groups per resource > 1 for a resource, e.g., groups
per resource = 2, this means that this resource is accessible by two groups. If a user is
member of both of these groups, the calculation of her group resources would count
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this resource twice, and therefore yield a wrong result. For this reason, groups per
resource also must be a part of the dependency group.
3.5 Characterization of Real-World Workloads
In this section, the real-world workloads that were retrieved according to the pro-
cess described in Section 3.3 are characterized. e characterization focuses on the
workload parameter set introduced in Section 3.4, but also considers some other
parameters.
e real-worldworkloads that are characterized in this section are exemplary.us,
it is not assumed that these workloads are representative for any kind of data sharing
application.e rst reason to present the workload characteristics anyhow is that it
can provide some guidance if workload parameters are missing. An IT operator who
has to estimate the performance of an SDS system may know some of the workload
parameters, but not all that are necessary for the performance evaluation method. It
is also possible the IT operator can estimate some of the parameters in average, but
cannot estimate the shape of the underlying probability distributions. To strengthen
the guidance character of this section, correlations between dierent (scalar) work-
load parameters are analyzed, as this may allow for a better estimation of missing
parameters. Again, the correlations are only presented with regard to the exemplary
real-world parameters. e second reason for presenting a characterization of the
real-world workloads is that these workloads form the input for the performance
evaluation of concrete SDS protocols, which is described in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6.
e workload characterization in this section consists of two parts. In the rst part,
all of the e-learning workloads and all of the groupware workloads are considered as
one large workload each, and the parameters of these large workloads are analyzed
and presented.is part starts with an analysis of group sizes and group permissions,
and their evolution over time. ereaer, the frequency and size of le uploads is
characterized.e part is concludedwith a presentation of resource permissions and
the frequency of permission denials. In the second part of this section, correlations
between scalar workload parameters are analyzed.
e characterized workload data base consists of 11 workloads, each reects a fac-
ulty of our university on an e-learning platform, and of 76 workloads that reect a
certain team or project on a groupware platform. In the following, when distinguish-
ing between e-learning and groupware workloads, the value for groupware work-
loads appears in parentheses.
e workloads comprise 10 920 (751) groups in total, reaching from zero-member-
groups to groups with 37 018 users. A group has 36 members on average.e distri-
bution of group sizes in buckets of ten is shown in Figure 3.2.
Tomake statements aboutmagnitudes of group sizes, each group is categorized into
one of four classes, based on group size: small groups comprise up to 20 members,
medium groups more than 20 and up to 200 members, large groups more than 200
and up to 2000 members, and extra large groups more than 2000 members.
Considering all groups in all workloads, a vast majority of 85.6% small groups is
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Figure 3.2: Frequency of named user groups with respect to the group size.
found, followed by 12.9% medium, 1.3% large and only 0.1% extra large groups.
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Figure 3.3: Frequency of users with respect to the number ofmemberships in named
user groups. Only users with more than one group membership are considered.
Regarding the frequency of group member additions, to 68.9% all of groups, no
member was added within the monitoring period. Not much surprisingly, the fre-
quency of group member additions correlates with the group sizes: While no user
was added at all to most of the small groups, a user was added to medium groups
once in about 6 (2) days. About 1.25 (4) users are added to a large and about 3.7 users
to an extra large group per day. e group with the most user additions per day is
one of the large groups with about 5 user additions per day.
Group member removals are much rarer events. From about 85.0% of all groups,
no user was removed at all during the monitoring period. On average, one removal
occurs for a given group once in 133 (268) days, with a standard deviation of 20 (39)
days. e group with most removals had 286 removals in 118 days, which equals
about 2.5 removals per day. Apart from the fact that the maximum group size is an
54
3 SDS WorkloadModeling and Generation
142.237
29.122
43.250
4.795 3.106 293 87 1 1
0
20.000
40.000
60.000
80.000
100.000
120.000
140.000
160.000
nu
m
be
r o
f w
ri
te
 ev
en
ts
size of data written (MB)
Figure 3.4: Frequency of write events with respect to the size of data written.
upper bound for the number of removals, no correlation was found between the size
of a group and the frequency of removals.
When analyzing group membership relations from the perspective of a user, it is
found that a user is member of 1.6 groups in average and of 852 groups in maximum.
Only 0.3% of all users are member of no group at all, the vast majority of 89.2% of
all users is member of exactly one group.e frequency of users with more than one
group membership is shown in Figure 3.3.
In the following, hierarchy between groups are analyzed. e analysis was only
carried out with regard to workloads that contain at least one group-groupmember-
ship. is applies to 13 workloads from the groupware workloads. e e-learning
platform workloads are not considered, as this platform does not support group hi-
erarchies at all.
In these 13 workloads, 87% of all groups are involved in a group hierarchy. When
only these groups are considered, a group is member of 1 group in average, and thus
has 1 member that is a group in average.
An important factor for the performance of the protocol presented in Chapter 6
is the number of descendant groups of a group g, i.e., all groups that a member of g
is member of. In the considered workloads, a group has 5 descendant groups on
average. Another important inuence factor for the performance of the mentioned
protocol is the sum of group members of all descendant groups regarding a certain
group. In the considered workloads, a group has about 6 descendant groupmembers
on average, with 358 descendant group members in maximum.
As the 13 workloads contain only a limited number of group-group memberships,
the raw KIT-AD workload was also analyzed in a similar manner. Note that this
workload will not be used as an input for a performance evaluation, as it only com-
prises users and groups and relation between those entities, but it does not contain
any resources or permissions on resources. In the raw workload, a group is mem-
ber of 1 group in average. Again, a group has about 6 descendants groups on av-
erage, with a maximum of 1 026 descendant groups. Furthermore, in the raw KIT-
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AD workload, a group has about 182 descendant group members on average, with
a maximum of 38 961.
Next, write events are analyzed. In this case, only a lower bound can be provided
for the frequency of write events, as the workload tracing and generation method
described in Section 3.3 only allows to capture one write event per resource per day.
Under this assumption, about 95 write events per day in the e-learning and about
1 516 write events per day in the groupware platform can be detected. In the average
write event, 1.19MB of data is uploaded to the storage provider. e biggest upload
in all of the workloads comprises 1 056MB.e distribution of data size per write
action is shown in Figure 3.4. As the plot shows, more than 63% of all written les
are smaller than 0.5MB, another 13% are sized between 0.5MB and 1MB, and only
about a quarter of all write actions are larger than 1MB.
Finally, resource permissions and the frequency of permission denials are analyzed,
as these may require potentially resource-intensive re-encryption operations if eager
revocation (cf. Section 2.2) is used. In the following, the eective le permission
are characterized, i.e., folder permissions are recursively applied to subfolders and
nally to les. On average, 97 (55) users are permitted to read and 4 (32) users are
permitted to read and write a le.
On the e-learning platform, permissions cannot be assigned to users directly but
only to groups; on average, 2.5 groups have read and 1.7 groups have read and write
access to a le. On the groupware platform, permissions can also be assigned to users
directly. In this case, 3.8 groups and 4.8 users are permitted to read a le, while 2.3
groups and 3.7 users are additionally permitted to write it.
From the perspective of a user, she is permitted to read 10.7 (421) les, and both read
and write 0.5 (254) les in average. Figure 3.5 shows the distribution of the number
of read and write permissions per user. In the groupware workloads, 94% of all the
read and 93% of the read and write permissions are granted by groupmembership. A
group has read access on 21 and additional write access on 13 les in average, ranging
from 1 up to 15 499 accessible les. No correlation could be found between the group
size and the number of accessible les.
A denial of read or write permissions is a rare event: While read-only access is
never denied in the analyzed workloads, write access on a given le is denied once
in about 2 375 (1 576) days.
In the remainder of this section, correlations between dierent scalar parameters
of single workloads are analyzed. While the results of this correlation analysis also
does not claim to yield results that are representative, they can give hints on how
to congure the workload generator introduced in Section 3.6.e analysis focuses
on the relationship of the overall “size” of a workload and several properties of the
groups the workloads comprises, represented by the average of the respective fre-
quency distribution.
e analysis considers two parameters representing the workload “size”: on the one
hand the total number of les, on the other hand the sum of all le sizes, referred to
as “workload data size”. Our workloads comprise between 10 and 15484 les, with
an average of 1220 les.
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Figure 3.5: Frequency of users with respect to the number of accessible les.
e total data size of the workloads ranges from 0.9 MB up to 29.8 GB, with an
average of 1 932 MB.e distribution of workload data size is shown in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.6: Frequency of workloads with respect to the size of all contained les.
Regarding the groups in the workload, the analysis considers the average number
of les a group has read access to, and the sum of the sizes of these les. Finally, the
analysis comprises the number of write actions that were carried out “by the group”,
i.e., by a user leveraging the write permissions she gets by her group membership,
and the size of data written “by the group”. About 96% of all workloads contain small
groups, about 50% contain medium ones, about 12% contain large groups and about
6% contain extra large groups.
e correlation between these scalar workload parameters is shown in Table 3.4
for the groupware and in Table 3.5 for the ILIAS workloads.e rst value in every
table cell represent Spearman’s correlation coecient, which was used rather than
Pearson’s correlation coecient because the involved parameters are not normally
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Table 3.4: Spearman’s correlation coecient and p-value of groupware workload pa-
rameters. Cells shaded in gray indicate that the correlation is statistically signicant,
assuming a signicance level α = 0.05.
1 2 3 4 5
1) workload number of
les
1.00
2) workload data size 0.88
(1,07E-
22)
1.00
3) average number of
accessible resources per
group
0.85
(9,29E-
20)
0.77
(2,62E-
14)
1.00
4) average accessible data
size per group
0.76
(8,80E-
14)
0.89
(7,46E-
24)
0.85
(9,29E-
20)
1.00
5) average number of write
actions per group
0.78
(7,33E-
15)
0.66
(1,24E-
09)
0.87
(1,23E-
21)
0.72
(6,58E-
12)
1.00
6) average data size writ-
ten per group
0.69
(1,06E-
10)
0.80
(4,64E-
16)
0.78
(7,33E-
15)
0.92
(3,86E-
28)
0.82
(2,12E-
17)
Table 3.5: Spearman’s correlation coecient and p-value of e-learning workload pa-
rameters. Cells shaded in gray indicate that the correlation is statistically signicant,
assuming a signicance level α = 0.05.
1 2 3 4 5
1) workload number of
les
1.00
2) workload data size 0.69
(1,88E-
02)
1.00
3) average number of
accessible resources per
group
0.58
(6,14E-
02)
0.19
(5,76E-
01)
1.00
4) average accessible data
size per group
-0.10
(7,70E-
01)
0.55
(2,26E+00)
-0.04
(9,07E-
01)
1.00
5) average number of write
actions per group
0.00
(1,00E+00)
0.03
(9,30E-
01)
0.15
(6,60E-
01)
0.00
(1,00E+00)
1.00
6) average data size writ-
ten per group
-0.11
(7,47E-
01)
0.40
(2,23E-
01)
-0.26
(4,40E-
01)
0.64
(3,39E-
02)
0.46
(1,55E-
01)
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distributed.e second value is the p-value that indicates the statistical signicance
of the correlation found. When a correlation has a signicance level higher than
0.05, the respective table cell is shaded gray.
It is easy to see that in regarding the ILIAS workloads, only two signicant corre-
lations could be identied: e number of les and the total le size of a workload
correlate, as well as the average aggregated size of all les accessible to the group,
and the total size of data written by using group permissions. Note that the latter
correlation is quite obvious if only one group has access to a set of les. However,
if more than one group is allowed to access a set of les, such a correlation is not
mandatory any more.
Regarding the groupware workloads, signicant correlations could be identied
between any pair of analyzed workload parameters. Strong correlations could be
found between the same parameter pairs as in the case of ILIAS workloads. In ad-
dition, strong correlations could be identied between, e.g., the total le size of a
workload and the average aggregated size of all les accessible to a group, and be-
tween the average number of les accessible to a group and the number of write
actions by using group permissions.
3.6 Generation of Synthetic Workloads
Workload generation means that based on a set of workload parameters, a workload
is generated that adheres to the denition given in Section 3.2. e generation of a
workload is necessary if the performance evaluationmethod requires a fully specied
workload, but the workload cannot be retrieved from real-world systems.is may
be the case if the real-world system under study does not exist yet, or if a possible
future change to the sharing or usage scenario of such a system should be analyzed.
e workload generation method introduced in this section is based on the work-
load parameterization presented in Section 3.4.e method leverages the separation
between static and dynamicworkload parameters by rst generating an initial autho-
rization graph according to the static parameters, which is aerwards incrementally
altered according to the dynamic parameters. Finally, it is proven that certain in-
stance of the workload generation problem are NP-hard. us, the generation of
large workloads is infeasible if certain parameter combinations are predened.
3.6.1 Workload Generation Method
e workload generation method described in this section was constructed as part
of a Bachelor’s thesis [Lei16].e method takes a set of workload parameter assign-
ments as input, and outputs a workload according to the denition given in Sec-
tion 3.2. e workload generation process comprises three steps: First, the set of
predened workload parameters—and partially also the assigned values itself—are
checked. If this check is successful, an instance of an authorization graph is generated
based on the predened static parameters. Finally, according to the predened dy-
namic parameters, incremental changes are applied to the authorization graph, and
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ReadData and WriteData events are inserted. In the following, each of these steps
will be explained in more detail.
e set of predened workload parameters is restricted by both some minimality
criteria that prevent that a workload depends too much on the generation method
itself, as well as some maximality constraints that are derived from the dependency
groups. e minimality constraints require that from each dependency group that
reects the properties of a bipartite graph, at least three out of four parameters are
predened.
To account for dependency groups, the set of predened workload parameters
is checked against each dependency group. In case of upper bounds, it is simply
checked whether the assignments of the respective workload parameters comply
with the upper bound. Regarding bipartite graph induced or transitive dependency
groups, it is checked whether the set of predened parameters contains one of these
dependency groups completely, i.e., whether all of the parameters of any dependency
group are specied at the same time. In this case, the workload generation is aborted.
is restriction is overly strict in a sense that it prevents the processing of a work-
load parameter assignment that may be valid. However, the only alternative would
be to calculate valid ranges for one workload parameter based on all other param-
eters in a dependency group. It is unclear whether this is possible at all, especially
for transitive dependency groups.
In the next step, the initial authorization graph is generated, based on the static
predened workload parameters. e generation method leverages two algorithms
to build the graph:e rst algorithm is an extension of the conguration model, a
well-known algorithm for the generation of random graphs (cf. Section 2.4.3). is
algorithm rst generates all graph nodes, according to the predened parameter as-
signments. ereaer, node degrees are drawn from the predened frequency dis-
tribution parameters. For example, if the parameter groups per user is predened, a
target number of groups is drawn for each user node. Finally, edges are randomly
added with consideration of the target degree of each node. e running time of
this algorithm grows linearly with the number of edges in the authorization graph,
and the resulting graph adheres to the predened workload parameters very closely.
However, this algorithm can only be applied if the set of predened parameters does
not contain any transitive parameter.
If transitive parameters are predened, the method has to switch to another algo-
rithm. In this case, the workload generation problem showed to be NP-hard with
regard to the number of groups.e NP-hardness proofs are given later in this sec-
tion. Consequently, it is not feasible to generate large workloads that adhere to the
predened workload parameters exactly. Instead, themethod employs a heuristic al-
gorithm, whose running time grows linearly with the number of transitive edges in
the graph.e heuristic rst generates user and resource nodes, and inserts tempo-
rary edges between these node sets, according to the predened transitive parame-
ters.is again can be done by using the conguration model. Further node degrees
are drawn from the other predened frequency distribution parameters.ereaer,
the algorithm orders the temporary edges by the user nodes they are starting from,
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and iterates over the edges. In the iteration process, the start user and end resource
nodes of consecutive temporary edges are added to a newly created group node, as
long as the target node degrees of the user and resource nodes already connected to
the group node are not exceeded. In this case, a new group node is created.
e nal workload generation step is the alteration of the initially generated au-
thorization graph according to the predened dynamic workload parameters. is
step is independent of the graph generation algorithm used in the preceding step.
e authorization graph is rst altered by adding or removing nodes; the number
of added or removed nodes of a certain type is drawn from the frequency distribu-
tion of the respective predened parameter. ereaer, edges in the authorization
graph are added or removed. For each node, rst the number of added and then the
number of removed edges is drawn from the respective frequency distribution.
One limitation of the generation method is, as already mentioned, the overly strict
parameter checking: As it is hard to check whether a given parameter assignment
is valid especially with regard to transitive dependency groups, the check simply
prevents the predenition of all parameters of a dependency group. is obviously
might also rule out valid parameter assignments, and therefore limits the space of
workloads that can be generated.
Another limitation of the generation method is that it is impossible to dene cor-
relations between parameters. For example, there is no way to predene that the
number of accessible resources of a group should grow linearly with the group size.
Furthermore, the generation method does not support “locality in space”, i.e. there
is no possibility to enforce clusters of users, groups and resources, with the proba-
bility that a user becomes member of a group within the cluster is higher than for a
group in another cluster. e generation method does also not support “locality in
time”, e.g., the predenition of bursts of a certain workload event type to imitate bulk
operations. One more limitation is that resource hierarchies cannot be generated.
e limitations regarding correlations, locality or resource hierarchies could only
be overcome by extending the set of supported workload parameters. is would
require both a further analysis of dependency groups and an enhancement of the
workload generation method. While this might be feasible from a conceptual point
of view, for applying the tool practically, this would require the user to know or pre-
dict even more workload parameters.
3.6.2 NP-hardness of Workload Generation
In this subsection, the NP-hardness of a set of workload generation problems is
proven. Note that the considered problems require a solution that exactly adheres
to the predened parameters. In many applications, it might be sucient when the
predened parameters are approximately met by the generated workload. However,
approximate solutions are beyond the scope of this section.
A generic formalization of a workload generation problem would be: Given a set
of predened static workload parameters (cf. Section 3.4), generate an authoriza-
tion graph that adheres to the predened parameters as closely as possible for some
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optimization criterion. is formalization leaves open, on the one hand, the con-
crete set of predened workload parameters, and on the other hand, the concrete
optimization criterion. us, the specication of the predened workload param-
eters, together with the optimization criterion, constitutes a workload generation
problem. In the remainder of this section, the predened parameters are referred
to as input parameters.
Restricting the Set of Analyzed Workload Problems
e set of static parameters given in Table 3.1 comprises 13 parameters, and therefore
allows for 213 parameter combinations. As anNP-hardness analysis of each parameter
combination would go far beyond the scope of this thesis, the space of considered
parameter sets has to be restricted.
As a rst restriction step, a more basic version of the authorization graph is con-
sidered that does not allow for a group hierarchy, i.e., the relation MemberGroup is
empty. is way, only 11 parameters have to be analyzed.
As a next restriction step, only those parameter combinations are considered that
do not completely specify any of the dependency groups as listed in Section 3.4. In
other words, only parameter combinations are considered that are a valid input for
the workload generation method introduced in the previous subsection. By testing
each parameter combination for conicts with any dependency group, the number
of non-conicting parameter combinations is calculated as 1 493.
In a further restriction step, only those parameter combinations are considered
that contain at least one transitive parameter. e reason for this is that the work-
load generation problems without transitive parameter can be solved with an exten-
sion of the conguration model in linear time, as described in the previous subsec-
tion. With this restriction, the set of considered parameter combinations comprises
1 066 elements.
Furthermore, only parameter combinations are considered that adhere to the fol-
lowing requirement: If the parameter combination comprises the number of nodes
of a certain type, it also comprises at least one a frequency distribution parameter
that is related to this node type, and vice versa. For example, if the combination con-
tains the parameter users per group, it also has to contain number of groups. Only 54
parameter combinations comply with this limitation.
In addition, the direct parameters direct resources per user and direct users per re-
source are also excluded, as in the workload generation method, these parameter
are treated independent of the transitive parameters. ey can easily be considered
by the extended conguration model. us, the parameter combinations of inter-
est are decreased to 18.
In the nal restriction steps, it is taken advantage of the fact that the set of static
workload parameters can be seen as symmetric, i.e., each parameter combination
has a “mirrored” parameter combination. If an algorithm is known to generate an
authorization graph according to a parameter combination, this algorithm can also
be applied to the mirrored parameter combination.erefore, from each pair of pa-
rameter combinations, only one representative can be chosen arbitrarily. For this
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reason, the NP-hardness analysis only considers parameter combinations that con-
tain the parameterGroupResourcesPerUser, and omits combinations that contain the
mirrored parameterGroupUsersPerResource as only transitive parameter. As a result,
the NP-hardness analysis deals with 9 workload parameter combinations, which are
listed in Table 3.6.
workload
generation
problem
input parameters
1 number of users, group resources per user
2 number of users, group resources per user, number of resources,
groups per resource
3 number of users, group resources per user, number of groups,
users per group
4 number of users, group resources per user, number of groups, re-
sources per group
5 number of users, group resources per user, groups per user
6 number of users, group resources per user, number of groups,
users per group, number of resources, groups per resource
7 number of users, group resources per user, number of groups,
users per group, resources per group
8 number of users, group resources per user, number of groups, re-
sources per group, groups per user
9 number of users, group resources per user, number of resources,
groups per resource, groups per user
Table 3.6: List of analyzed workload parameter combinations
NP-hardness Analysis
Aworkload generation problemWorkload-Gen-X requires, given one of the work-
load parameter combinations Px from those listed in Table 3.6, to generate an autho-
rization graph that adheres to all the input parameters in Px/{GroupResourcesPerUser}
exactly, and minimizes the sum of dierences between the input and the actual fre-
quency distribution of GroupResourcesPerUser, i.e., minimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
eWorkload-Gen-X problems corresponding to the workload parameter com-
binations are visualized in Figure 3.7. For each problem, the diagram visualizes the
input parameters.e user nodes are represented as blue squares on the le side of
each problem visualization, the group nodes as yellow squares in the middle and the
resource nodes as green squares on the right side.e circles indicate the degree of
each node; while the yellow circles represent direct parameters, the red circles at the
top of the user nodes represent the transitive parameter GroupResourcesPerUser.
In Figure 3.7, the problems are ordered in three layers and connected by blue ar-
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Figure 3.7: Visualization of analyzed workload generation problems. e arrows
connecting dierent problems do not indicate a specialization or generalization re-
lation, but superset/subset relations between the respective sets of input parameters.
rows: An arrow indicates that the parameter set of the target problem equals the
union of the parameter sets of the starting problems. It is important to stress that
this visualized relation between dierent problems is no specialization or general-
ization relationship, i.e., an instance of one of those problems cannot be expressed as
an instance of another problem just by applying some restrictions.
For the sake of brevity, the node degree that was drawn for a certain node, i.e. the
target node degree, is referred to in an object-oriented language like manner, such
as, e.g., user.targetGroups for the drawn number of groups a certain user node is
connected to.e number of groups the user node is connected to aer the algorithm
has nished is referred to as user.groups. In the following, it is shown that problems
1, 2 and 5 can be solved in polynomial time by describing a linear-time algorithm.
Denition 7 (Workload-Gen-2). Given frequency distributions for the parameters
number of users, group resources per user, number of resources and groups per resource,
generate an authorization graph adhering to number of users, number of resources and
groups per resource exactly, and thatminimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
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Workload-Gen-2 can be solved in linear time with re-
gard to the number of users and resources: For each re-
source node, resource.targetGroups group nodes are created
and connected to the resource node. Each user node is con-
nected to user.targetResources group nodes, with the limita-
tion that these group nodes have to be connected to pairwise
dierent resources.
Denition 8 (Workload-Gen-5). Given the number of users and frequency distri-
butions for group resources per user and groups per user, generate an authorization
graph that adheres to number of users and groups per user exactly, and minimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
Workload-Gen-5 can also be solved in linear time with
regard to the number of users: For each user node,
user.targetGroups group nodes are created and connected to
the user node. Furthermore, user.targetResources resource
nodes are created and connected to one of the newly created
group nodes; the remaining group nodes are not connected
to any resource node.
Denition 9 (Workload-Gen-1). Given the number of users and a frequency distri-
bution for group resources per user, generate an authorization graph that adheres to
number of users exactly, and minimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
Workload-Gen-1 can also be solved in linear time with
regard to the number of users by enhancing it to either
Workload-Gen-2 or Workload-Gen-5. For example,
Workload-Gen-1 can be enhanced toWorkload-Gen-5 by
arbitrarily dening user.targetGroups for each user node.
e workload generation problems 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are NP-
hard problems, which will be proven as follows: One of the
well-known NP-hard problems Subset-Sum or Partition, which are both dened
in the next paragraph, is reduced to Workload-Gen-X. Note that Subset-Sum or
Partition are both decisional problems, where the solution to the problem is either
yes or no, whileWorkload-Gen-X is an optimization problem.erefore, the basic
idea is to construct reduction proofs in a way that the decisional problem evaluates
to yes i a perfect solution for the optimization problem can be found, i.e., a solution
where user.resources equals user.targetResources for each user node. In each proof,
it is shown that the existence of a perfect solution toWorkload-Gen-X is equivalent
to a positive evaluation of Subset-Sum or Partition.
e Subset-Sum problem is dened as follows:
Denition 10 (Subset-Sum problem [CLO91]). Given n integers a1,. . . ,an and an in-
teger s, is there a subset I of {1,. . . ,n} such that∑i∈I ai = s?
e Partition problem is dened as follows:
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Denition 11 (Partition problem [BRV13]). Given n integers a1,. . . ,an, is there a sub-
set I of {1,. . . ,n} such that s ∶= ∑i∈I ai = ∑i∉I ai?
Note that while ecient algorithms exist that provide approximate solutions to
Subset-Sum and Partition [KX15], this does not imply that ecient approxima-
tion algorithms also exist for the workload generation problem. To show that algo-
rithms for well-known problems are also applicable to a workload generation prob-
lem, the workload generation problemmust be reduced to the well-known problem,
with certain constraints on the complexity of the reduction. is is the opposite of
what is done in this section.
In the remainder of this section, each of the NP-hard workload generation prob-
lems is dened, and a proof of the NP-hardness is given.
Denition 12 (Workload-Gen-3). Given thenumber of users and thenumber of groups,
and frequency distributions for group resources per user and users per group, generate
an authorization graph that adheres to number of users, number of groups and users
per group exactly, and minimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
e NP-hardness of Workload-Gen-3 with regard to the
number of group nodes is proven by reducing the Parti-
tion problem. To transform the Partition problem in-
stance to Workload-Gen-3, rst insert s user nodes with
user.targetResources = 1, and another s user nodes with
user.targetResources = 2. For each integer ai , insert one
group node with group.targetUsers = ai .is transformation
can be done in linear time.
Aer graph generation, each user is assigned to exactly one group: As for each user,
user.targetResources > 0, each user is assigned to at least one group. But as there are
2s user nodes and the sum of group.targetUsers for all groups equals 2s, each user
is connected to at most one group.
If a perfect solution was found, each group node is connected to either one or two
resource nodes, depending on the value of user.targetResources of the group mem-
bers. us, the group nodes are partitioned into “one-resource groups” and “two-
resource groups”, where each one-resource group is only connected to user nodes
with user.targetResources = 1. erefore, the sum of group.targetUsers equals s for
all one-resource groups. is works exactly when s can be represented as the sum
of a subset of the integers a1,. . . ,an.
Denition 13 (Workload-Gen-4). Given thenumber of users and thenumber of groups,
and frequency distributions for group resources per user and resources per group, gen-
erate an authorization graph that adheres to number of users, number of groups and
resources per group exactly, and minimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
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e NP-hardness of Workload-Gen-4 with regard to
the number of group nodes is proven by a reduction of
Subset-Sum. e Subset-Sum instance is transformed to
a Workload-Gen-4 instance by creating one user node
with user.targetResources = s, and another user node with
user.targetResources =∑ni=1 ai . For each integer ai , insert one
group node with group.targetResources = ai .is transformation requires a number
of steps that is linear in the Subset-Sum problem size n.
In the resulting graph, since the sum of group.resources over all groups equals∑ni=1 ai , this is an upper bound for the number of resources that is connected to a
group at all.
If a perfect solution was found, the generated graph contains exactly ∑ni=1 ai re-
source nodes that are connected to a group at all: ere cannot be fewer resources
connected to a group at all, since user.targetResources of the second user node equals∑ni=1 ai . is observation also implies that each resource is connected to no more
than one group node, i.e., it is impossible that there exists more than one path from
a certain user to a certain resource. e sum of group.resources of all groups the
rst user node is connected to equals user.targetResources, which was dened as s.
is is equivalent to the statement that s can be represented as the sum of a sub-
set of the integers a1,. . . ,an.
Denition 14 (Workload-Gen-6). Given the number of users, the number of groups
and the number of resources, and frequency distributions for group resources per user,
users per group and groups per resource, generate an authorization graph that adheres
to number of users, number of groups, users per group, number of resources and groups
per resource exactly, and minimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
Workload-Gen-6 can be proven NP-hard with regard to
the number of group nodes by a reduction of Subset-Sum.
e reduction proof requires that the size of the subset that
sums up to s—denoted as k—is dened up front.e original
Subset-Sum problem can be solved by iteratively increasing
k from 1 to n/2, which is obviously linear in n. us, this
constrained version of Subset-Sum is nonetheless NP-hard.
e instance transformation requires to add s user nodes with user.targetResources
= 1, and of k resource nodes with resource.targetGroups = 1. For each integer ai , one
group node is created with group.targetUsers = ai . is transformation is linear in
the Subset-Sum problem size n. Assuming a perfect solution, the generated graph
has exactly k group nodes connected to one resource each, and the remaining group
nodes are not connected to any resource. No group node can be connected to more
than one resource node, as this would violate the restriction of user.targetResources
= 1. For the same reason, a user node can only be assigned to exactly one group node
that is connected to a resource.us, each of the s user nodes is connected to exactly
one of the k group nodes that are connected to a resource at all.is is only possible
if the sum of group.targetUsers for these k group nodes equals s, which is equivalent
to the statement that a k-sized subset of a1,. . . ,an exists that sums up to s.
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Denition 15 (Workload-Gen-7). Given thenumber of users and thenumber of groups,
and frequency distributions for group resources per user, users per group and resources
per group, generate an authorization graph that adheres to number of users, number
of groups, users per group and resources per group exactly, and minimizes the target
function∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
e proof of the NP-hardness of Workload-Gen-7 with
regard to the number of groups is done by a reduction of
Partition. e linear-time transformation from the Parti-
tion instance to an instance of Workload-Gen-7 requires
to create two user nodes with user.targetResources = s each.
A third user node with user.targetResources = 2s is cre-
ated. For each integer ai , one group node is inserted with
group.targetResources = ai and group.targetUsers = 2.
A perfect solution for the generated graph comprises exactly 2s resources that are
connected to a group at all, and each of these resources is connected to only one
group. e reason for this was already described in the proof of NP-hardness of
Workload-Gen-4. e third user node is connected to all groups, as only this
way, the requirement user.targetResources = 2s can be met. In consequence, each
group is additionally connected to either the rst or the second user node, i.e., the
set of groups is partitioned into “rst-user groups” and “second-user groups”. As
user.resources = s for the rst and the second user node, the sum of group.resources
over the groups of each partition equals s.e existence of this partitioning is equiv-
alent to the statement that Partition evaluates to yes for a1,. . . ,an.
Denition 16 (Workload-Gen-8). Given the number of users and the number of
groups, and frequency distributions for group resources per user, resources per group
and groups per user, generate an authorization graph that adheres to number of users,
number of groups, resources per group and groups per user exactly, and minimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
e NP-hardness of Workload-Gen-8 with regard to
the number of group nodes can be proven by a reduc-
tion of Subset-Sum. Similar to the NP-hardness proof of
Workload-Gen-6, the size of the subset whose elements
sum up to s is predened as k, thus, the algorithm has to be
repeated linear times.
e transformation of the Subset-Sum instance involves
the creation of one user node with user.targetResources = s and user.targetGroups
= k. Another user node is inserted with user.targetResources = ∑ni=1 ai and
user.targetGroups = n. Again, for each integer ai , one group node is created with
group.targetResources = ai , which can be done in a number of steps that grows lin-
early with the problem size n.
In the resulting graph, the second user nodewill be connected to every group node,
which is caused by user.targetGroups set to n.
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Assuming a perfect solution was found by the graph generation algorithm, there
will be exactly ∑ni=1 ai resource nodes that are connected to a group node at all, and
each of these resource nodes will be connected to exactly one group.e reason for
this was already discussed in the NP-hardness proof of Workload-Gen-4.e rst
user node is assigned to k groups, and the sum of group.resources for each of these
groups must equal user.targetGroups, which is s.is is equivalent to the statement
that s can be represented as the sum of k integers out of the integer set a1,. . . ,an.
Denition 17 (Workload-Gen-9). Given thenumber of users andnumber of resources,
and frequency distributions for group resources per user, groups per resource and
groups per user, generate an authorization graph that adheres to number of users,
number of resources, groups per resource and groups per user exactly, and minimizes∑ni=1 ∣ui .targetResources − ui .resources∣.
Finally,Workload-Gen-9 can be provenNP-hard with re-
gard to the number of users by reduction of Subset-Sum.
As in the NP-hardness proofs of Workload-Gen-6 and
Workload-Gen-8, the size of the subset whose elements
sum up to s is predened as k.
e transformation of the Subset-Sum instance requires
the creation of one user node for each integer ai with
user.targetResources = ai and user.targetGroups = 1. An additional user node is in-
serted with user.targetResources = s and user.targetGroups = k. Furthermore,∑ni=1 ai
resource nodes are created, each with resource.targetGroups = 1.
If the graph generation algorithm yields a perfect solution, every user node except
of the last one will be connected to exactly one group node, which in turn is con-
nected to ai resource nodes.e last user node is assigned to k group nodes, and the
sum of group.resources for these groups equals user.targetGroups, which is s.is is
possible exactly if s can be represented as the sum of a k-sized subset of a1,. . . ,an.
e fact that some specic workload generation problems are NP-hard indicates
that workload generation, and performance evaluation methods that rely on work-
loads, might hardly be feasible for large workloads.
3.7 Conclusions and Outlook
e sharing and usage scenario has a major inuence on the performance of SDS
protocols, and therefore has to be a part of performance evaluation methods. In this
chapter, workloads were introduced as a combined sharing and usage model. It was
shown how real-world workloads can be retrieved from sharing services running
in production. However, it was argued that fully specied workloads will be avail-
able in practice only rarely. is can be due to several reasons: e system under
study might not even exist yet, the tracing of these systems might require too much
eort, or it might be necessary to assess the performance of a given SDS system un-
der varying sharing or usage scenarios, e.g., to predict the changes in performance
caused by assumed future changes in the sharing behavior. It was argued that even if
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fully specied workloads are unavailable, at least a set of workload parameters might
be known or can be estimated.us, a performance evaluationmethod that is usable
in practice should accept a set of workload parameters as input.
e identication of a set of workload parameters that constitutes a sucient in-
put for a performance evaluation method is challenging, as this set should fulll two
conicting goals at the same time: On the one hand, the set should only contain pa-
rameters that are likely to be known by the provider of the sharing system, who is
assumed to carry out the performance evaluation. On the other hand, the set should
be comprehensive enough to specify the workload in sucient detail. In this chap-
ter, a set of workload parameters was presented that can serve as a basis for workload
generation, which again can be considered an initial step of a performance evalua-
tion. is set was constructed as a trade-o between these goals: Some degrees of
freedom regarding the workloads that comply to the parameter set were accepted,
e.g., correlations between dierent parameters cannot be predened. However, this
deliberate limitation allows to avoid workload parameters that may only be known
or estimated aer a very detailed inspection of the sharing and usage scenario of
the SDS system under study.
Based on the presented workload parameter set, real-world workloads were char-
acterized.ese workload were retrieved from an e-learning and a groupware plat-
form running at KIT in production. While it cannot be claimed that these workloads
are also representative for dierent data sharing applications, they can be consid-
ered as a guideline if workload parameters that are required for workload genera-
tion are unknown.
Finally, the workload generation method was presented. It could be shown that
the hardness of the graph generation problem that has to be solved for workload
generation depends on the set of predened workload parameters: As long as the set
does not contain a transitive parameter, i.e., a parameter that describes the indirect
relation of users and resources via group memberships and permissions, the related
problem instances can be solved in linear time. If a transitive parameter is predened,
it was proven that many of the related problem instances are NP-hard. Future work
could try to identify approximate solution approaches that are feasible in practice.
e problem instances considered in the NP-hardness proofs require that possible
solutions exactly adhere to all non-transitive parameters. However, for many appli-
cations, an approximate solution might be sucient. erefore, a future task could
be to analyze the hardness of workload generation problems that also accept a solu-
tion that ts the predened parameters “good enough”.
A possible enhancement of the workload denition would be a media type label
for resources, which indicates whether the resource is a text document, a picture, a
movie etc. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, this would allow to estimate the time it
requires the user client to process the resource aer the download. As this processing
time is required no matter if the data sharing is secure or “insecure”, it could serve
as a baseline to assess the overhead of security in data sharing.
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Evaluation
In existing literature, the performance of SDS protocol when processing dierent
workload event types, e.g., uploading data or adding a member to a sharing group,
is usually expressed in terms of asymptotical behavior of some performance metric
in relation to some workload parameter N . While asymptotical analyses are a good
starting point to identify factors that are relevant for the performance, they are not
sucient to estimate the concrete performance of secure data sharing for two rea-
sons. First, the values that the workload parameter N typically takes, i.e., the under-
lying sharing model of the system, is oen unclear: While we assume that a storage
provider may have some rough idea of the range of sharing group sizes or the over-
all size of data shared, many possibly relevant parameters are harder to determine,
e.g., the average number of les accessible per sharing group.is issue was already
addressed by the workload characterization presented in Section 3.5. Second, the
asymptotical analysis abstracts from constant factors, e.g., the properties of the client
hardware, which may be highly relevant for the performance in reality.us, a more
ne-grained method for evaluating the performance of SDS protocols is necessary.
In this chapter, the methods used in this thesis for performance evaluation of SDS
protocols are presented: an analyticalmethod in Section 4.1, and a simulativemethod
in Section 4.2. As the performance depends not only on the SDS protocol, but also
on the workload and the client hardware, these factors are incorporated into both
methods.e methods especially dier in that the simulative method requires fully
specied workloads, while the analytical method might operate on more abstract
workload parameters, which renders the latter more usable in real-world applica-
tions. However, it will be shown that there are cases in which the analytical method
requires mathematical techniques that are hard to handle in practice. In those cases,
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the simulative method might be preferred.
e goal of both the analytical and the simulative performance evaluation method
is the estimation of the computation time and incoming and outgoing network trac
required on a user’s client device.e rst dimension, the computation time, repre-
sents the time it takes the client device to process a workload event completely.e
use of SDS requires computation time especially for cryptographic operations, e.g.,
for the generation of keys, for encryption and decryption, or for the generation of
digital signatures.is dimension is relevant for the deployability of the SDS system,
as it has a major inuence on the delay the user experiences, e.g., when she down-
loads and opens an encrypted document. In this thesis, it is assumed that a workload
event is processed sequentially, i.e., the concurrent processing is not considered.
As second dimension, the network trac that is induced by SDS is considered.
SDS generates network trac in addition to the network trac required by “inse-
cure” data sharing, as it requires the exchange of cryptographic material between
the users, e.g., encrypted data, encrypted keys, or digital signatures. is dimen-
sion also has a major impact on the deployability of the SDS system, as especially
mobile devices may be connected to wireless networks with small bandwidths. e
performance evaluation methods consider incoming and outgoing trac separately.
In the following, the term costs of an operation is used as a placeholder for either the
computation time or the network trac induced by an operation.
e basic assumption behind both the analytical and the simulative method is that
the performance is largely determined by the cryptographic operations. us, only
the computation time and the network trac generated by cryptographic operations
are considered by the methods.
Parts of this chapter have already been published before in [KH15] and [KH16].
4.1 Analytical Method
In this section, the analytical performance evaluationmethod is presented.emod-
eling process for thismethodusually starts with the formalization of the performance
of a single workload event, which will be introduced in the rst part of this section.
In the second part, it is shown how the single-event model can be generalized to
evaluate the performance of an SDS protocol under a complete workload.
4.1.1 Analyzing the Performance of Single Workload Events
With the analytical method, the performance is estimated by using a set of mathe-
matical expressions.ese expressions have to be evaluated by inserting the concrete
costs of cryptographic operations on a certain device, and concrete workload param-
eters (cf. Chapter 3).e expressions are built in a manual process by analyzing the
SDS protocol under study. For each workload event type, the SDS protocol denes
a sequence of operations that have to be carried out. From this denition, which is
usually given in pseudocode, the number and type of cryptographic operations have
to be extracted. e result of the protocol analysis is one expression per workload
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event type for each of the dimensions computation time, incoming network trac,
and outgoing network trac.
Whereas the goal of the method is to evaluate the performance regarding a whole
workload, the SDS protocol analysis usually only yields the performance for the ex-
ecution of a single workload event. ere are dierent challenges for the general-
ization of the resulting per-event, or raw, expressions to per-workload expressions.
ese challenges will be discussed in the next subsection.
A simple example for a raw expression allows to calculate the computation time for
processing a RemoveUserFromGroup event of a ctitious SDS protocol as
ctRemoveUserFromGroup = ctCreateSymKey+ctAsymEncryptKey×groupSize, (4.1)
where ctCreateSymKey represents the time required to create a symmetric key, ctA-
symEncryptKey represents the time required for the encryption of a symmetric key
with an asymmetric cipher, and groupSize is the current size of the user group. From
a syntactical point of view, the expression is an algebraic expression, and therefore
comprises variables that are linked by algebraic operations. e variables in a raw
expression are either costs of cryptographic operations, such as ctCreateSymKey and
ctAsymEncryptKey in the example above, or entity parameters such as groupSize. An
entity parameter is a parameter that is related to a specic entity within theworkload,
i.e., a user, a group, or a resource. Similar to workload parameters, the set of think-
able entity parameters is not limited (cf. Section 3.4). An entity parameter might be
as simple as “the number of groups the user is member of ” or “the data size of a re-
source”, while it might as well be as complex as “the number of users that have access
tomore than 50% of the resources the user has access to”.e last example shows that
to evaluate an entity parameter, it may be necessary to not only consider the entity in
question, but also other entities that are related in someway. An entity parameter can
be generalized to a workload parameter in many ways, e.g., by dening a workload
parameter that reects the average of an entity parameter over all entities of this type.
e validity of the analytical method is based on some assumptions. e rst as-
sumption is that both the computation time as well as the network trac required for
processing a workload event can be estimated with sucient precision by only con-
sidering cryptographic operations. As the trac size of the actual shared (and en-
crypted) data is part of the workload, it is also taken into account in the performance
evaluations carried out for this thesis, and can also serve as a baseline to compare SDS
with “insecure” data sharing. On the other hand, the computation times required to
process data by the client-side application, such as rendering a document or amovie,
are not taken into account.is is discussed as future work at the end of this chapter.
e second assumption is that the costs of the cryptographic operations carried out
to process one workload event are independent from each other.is means that the
costs of a repetition of a cryptographic operation scale linearly with the number of
repetitions. is assumption may break if a cryptographic operation consists of an
initialization phase thatmay take a comparatively long time, and an arbitrary number
of comparatively fast repetitions. In fact, some micro-benchmarking shows that this
assumption breaks, e.g., when using certain implementations of AES:e total time
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required to encrypt a large chunk of data cannot be formulated asmultiple of the time
required to encrypt a small chunk of data. However, the micro-benchmarking also
shows that the error of a linear approximation is within the range of microseconds,
which can be considered acceptable for the purpose of this thesis.
e third assumption regarding the validity of the analytical method is that the
costs for processing the workload events can be considered isolated from each other.
is especially means that aer processing a workload event, the client-side state
is completely cleared, i.e., all required and generated cryptographic material is lo-
cally deleted, apart from personal keys of the user. us, if the costs for processing
a workload event is dependent on previous workload events in any way, then this
dependency has to be modeled as an entity parameter.
As alreadymentioned, an expression can be built by using an arbitrary combination
of algebraic operations. In course of the performance evaluation of dierent SDS
protocols carried out in this thesis, various types of expressions were actually met.
For example, sometimes the costs can be expressed independent from any entity
parameters by simply scaling the costs of a single cryptographic operation:
ctAddUser = 2 × ctCreateAsymKeyPair. (4.2)
In other cases, the costs are expressed as linear combination of dierent entity pa-
rameters, similar to the following example:
ctRevokeUserReadWriteAccess =resourceReaders × ctAsymEncryptKey+
2 × resourceWriters × ctAsymEncryptKey, (4.3)
where a key has to be asymmetrically encrypted for each user that is granted read
access on the resource, and two keys have to be asymmetrically encrypted for each
user that is granted read and write access. Finally, some expressions requires to sum
up one parameter of multiple entities, where the number of sum elements is deter-
mined by another entity parameter:
ctRemoveUserFromGroup = userGroups∑
i=1 groupSize × ctAsymEncryptKey (4.4)
In this example, the computation time of a group member removal event is deter-
mined by the sum of the group sizes of the removed user’s groups.
4.1.2 Analyzing the Performance of Complete Workloads
To generalize the raw expressions that are related to a single workload event to ex-
pressions that are related to the workload as a whole, the entity parameters have to
be replaced by workload parameters. For example, to generalize the raw expression
given in Equation 4.1 to yield the average computation time for the group member
removal event over the whole workload, the entity parameter groupSize has to be
replaced by an average over the whole workload. More generally, the workload pa-
rameter must reect a set of samples of the entity parameter taken in the course of
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the workload. As each expression is related to a certain workload event type, the en-
tity parameter should only be sampled when an event of exactly this type occurs. For
example, the entity parameter groupSize in the raw expression Equation 4.1 should
be replaced by a workload parameter that reects the group size whenever a group
member is removed. Depending on the purpose of the performance evaluation and
the required accuracy, it might be valid to insert a more general sample set of the
entity parameter: In the example above, the entity parameter groupSize might also
be replaced by a workload parameter that represents the group size whenever an
arbitrary workload event occurs.
e types of workload parameters considered in this thesis are either scalar values
or frequency distributions (cf. Section 3.4). erefore, an entity parameter can be
replaced by either the frequency distribution of a set of samples of this parameter, or
by a statistical measure of this frequency distribution. However, this replacement is
related to some assumption and challenges, which are discussed in the following.
e rst challenge is that replacing an entity parameter by a frequency distribution
or a statistical measure of such a distribution is only possible if the expression com-
prises nomore than oneworkload parameter.e reason for this is that algebraic op-
erations involving multiple frequency distributions—or their statistical measures—
are not meaningful.e only exception is the average of the frequency distributions.
ere are two ways to deal with this issue: Either the entity parameters are not re-
placed by the respective frequency distributions one by one, but they are replaced
by a joint frequency distribution as a whole. For example, the raw expression Equa-
tion 4.3 can be generalized by retrieving the joint frequency distribution of the entity
parameters resourceReaders and resourceWriters, and replacing the sum of the entity
parameters with the frequency distribution of resourceReaders+ 2× resourceWriters.
However, from amethodical point of view, replacing entity parameters by joint fre-
quency distributions can be considered as a step towards a simulative performance
evaluation method. In fact, the simulative method discussed in Section 4.2 implic-
itly takes these joint frequency distributions into account. A way to deal with this
limitation while retaining the analytical method is to switch from descriptive fre-
quency distributions to probability distributions, which is discussed in the remain-
der of this section.
While it is possible to apply algebraic operations on the probability distributions
underlying the frequency distributions of the workload parameters, there are still
some assumptions required. For example, without knowing the joint distribution
of the workload parameters, the expression can only be evaluated if the contained
workload parameters are statistically independent.is breaks, e.g., as soon as there
are multiple occurrences of one and the same workload parameter within an expres-
sion [Wil89]. In case of independentworkload parameters, theremay beways to, e.g.,
calculate a linear combination of the parameter probability distributions by convo-
lutions of these distributions. While convolutions are well-known for some concrete
families of probability distributions, cumbersome mathematical techniques such as
numerical methods are required to calculate convolutions of other distribution fam-
ilies: “is is because the resulting formulae are sometimes so complex (e.g. innite
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series of transcendental functions) that a computer program is needed to calculate
the specic values and to determine the behaviour of the distribution.” [Wil89]
e property of statistical independence of the workload parameters is also impor-
tant when carrying out a sensitivity analysis, i.e., when the impact of one or more
workload parameters on the performance should be analyzed. A common way to
carry out a sensitivity analysis is to vary one parameter while xing all other param-
eters, which is known as One-Factor-at-a-Time experiment [Dan73]. is requires
that the parameters can be varied independently from each other, which is obvi-
ously possible with statistically independent parameters. If the parameters depend
on each other, it is only possible to vary the joint distribution of these parameters,
which defeats the goal of quantifying the impact of a distinct workload parameter
on the performance.
In conclusion, the analytical method is a straight-forward method that is based on
a manual analysis of the SDS protocol under study. e resulting set of expressions
is a comparatively intuitive performance evaluation model. e analytical method
does not require fully specied workloads as input, but workload parameters are suf-
cient, which enhances the employability of this method in practice. In many cases,
it can be used to do a sensitivity analysis with low eort, especially when only the
average performance is of interest. However, if the performance of an SDS proto-
col is determined by dependent workload parameters, the input of the method must
either be based on joint frequency distributions, which is a step towards the simula-
tive method presented in the next section. Alternatively, the deterministic frequency
distributions are replaced by probability distributions. However, the mathematical
techniques required to calculate with certain families of probability distributions
are cumbersome. us, in case of dependent workload parameters, the simulative
method might be more practical.
4.2 Simulative Method
In this section, a simulative performance evaluation method is presented.e main
idea of this method is that SDS protocols respond to workload events by manipulat-
ing the key graph that represents the system state. ese key graph manipulations
directly reect the costs of the operation. In the rst part of this section, a deni-
tion of the key graph is introduced that serves as a basis for the simulative perfor-
mance evaluation method. In the second part, the simulative performance evalua-
tion method is presented.
4.2.1 Key Graph
As shown in Section 2.2, an SDS protocol leverages cryptographic data structures,
such as keys, lockboxes, or digital signatures to achieve condential, integer and au-
thentic data sharing. As a simple example, when a resource should be written, an
SDS protocol may rst create a symmetric key to encrypt the resource, and then cre-
ate a lockbox by encrypting this symmetric key with the public key of the writing
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user. e main idea of the simulative method is based on two observations: First,
the generation of these cryptographic data structures requires computation time,
and the up- and download of the data structures generates network trac. And sec-
ond, lockboxes and signatures are about linking multiple keys, or linking a key to
a resource: both lockboxes and digital signatures are parameterized by a key—the
encrypting or signing key, respectively—and they are related to some encrypted or
signed data, which may be a key by itself, or a resource.erefore, the cryptographic
data structures and their relations form a graph—the key graph —, and the perfor-
mance can be estimated from the changes to the key graph. us, for performance
evaluation purposes, SDS protocols can be modeled in terms of the manipulations
they carry out on the key graph.
In the following, a denition is given for the key graph that is used as the basis for
simulative performance evaluation.is denition of a key graph is an extension of
the denition given in Section 2.2. For the rest of this thesis, the term key graph refers
to the denition given below, if not stated otherwise. In the following, the possible
types of nodes and edges are specied.
Denition 18. A key graph node has one of the following types: user, resource, key,
lockbox, signature.e set of user nodes is denoted byU , the set of keys as K, the set
of resources as R, the set of lockboxes as L, and the set of signatures as S.e set of
key graph nodes is denoted as Vkg .
e edges between node types carry dierent semantics, as, e.g., an edge from a
user node to a key node indicates that the user has access to this key in clear text.
However, there are combinations of edge source and edge target node types cannot
be assigned meaningful semantics for SDS, such as an edge from signature node to
a user node.erefore, the set of allowed key graph edges has to be restricted.
Denition 19. e edge source node s and edge target note t of a key graph edge
fulll the following conditions:
1. s ∈ U ⇒ t ∈ K ∪ R ∪ L ∪ S
2. s ∈ K ⇒ t ∈ L ∪ S
3. s ∈ L⇒ t ∈ K ∪ R
4. s ∈ S ⇒ t ∈ L
5. s ∉ R
e set of key graph edges is denoted as Ekg .
An overview of the allowed edge types and the semantics of those is given in Ta-
ble 4.1.
Based on these denitions, the key graph can easily be dened as:
Denition 20. A key graph is a directed acyclic graph (V , E) with V = Vkg and
E = Ekg .
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source node
type
target node
type
semantics
user key the user stores the key in plain text on her client
user resource the user stores the resource in plain text on her client
user lockbox the user just created or retrieved the lockbox
user signature the user just created or retrieved the signature
key lockbox the lockbox was created using the key
key signature the signature was created using the key
lockbox key the lockbox encrypts the key
lockbox resource the lockbox encrypts the resource
signature lockbox the signature can be used to check the integrity of the lock-
box
Table 4.1: List of allowed key graph edge types and their semantics
An exemplary key graph is visualized in Figure 4.1.
Both symmetric keys and asymmetric key pairs aremodeled as key nodes. An edge
from an asymmetric key node to a lockbox node means that the lockbox was created
using the public part of the key pair and has to be decrypted using the private part.
An edge from a lockbox node to an asymmetric key node means that the lockbox
contains the private part of the asymmetric key pair. Lockbox nodes additionally
store the size of the ciphertext they encrypt.
As the semantics of the node and edge types prohibit certain anomalies such as
a lockbox node without an outgoing edge, the following requirements are specied
for a key graph to be consistent:
– Each key node must have at least one incoming edge, as otherwise, no user
could ever retrieve this key in plain text.
– Each resource node must have at least one incoming edge, as otherwise, the
resource would not be stored anywhere.
– Each lockbox nodemust have at least one1 incoming edge and exactly one out-
going edge.
– Each signature node must have exactly one incoming edge—starting at the
key used for signing—and at least one outgoing edge, as a signature can sign
multiple lockboxes.
To ensure that the key graph is always in a consistent state, atomicmanipulations on
the key graph, i.e., adding or removing a node or edge of a certain type, are encapsu-
lated in transactions. An exemplary transaction isAddEncryptedResource(r, size, k, u),
1e use of so-called “broadcast secret schemes” can lead to more than one incoming edge for a
lockbox.
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Figure 4.1: Visualization of an exemplary key graph.
which indicates that user u encrypted resource r of size size with key k and up-
loaded the encrypted resource to the storage provider. e manipulations made by
this transaction are listed in Listing 4.1 , and visualized in Fig. 4.2. 
AddResourceNode(newResourceId);
AddLockboxNode(newLockboxId, encryptedResourceSize);
AddLockboxResourceEdge(newLockboxId, newResourceId);
AddKeyLockboxEdge(encryptionKeyId, newLockboxId);
AddUserLockboxEdge(creatorId, newLockboxId); 
Listing 4.1: Sequence of atomic key graph operations in transaction
AddEncryptedResource
An SDS protocol uses the key graph transactions tomanipulate the key graphwhen
triggered by a workload event. From this perspective, an SDS protocol can be con-
sidered as a set of procedures, with one procedure per workload event type. Each
of these procedures takes the workload event parameters and the current key graph
as input, and carries out a sequence of key graph transactions. e control ow of
the procedure may be dened by using arbitrary control ow constructs, such as
branches or loops.
Note that this denition of a key graph cannot be used to evaluate whether a user
can or cannot access a resource, i.e., the denition cannot be used for a reachability
analysis in an access control sense. e reason for this is that the denition allows
to delete lockbox and signature nodes, which simply reects that the corresponding
cryptographic data structures are deleted. Opposed to that, a model that evaluates
the reachability would probably assume that cryptographic data structures are never
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Figure 4.2: Manipulation of key graph by transaction AddEncryptedResource.
deleted. However, a “reachability evaluation” key graph can easily be constructed
from a “performance evaluation” key graph as dened above by simply skipping all
node or edge removals.
4.2.2 Simulative Performance Evaluation Method
e simulative performance evaluation method is based on a state machine. e
input symbols of this machine are the workload events dened in Section 3.2. e
states are key graph states, i.e., instances of the key graph as specied in the previous
subsection.e state transition function is determined by the SDS protocol. Finally,
the output of each transition is the estimated incoming and outgoing network trac
and computation time that the acting user needed to carry out the respective key
graph manipulation.
Formally, we dene the simulative performance evaluation method as follows:
Denition 21. e simulative performance evaluation method is a state machine(E ,R,K, kg0, δ,ω) with:
– input symbols from E : the set of workload events as specied in Section 3.2;
– output symbols fromR: the set of tuples (u, tcomp, nin, nout) where u is a work-
load user (cf. Section 3.2), and tcomp, nin and nout are the required computation
time, incoming and outgoing network trac volume, respectively;
– states from K: the set of consistent key graph states;
– the starting state kg0: the key graph state with V = ∅ and E = ∅;
– the state transition function δ, which is the key graph transformation function:
δ∶K × E → K;
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– the output function ω, which is the performance function: ω∶K × E →R
In the following, the dierent components of this denition are discussed.
e set of states in our state machine is specied as the set of consistent key graph
states K. In the former subsection, the consistency requirements for a key graph
were described, and it was argued that an SDS protocol manipulates the key graph
by means of key graph transactions. For the simulative method, this implies that the
SDS protocol determines the transitions between key graph states when triggered by
a workload event e ∈ E . us, to model an SDS protocol, it must be specied how
the key graph transformation function δ is calculated.
is leads to the following denition:
Denition 22. An SDS protocol model is a function δ∶K×E → K that, given a consis-
tent key graph instance k0 and a workload event e, transforms k0 to a new key graph
instance k1 by applying an arbitrary number of key graph transactions.
As shown in the previous subsection, the state transition function can be imple-
mented as a set of procedures, where each procedure is triggered by a certain work-
load event type.
e output of the method are the costs required for a key graph state transition.
More specically, the output states the required computation time and incoming and
outgoing network trac volume for the user that carried out the key graph manip-
ulation. e performance function ω maps a key graph state transition to concrete
values for the costs, i.e., it assigns costs to each manipulation made on the key graph.
e complete implementation of the performance function is omitted here, as most
of the cost assignments are quite obvious. As an example, theAddEncryptedResource
transaction that is shown in Fig. 4.2 incurs computation time to user u for the en-
cryption of resource r, and it incurs outgoing network trac volume to upload the
encrypted resource r to the storage provider.
4.2.3 Limitations and Relation to Analytical Method
e simulative method is based on some assumptions that are necessary due to the
abstraction by the key graph. ese assumptions generally require that generation
and transfer of cryptographic data structures are always coupled. For example, it has
to be assumed that a signature that is uploaded to the storage provider was gener-
ated just before the upload, or that a downloaded lockbox is decrypted right aer
the download. us, the upload of already existing signatures or lockboxes, or the
cloning of keys without actually generating them cannot be modeled.
In the remainder of this subsection, the dierences between the analytical and the
simulative method are discussed. e most obvious dierence is that for the simu-
lative method, fully specied workloads complying with the denition given in Sec-
tion 3.2 are required. Opposed to the analytical method, it is not enough to provide
a set of workload parameters, which is challenge for using this method in practice.
However, depending on the set of known workload parameters, the workload gen-
eration method shown in Section 3.6 might be sucient to prepare a workload as
input for the simulative method.
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Furthermore, the analytical method tends to make fundamental inuence param-
eters for the performance more emergent: While the dierent procedures that form
the protocol model also have to be built by a manual analysis, the simulative proto-
col model is closer to a given pseudocode representation than in the analytical case.
is can be considered a drawback of the simulative method, as relations between
the workload parameters and the performance can hardly be understood by inspec-
tion of the protocol model. At the same time, the process of protocol modeling is
usually simpler than for the analytical method.
A further dierence between the analytical and the simulative method is the set of
SDS protocols that the respective method can be applied to.e simulative method
can be applied to only a subset of SDS protocols that can be evaluated with the ana-
lytical method. e reason for this is that an SDS protocol can only be simulated if
it retains to the cryptographic structures of keys, lockboxes and signatures. On the
other hand, as long as this requirement is fullled, SDS protocols using arbitrarily
complex cascades of keys, lockboxes and signatures can be simulated.
ere are methods that “lie between” the analytical and the simulative method in
some sense. For example, the simulative method could be altered by omitting the
key graph, and just summing up the costs of the cryptographic operations instead.
is would not inuence the accuracy of the method, and would even enhance the
set of SDS protocols the method can be applied to. However, the key graph-based
method has two advantages: First, the method species a xed abstraction level, i.e.,
it species the operations that have to be included in the model.is promotes a fair
comparison between dierent SDS protocols. Second, from a simulation manage-
ment perspective, the key graph holds the complete state of the authorizationmodel,
which is usually required by the SDS protocol. In some cases, the information stored
by the authorization model is not sucient for the SDS protocol. For example, a
protocol may require information about the number of group member additions
and removals that occurred in a given user group in the past. If this information
is required, it can typically also be inferred from the key graph. erefore, the key
graph manages the major part of the simulation state, and supersedes an additional
implementation of the state management.
Another possibility to alter the simulative method is to change the output function
in a way that is does no longer yield xed costs, but one or more expressions accord-
ing to the analytical model (cf. Section 4.1). ese expressions already include an
evaluation of the workload parameters, but the costs of cryptographic operations are
still expressed as variables. If the total operation costs depend on only one workload
parameter, a single expression is sucient. If the expression costs depend on more
than one workload parameter, the output function yields a vector of expressions,
with one vector element for each workload event of the given operation type.ese
vector elements can be considered as raw expressions in the terminology of the an-
alytical method.e resulting expressions are evaluated by inserting concrete costs
for cryptographic operations.e advantage of this adapted simulativemethod is the
decoupling of the simulation and the simulated hardware, as the output is hardware
independent. us, the SDS performance of dierent hardware could be evaluated
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with only one simulation run per workload and SDS protocol. While this adaptation
potentially reduces the number of necessary simulation runs, it does neither inu-
ence the accuracy of the method, nor does it enhance the set of SDS protocols the
method can be applied to.erefore, the adaptation can be regarded as future work.
4.3 Conclusions and Outlook
In this chapter, it was argued that a performance evaluation of SDS protocols regard-
ing their asymptotical behavior is not sucient to assess the real-world deployability.
Two performance evaluation methods were presented that both yield concrete costs
for an SDS protocol employed under a given workload. e analytical method re-
quires only workload parameters instead of fully specied workloads. However, the
analytical method has limitations when the performance of a given operation is in-
uenced by more than one workload parameter, and statistical measures other than
the average should be analyzed. e simulative method overcomes this drawback,
but requires fully specied workloads, which might be unavailable in many cases. In
some of these cases, the required workloads can be generated according to the gen-
erationmethod presented in Chapter 3. In the remaining chapters of this thesis, both
methods are used to carry out performance evaluations of dierent SDS protocols.
While the performance evaluation methods presented in this chapter can be used
to estimate the expected performance, they do not give any advice on whether the
performance is acceptable for the end users in practice. One approach to assess this
question is to compare the expected performance of secure data sharing with that
of “insecure” data sharing, assuming the same workload.erefore, the overhead of
security could be evaluated as “the price to pay”. For the required network trac,
the analytical performance evaluation methods allow to separate the transfer size of
the shared data from the size of the cryptographic data structures. e simulative
method can easily be enhanced to do so. us, both methods can be used to assess
the overhead of secure data sharing in terms of network trac. On the other hand,
the computation times for all “administrative” workload events, such as GrantUser-
ReadAccess orAddUserToGroup, can be assumed as zero in the insecure case, making
the overhead assessment trivial. An overhead assessment of the computation time
for ReadData and WriteData workload events is challenging and not supported by
the performance evaluation methods presented in this chapter.e reason for this is
that the computation time is highly dependent on both the media type of the shared
document, such as a spreadsheet or a movie, and the concrete client application used
for processing the document. However, the media type is not part of the workload
denition given in Section 3.2. It is considered future work to incorporate the media
type into both the workload denition and the performance evaluation methods.
Another future research direction might be the consideration of further perfor-
mance dimensions. For example, the network latency caused by an SDS protocol
would be a relevant metric, since it has a strong impact on the waiting time experi-
enced by the end user.e latency is heavily inuenced by the number of roundtrips
between end user and storage provider that are required for a certain operation.e
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challenge of evaluating the number of roundtrips is that it depends not only on the
SDS protocol itself, but also on the implementation of the protocol.is is especially
the case if the exact cryptographic data structures that have to be retrieved from the
storage provider are not known to the client at the beginning of an operation, and
have to be determined dynamically. Without modeling implementation details, it is
impossible to tell whether the client fetches the required cryptographic data struc-
tures one by one, or fetches all potentially required data structures in one operation,
which trades a low number of roundtrips for a higher volume of transferred data.
As further possibility, the storage provider might be able to deliver exactly the re-
quired data structures. However, in this case, the storage provider has to know the
SDS protocol that is used, which again is an implementation issue. us, consider-
ing the latency requires a dierent model of an SDS protocol that also takes more
implementation details into account.
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Operations
In this chapter, the performance evaluationmethods presented in the previous chap-
ter are applied to dierent E2E-SDS protocols. e focus of this chapter is on E2E-
SDS protocols that support named user groups, i.e., user groups that are managed
by a dedicated group owner. is feature is part of popular distributed le systems,
such as NFSv4 and CIFS.e details of the group-based authorization model that is
realized by the protocols are described in Section 3.1.
e protocols analyzed in this chapter employ joint authorization operations, i.e.,
operations that are carried out by at least two dierent users in a collaborative man-
ner.ese operations require that the involved users are reachable in the network and
able to allocate the necessary computational resources immediately upon request.
On the one hand, this limits the practical applicability of the protocol especially in
conjunction withmobile user devices. On the other hand, joint authorization opera-
tions constrain the attack vector for certain attacks on E2E-SDS protocols, which will
be detailed in this chapter. A novel E2E-SDS protocol that omits joint authorization
operations is introduced in Chapter 6.
e chapter starts with a specication of the requirements that arise from the com-
bination of E2E-SDS and the support for named user groups in Section 5.1. In Sec-
tion 5.2, attacks onE2E-SDS protocols are discussedwith regard to necessary attacker
capabilities, prerequisites, and countermeasures.
e main contributions of this chapter are performance evaluations of concrete
E2E-SDS protocols. e computation time and network trac volume required by
the dierent authorization operations are evaluated by means of the two methods
introduced in Chapter 4. e performance evaluations are based on the real-world
workloads that were characterized in Section 3.5.
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In Section 5.3, the performance of an E2E-SDS protocol is evaluated that is sim-
ilar to protocols that are in productive use today. is protocol is based on tradi-
tional cryptographic primitives, i.e., symmetric and asymmetric cryptography that
produces ciphertexts dedicated to a single recipient only. To improve the perfor-
mance of the protocol for large user groups, it is extended with an existing Group
Key Management approach.
Moreover, the introducedperformance evaluationmethodswere applied to anE2E-
SDS protocol based on Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). On the one hand, ABE
promises to enable resource-saving SDS systems in terms of ciphertexts that have to
be generated and distributed. On the other hand, some ABE schemes were shown
to exhibit a performance worse than traditional cryptography, at least in small and
articial sharing scenarios. In Section 5.4, rst an ABE scheme is identied that fa-
cilitates E2E-SDS, which conicts with the need for a central trusted entity thatmany
ABE schemes bring along. Second, the attribute-based authorizationmodel of a suit-
able ABE scheme ismapped to the group-based authorizationmodel.ree dierent
alternatives for the mapping were identied, and the performance of each mapping
alternative is evaluated in Section 5.5. Finally, the performance of the E2E-SDS pro-
tocols based on traditional cryptography and the ABE-based protocol are compared.
Conclusions and future work are presented in Section 5.6.
e content presented in this chapter has partially been published before in [KH13],
[KH14], [KH15] and [KH16].
5.1 Requirements for E2E-SDS Supporting Named User
Groups
One objective of this thesis is to evaluate the performance of E2E-SDS protocols that
support named user groups. In this section, the requirement on E2E-SDS proto-
cols with support for named user groups are stated explicitly. e requirements are
derived from the denition of E2E-SDS as given in Section 2.2, and from the group-
based authorization model introduced in Section 3.1.is section strives to compile
and summarize the requirements, and to discuss requirements that arise from the
combination of E2E-SDS and the support of named user groups.
Aer a recap of the entities in the system and the authorizationmodel, the required
expressiveness of authorization policies is discussed. ereaer, requirements re-
garding the trust between the system entities are stated. Finally, requirements on
the revocation of access permissions are introduced. e numbering of a part of
the requirements serves as a reference for the evaluation of ABE schemes presented
in Section 5.4.1.
5.1.1 System Entities and Authorization Model
e system entities that strive to share data are represented by users.e shared data
is stored at a storage provider as a set of resources, where a resource constitutes a data
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chunk that can be shared independently from other data chunks. Each resource has a
resource owner that grants and denies read or read and write access to other users—
referred to as direct permissions—or to nameduser groups. Anameduser group—or
simply “group” for the remainder of this thesis—is a set of users that is managed by a
group owner, and exists independently from any permissions on resources. Each re-
source owner might grant access on her resources to arbitrary groups.e described
group-based authorization model was detailed in Section 3.1.
5.1.2 Expressiveness of Policies
To be able to implement the group-based authorizationmodel sketched in the previ-
ous section, ne-grained access control policies are required that can be applied on
a per-resource basis. ese policies have to be expressive enough to grant read and
additionally write access to arbitrary users and groups (Req.1). Especially, the poli-
cies must allow the owner of a resource to grant access to groups owned by dierent
group owners (Req.2). For example, a resource owner could specify that her resource
r can be accessed by all members of g1 owned by user ua, and by all members of g2
and g3, which ub owns. On the other hand, a resource owner should not have to be
forced to share data with at least one group from each group owner (Req.3).
5.1.3 Trust and Authorization Process
e essential property of E2E-SDS is that the authorization and access control en-
forcement on the shared data is carried out solely by the users that are allowed to
access the data.us, no entity outside the set of users that is allowed to access a re-
source has to be trusted to protect the condentiality or integrity of the resource.is
also applies to the storage provider, which is not trusted to protect the condentiality
or the integrity of the stored resources in any way. Note that the storage provider is
trusted to protect the availability of the shared data by enforcing write access con-
trol.e avoidance of a trusted third party especially implies that there cannot be a
central authority that is technically able to access all of the resources (Req.4).
Regarding the trust between users, users that have access to a common shared re-
source trust each other not to disseminate the data outside the sharing group. Fur-
thermore, there are no system-wide “administrative” or “privileged” users.erefore,
every user may act as resource or group owner for an arbitrary number of resource
or groups, respectively (Req.5).
Regarding the authorization process, an independence of user actions is required
in a sense that one user might not—deliberately or by intention—stop another user
from carrying out an authorization operation. A strict formulation of this require-
ment would be that each authorization operation involves only the user that initiated
the operation, and does not require the cooperation of another user, i.e., joint autho-
rization operations are omitted altogether. However, this strict formulation is not
fullled by any E2E-SDS protocol found in literature so far. erefore, the require-
ment is relaxed to the avoidance of joint authorization operations, except for the
case of group member removal operations (Req.6).
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Finally, the order of authorization operations should not be constraint, apart from
trivial constraints like that a user has to be granted a permission before the permis-
sion can be revoked (Req.7).
5.1.4 Revocation
E2E-SDS requires that it is possible to revoke user access permissions at any point
in time.is applies to both the revocation of direct user permissions, and to group
memberships.e permissions must be revocable independent from each other, i.e.,
it must be possible that a user loses access to resource r1, but keeps access to resource
r2; the same applies for group memberships (Req.8).
e requirements stated so far have implications on the way revocation could be
implemented: e revocation cannot be implemented by use of a proxy that holds
some cryptographic information that is needed for decryption, and controls access
to this information using logical access control (Req.9).e reason for that is that in
this case, the proxy could easily share the cryptographic information with a revoked
user, and has to be trusted to protect the condentiality of the shared data. Fur-
thermore, revocation cannot be implemented by leveraging multiparty computation
of all users who keep their permission (R.10), because this would conict with the
independence of authorization operations as stated in Req.6. Finally, revocation can-
not be implemented by enforcing an expiration date for access permissions or group
memberships (R.11). is would also conict with Req.6: e resource or group
owner would stop the permitted users to read or write the resource if she omits to
renew the required cryptographic material in time.
For revocation of read access, lazy revocation is considered sucient, as many
SDS protocols incorporate this concept (cf. Section 2.2). Lazy revocation allows
the revoked user to continue reading the resource as long as its contents have not
been changed.
5.2 Attacks on E2E-SDS Protocols
e goal of E2E-SDS is to protect the condentiality and integrity of shared data that
is stored at the storage provider. However, the question whether these security objec-
tives are achieved by a certain E2E-SDS protocol can only be answered with regard to
the capabilities of the attacker. In this section, possible attacks on the condentiality
and integrity of shared data are discussed with regard to dierent attacker models.
An overview of dierent attacks is provided in Table 5.1. e table is not meant
provide a complete overview of all possible attacks, but is restricted to attacks com-
monly found in literature. Attacks on the cryptographic primitives that are used by
the E2E-SDS protocol, and attacks on the devices of the users are out of scope. In
the following, the dierent attacks are discussed.
e rst two attacks listed in Table 5.1 were already discussed in Section 2.2: An
attacker with read-only access on the data stored at the storage provider might obvi-
ously endanger the condentiality of the shared data, which can be prevented by em-
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ploying client-side encryption. A stronger attacker might have both read and write
access on the storage provider. is obviously applies to the storage provider itself,
but could also be achieved by an attacker leveraging some vulnerabilities in the so-
ware used by the storage provider. Such an attacker can try to tamper with the en-
crypted data. Whether it is possible to tamper with encrypted data in a controlled
way depends on the cipher that is used for encryption. Unauthorized manipula-
tions of the shared data can be prevented altogether by applying digital signatures
in addition to the encryption.
e next attack is referred to as key graph forgery attack in this thesis. A key graph
comprises cryptographic data structures that are stored at the storage provider, such
as lockboxes or signatures, and was dened in Section 4.2.1.e authorization state
of an SDS system at a given moment is determined by the state of the key graph. If
the integrity of the lockboxes is not protected, the key graph, and thus, the authoriza-
tion state of the SDS system might be manipulated by an attacker that has read and
write access to the storage provider. Such an attack might be carried out by using
a public key that is part of the legitimate key graph to encrypt a forged key that is
known by the attacker, which can then be the root of a part of the key graph that is
completely under the control of the attacker. A more detailed description of the key
graph forgery attack, its necessary preconditions and the common countermeasure
are given in the following.
e nal goal of the key graph forgery attack is to breach the condentiality or
integrity of an attacker-chosen resource. For this purpose, the attacker places one or
more forged keys in the key graph, which are subsequently used by legitimate users
to encrypt further keys or resources. To be able to carry out this attack, the attacker
is required to know the specications of the E2E-SDS protocol that is employed. For
the attack to work, the attacker does not have to be a legitimate user in the E2E-SDS
system, i.e., a user that knows a part of the key graph, nor does the attacker have to
collaborate with a legitimate user.
e feasibility of the key graph forgery attack strongly depends on the concrete
E2E-SDS protocol that is employed.e E2E-SDS protocol is vulnerable to the attack
if at any instance in time, the protocol yields a key graph with certain properties. To
describe those properties conveniently, some terms are specied for the context of
this section. A subgraph of the key graph is dened by a subset of the key graphnodes,
and is required to contain any key graph edge that connects two nodes within this
subset. A descendant-complete subgraph is a subgraph that, if it contains a certain
node, it also contains all descendant nodes of this certain node, i.e., all nodes that
can be reached from this certain node by traversing the directed key graph edges. A
source node of a subgraph is a node that belongs to the subgraph, but does not have
any incoming edges that are part of the subgraph. Similar to that, a sink node is a
subgraph node without any outgoing edge within the subgraph.
An E2E-SDS protocol is vulnerable to the key graph forgery attack regarding re-
source r if at any instance in time, the key graph instance representing the cur-
rent authorization state contains a descendant-complete subgraph with the follow-
ing properties:
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– e target of the attack, resource r, is part of the subgraph.
– e key that will be used to encrypt the resource r in the next write event is
part of the subgraph.
– Every source node of the subgraph is a public key.
– e plausibility of the content of any resource in the subgraph is not checked by
the writer, i.e., the resources are not downloaded and checked before writing.
When these conditions are fullled, the attacker might carry out the attack by forg-
ing the descendant-complete subgraph, except for the source nodes. For this pur-
pose, the attacker replaces every non-source key in the subgraph with an arbitrary
key by overwriting all lockboxes that belong to the subgraph at the storage provider.
e resources in the subgraph are replaced by arbitrary ciphertexts. To connect the
forged subgraph to the genuine parts of the key graph, the attacker uses the public
keys that are related to the source nodes of the subgraph to generate themissing lock-
boxes. As soon as a legitimate user wants to write resource r, this user downloads
the forged encryption key and encrypts the resource with this key. In consequence,
the encrypted resource can also be decrypted by the attacker.
e common countermeasure against the key graph forgery attack is to sign the
binding between each key and its function in the E2E-SDS protocol. is mecha-
nism is employed by existing E2E-SDS protocols, such as SiRiUS [GSMB03] (cf. Sec-
tion 2.2). is way, each user that retrieves a key can check whether this key was
created by a legitimate user for the intended function.e set of key functions that
an E2E-SDS protocol requires to work strongly depends on the protocol. e E2E-
SDS protocols that are considered in this thesis usually require key functions that on
the one hand refer to a user, a named user group, or a resource, and on the other
hand describe the purpose of the key, such as encryption or signing.us, a typical
example of a key function is “signing key for resource r”.
Signing the binding of keys and their functions bears a challenge with regard to the
freshness of the signatures: While the signatures guarantee that a key was bound to
a function at some past instance in time, they cannot guarantee that the key is still
bound to the function at the moment of validation.is shortcoming enables a roll-
back attack, which allows an attacker to replace the current key bound to a function
with an older one, and also replace the regarding resources with older ones.
Note that an attacker cannot roll back arbitrary keys in isolation. e granularity
of rollback attacks is limited by the fact that the E2E-SDS protocols analyzed in this
thesis always update descendant-complete subgraphs as a whole.e reason for this
is that the protocols update keys only when access of a user to a certain key should
be revoked. In this case, all keys that can be inferred from this key are renewed as
well, which are exactly the keys in the descendant-complete subgraph. As a con-
sequence, only descendant-complete subgraphs as a whole can be rolled back, i.e.,
if a certain key node is rolled back, all descendant nodes of this key node have to
be rolled back as well.
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A possible countermeasure against the rollback attack is a periodic refreshment
of the signature of the key-function binding. For this purpose, an expiration date
is incorporated into the signatures, and the signature is periodically refreshed be-
fore expiration.is way, a rollback attack is only possible as long as the rolled back
signature is not yet expired.e limitation of this solution is that it can only be ap-
plied when only a single user generates the respective signatures: Periodic refresh-
ing requires to check the validity of the signature before refreshment by comparing
a ngerprint of the signed data on the storage provider with a local copy of the n-
gerprint. When multiple users are allowed to generate a signature, the data on the
storage provider and the ngerprint may have been changed by another legitimate
user in the meantime.
When a periodic refreshment of the key-function binding signature is applied to
a certain key in the key graph, it protects every descendant-complete subgraph that
contains this node from being rolled back as a whole. Although this protects the
freshness of a descendant-complete subgraph as whole, it constitutes only a limited
protection for each “child” subgraph of the descendant-complete subgraph. When
the child subgraphdoes not contain the key thatwas protected by a periodic signature
refreshment, the child subgraph can still be rolled back within a certain time range:
In this case, the child subgraph can be rolled back to the time of the latest change
on the “parent” subgraph.
Although all of the E2E-SDS protocols analyzed in this and the next chapter lever-
age signatures of key-function bindings with periodic refreshment, they dier in the
size of the descendant-complete subgraphs that cannot be protected by the periodic
refreshment. e protocols presented in this chapter protect the whole key graph
except for the resources. On the other hand, with the protocol presented in the next
chapter, certain parts of the key graph cannot be protected by periodic signature re-
freshment, which is the result of a trade-o between security and practical appli-
cability (cf. Section 6.2).
Countermeasures against a rollback attack in case ofmultiple users that are allowed
to write a resource or generate a key are provided, e.g., by SUNDR [LKMS03] or
Cachin et al. [CSS07]. However, these approaches have several drawbacks, e.g., in
terms of required network trac or the underlying trust model. Furthermore, the
approaches require the user devices to hold a local state, thus, switching the device
requires to synchronize the local state in an integrity-preserving way.
A further countermeasure against rollback attacks constitutes the local caching of
resources, as it is realized by Sync&Share services. If both the local and the remote
copy of a resource are signed with a timestamp, a rollback of the resource can be
detected by comparing the timestamps of the signatures before updating the local
copy. In fact, local caching of resources provides a comparatively strong protection
against rollback attacks on the key graph: A descendant-complete subgraph contains
at least one resource node in almost any case. is prevents the whole subgraph
from being rolled back.
e last attack discussed in this section is the forking attack. e goal of this at-
tack is not to replace a part of the key graph by an older version. Instead, a forking
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attack aims to partition the set of users that is allowed to access a part of the key
graph, and a user in one partition can no longer see the changes made by a user
in any other partition [MS02]. is way, forking allows to hide changes made to a
resource from other users, and thus endangers the freshness of the resource. How-
ever, a forking attack has the limitation that dierent forks of a state can never be
joined again without detection.
A countermeasure against forking is provided by signing the key-function binding
or the resource, and periodically refreshing the signature. Again, this only works
in case of a single user that is allowed to update the key or the resource. In case of
multiple users updating the key or the resource, it was shown that forking cannot
be prevented without a trusted third party [LKMS03]. When an E2E-SDS protocol
protects the freshness of the encryption keys by means of periodic refreshment, a
resource can only be forked as long as the encryption key is not renewed, plus the
expiration of the signature of the old encryption key. As this applies to the protocols
introduced in this chapter, the attack vector for forking is rather limited.
Finally, an attacker is considered that has not only read and write access to the stor-
age provider, but also collaborates with a revoked user, and targets resources that the
revoked user was allowed to write before the revocation. Under this assumption, a
rollback attack might not only endanger the freshness of a resource, but also its in-
tegrity: A rollback attack now allows an attacker to replace the current key bound
to a function with an older one that is known to the revoked user. is attack can
be prevented by a periodic refreshment of signatures in case of a single writer, and
SUNDR and similar approaches in the case of multiple writers. However, the local
caching of resources cannot prevent this kind of attack: If the attacker and the col-
laborating user regain write access to a resource through the rollback attack, they
actually do not have to roll back the resource, but can write the resource immedi-
ately aer the rollback of the related keys. From the perspective of a user reading the
resource aerwards, this looks like a legitimate update of the resource.
With regard to an attacker that collaborates with a revoked user, forking also en-
dangers the integrity of the resource: Forking allows the attacker to create an addi-
tional view on the key graph, where the revoked user still has access permissions.
Again, signing the key-function binding or the resource, and periodically refresh-
ing the signature prevents forking of a key. In consequence, an attacker cannot gain
any additional advantage from the collaboration with a revoked user if the protocols
presented in this chapter are employed.
5.3 Performance of E2E-SDS Using Traditional Cryptog-
raphy
e E2E-SDS protocols studied in this section are based on traditional cryptography,
i.e., symmetric and asymmetric cryptography that produces ciphertexts dedicated to
a single recipient only.us, the protocols use lockboxes, which are encrypted keys
that serve the purpose to make the encrypted key available to everyone who knows
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Figure 5.1: Exemplary key graph for basic protocol.
the encrypting key, and digital signatures (cf. Section 2.2).e protocols fulll all of
the requirements on E2E-SDS and a support for named user groups stated in Sec-
tion 5.1. us, they ensure condentiality and integrity of shared data against an
attacker that has full access to all the data stored at the storage provider and fully
controls the access control enforcement of the storage provider, no matter if attack-
ers are internal or external to the storage provider.
A prerequisite for the protocols are non-compromisable facilities that allow each
user to retrieve the public keys used in the protocols with guaranteed authenticity
and integrity.
5.3.1 Protocols Under Study
As no existing E2E-SDS protocol could be found in literate that fullls all of the
requirements stated in Section 5.1, existing protocols were combined for this pur-
pose.erefore, the protocols presented in this section combine the basic workings
of SiRiUS [GSMB03], including signatures of the key graph and periodic refresh-
ment of these signatures, with named user groups as realized by Cepheus [Fu99]
(cf. Section 2.2).e protocols also exhibit similarities to the protocol employed by
Boxcryptor 2.01, which is an existing service that supports encrypted data sharing.
In this chapter, two protocols based on traditional cryptography are presented: the
basic and the extended protocol. In the following, the cryptographic operations re-
quired to realize each authorization operation will be described.
e key graph that the basic protocol generates to grant group g read access on
resource r is depicted in Figure 5.1. e two protocols have in common that each
user u and each group g is assigned an asymmetric user key pair UKu or group key
1https://www.boxcryptor.com/en
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Figure 5.2: Exemplary key graph for extended protocol.
pair GK g , respectively. Each resource is encrypted with a symmetric resource key
RKr. To grant read access on resource r to user u or group g, RKr is encrypted with
UK pubu or GK pubg . Furthermore, the resource is signed with the private part of an
asymmetric resource signing key pair RSK privr (omitted in Figure 5.1), which can be
encrypted with UK pubu or GK pubg to grant write access to user u or group g.
e two protocols dier in the way GK g is distributed to the group members. In
the basic protocol, GK g is distributed to the group members in a simple way by cre-
ating a symmetric master key GMg to encrypt GK privg and encrypting the master
key with the public key UK pubm of each group member m. When a user leaves the
group, GK g and GMg are renewed and again encrypted with the public key of each
remaining group member.
In the extended protocol, a well-known Group Key Management approach called
Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) [WHA99] was integrated to avoid revocation costs that
are linear in the group size. e decision for LKH was based on an evaluation of
Group KeyManagement approaches with regard to their asymptotical performance,
which was published in [KH13]. With LKH, GMg is the root of a tree of keys, where
each key is encrypted with each of its child keys (cf. Figure 5.2). e leaf keys are
encrypted with the public keys of the group members. e basic idea is that when
a group member is removed, only the keys on the path from the removed user’s key
pair to the root of the tree and all lockboxes that encrypt one of these keys must
be renewed.us, the number of renewed keys and lockboxes grows only logarith-
mically with the group size.
Both protocols can be congured to use eager or lazy revocation, which applies
when a user or a named user group loses access to a resource. With eager revocation,
the resource owner renews the resource encryption key and re-encrypts the resource
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with the new key, which requires her to upload the resource again. With lazy revo-
cation, the resource owner only renews the resource encryption key RKr, and the
re-encryption of the resource is delayed until the next time the resource is written.
e protocols leverage joint authorization operations when a user is removed from
a group. Aer the owner of the group has renewed the group key, she collects the
set of resources that can be accessed by the group, i.e., the set of group-accessible
resources. e group owner informs every resource owner that owns at least one
group-accessible resource about the revocation. e resource owner reacts by re-
newing the resource encryption key RKr, and if the group has write access to the re-
source, also the resource signing key pair RSKr. If eager revocation is employed, the
resource owner also has to re-encrypt her group-accessible resources aer a group
member removal.
To prevent the attacks discussed in the previous section, the protocols digitally sign
the binding of keys to their functions, and digitally sign the resources. Moreover,
the signatures of all key-function bindings have to be periodically refreshed: For
resource-related keys like RKr or RSK privr , the refreshment is done by the resource
owner, while for group-related keys likeGK pubg , the refreshment is done by the group
owner.is prevents key graph forgery attacks altogether, and limits the attack vector
of rollback and forking attacks to resources.
5.3.2 Performance Evaluation Results for Real-World Sharing Sce-
narios
In this section, the results of the performance evaluation of the basic and the ex-
tended protocol are presented.e performance evaluationwas carried out bymeans
of the simulative method introduced in Section 4.2, and yields the computation time
and the network trac volume required for each authorization operation. All eval-
uation results are related to the real-world workloads that are characterized in Sec-
tion 3.5.
e evaluation is based on the assumption that AES with 256 bit keys is used for
symmetric encryption andRSAwith 2048 bit keys is used for asymmetric encryption
and digital signatures, as these ciphers are also used by current services that allow for
secure data sharing, such as the aforementioned Boxcryptor 2.0 service.
e computation times of the respective cryptographic operations were bench-
marked on three devices. To include popular user devices that are prone to per-
formance problems, two smartphones were benchmarked: an iPhone 3G produced
in 2008, and a Samsung Galaxy S5 Mini produced in 2014. Additionally, a Dell Lat-
itude E4310 notebook produced in 2011 was benchmarked. For this purpose, the
OpenSSL speed benchmark2 was used. e measured computation times for RSA
and AES are shown in Table 5.2.
In short, the comparison shows that for RSA operations, the Galaxy outperforms
the old iPhone 3G by a factor of about 7, while the notebook outperforms the Galaxy
by a factor of about 6. When AES is considered, the dierences between the devices
2https://www.openssl.org/docs/man1.0.2/apps/speed.html
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iPhone 3G Galaxy S5 Mini Latitude E4310
RSA 1024 sign/s 18.7 132.5 817.0
RSA 1024 verify/s 363.8 2 799.0 15 211.0
RSA 2048 sign/s 3.2 23.0 124.0
RSA 2048 verify/s 114.2 874.7 4 225.0
AES 256 KB/s 4 311 12 651 48 170
Table 5.2: Cryptographic operation benchmarks for dierent devices
are smaller: e Galaxy outperforms the iPhone by a factor of 3, and the notebook
performs AES about 3 times faster than the Galaxy.
e focus of this section is to give realistic estimations of the performance of poten-
tially resource-intensive authorization operations:e removal of a member from a
large group, the upload of a big le, and the re-encryption of resources when a user
loses access on the resource. e latter is required either when a user is removed
from a group that has access to the resource, or when a directly assigned access to
the resource is denied. e performance is analyzed separately for group owners,
resource owners, and users that just up- and download data.
First, the performance of write operations is analyzed. e required computation
time for a write operation depends on the size of the data written, andmeasurements
show a strong linear correlation between the data size and the AES encryption time
when data size exceeds 100KB in the case of the Dell notebook.e encryption time
for the largest le in the considered workloads, which comprises 1 056MB, is 243 sec
on the iPhone, 85 sec on the Galaxy and 19 sec on the notebook. However, for an av-
erage le with about 1.19MB, the computing time is only about 20ms, 92ms, and
261ms, respectively.
Besides the time needed for symmetric encryption and decryption of the shared
data, awrite operation usually requires additional computation time for further cryp-
tographic operations, e.g., to decrypt lockboxes or similar.is additional computa-
tion time is referred to as key management computation time in this section. When
the basic protocol is used, the key management computation time is approximately
constant for each device: 955ms for the iPhone, 134ms for the Galaxy and 110ms for
the notebook. However, when the extended protocol is used and the write access is
granted by a group membership, the computation time depends on the size of the
iPhone 3G Galaxy S5 mini Latitude E4310
small groups 1.278 0.179 0.147
medium groups 1.280 0.180 0.147
large groups 1.296 0.182 0.148
Table 5.3: Average key management computation time (in seconds) for write opera-
tions when the extended protocol is used.
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Figure 5.3: Average computation time of a group member removal operation for
dierent group sizes when the basic protocol is used.
group.e reason for this is that a potential writer has to retrieve the current group
key by traversing a path from a leaf of the underlying key tree to the root, and as the
number of key tree leaves has to grow proportional with the group size, the depth of
the tree also depends on the group size.e average key management computation
time per device and group size bucket for the extended protocol is shown in Table 5.3.
When the keymanagement computation time is comparedwith the time required for
the symmetric encryption of the data by looking at the proportion of both values, it
is found that the proportion heavily depends on the device, andmore specically, on
relation of the speed of symmetric versus asymmetric cryptography. In about 70% of
all write actions, the data encryption timemakes up less than 10% of the overall com-
putation time and is therefore dominated by the keymanagement computation time.
is shows that despite the keymanagement computation time accounts for a signif-
icant part of the total computation time for a write operation, the higher key man-
agement computation times induced by the extended protocol are still below 1.3 sec.
Next, the performance of group member removal operations is analyzed.ese op-
erations have to be processed by the owner of the group. Figure 5.3 shows the compu-
tation time required by the dierent devices using the basic protocol and illustrates
that while the computation time is below 3 sec for small and medium groups, it can
be signicant for large or extra large groups.e maximum computation time for an
extra large group was about 324 sec on the iPhone, 44 sec on the Galaxy and 19 sec
on the notebook. Figure 5.4 shows the average computation time for the extended
protocol. It shows that using the extended protocol increases the computation time
for small, medium and large groups, but reduces the performance signicantly for
extra large groups, e.g., from about 197 sec to 14 sec when using an iPhone. As can be
seen in Figure 5.5, the outgoing network trac volume required to remove amember
from a group is also signicantly decreased when using the extended instead of the
basic protocol, e.g., from 7 494KB to 25 KB for extra large groups.
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Figure 5.4: Average computation time of a group member removal operation for
dierent group sizes when the extended protocol is used.
Finally, the performance of re-encryption operations is analyzed, which are carried
out by the owner of the resource. Similar to write operations, re-encryption opera-
tions require computation time for key management tasks and, if eager revocation
is used, for the decryption and encryption of shared data. As stated before, the data
encryption and decryption time grows linearly with the size of the re-encrypted data.
For the key management computation time, an average of 2543ms was found on the
iPhone, 1658ms on the Galaxy S5 Mini and about 1627ms on the notebook. Here
again, the proportion of computation time that is required by key management op-
erations and by the symmetric encryption of the data depends on the relation of
the speed of symmetric versus asymmetric cryptography of the device. e results
also show that the data encryption time exceeds the key management time when
more than 5.8MB of data are re-encrypted on the iPhone, more than 10.7MB on
the Galaxy S5 Mini and more than 35.5MB on the notebook. In about 85% of all
rekeying operations, the data encryption time makes up less than 10% of the over-
all computation time. us, the key management computation time dominates the
encryption and decryption time also for re-encryption operations, which indicates
that the use of eager revocation has typically not a huge impact on the required com-
putation time. Furthermore, re-encryption operations require the upload of new
lockboxes for each user or group that is still allowed to access the resource.e nec-
essary network trac volumes is rather small, as it ranges from 6.2 KB to 356KB in
our workloads, with 7.9 KB on average.
In summary, with regard to the considered workloads, only minor performance
penalties have to be expected for most of the authorization operations, as the com-
putation time for these operations is mostly up to some seconds, even on an iPhone
3G manufactured in 2008. However, signicant performance penalties have to be
expected for the management of group memberships in large user groups, i.e., user
groups with a few thousand or more members. In this case, the computation times
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Figure 5.5: Average outgoing network trac volume of a group member removal
operation for dierent group sizes.
rise up to 324 seconds on the iPhone 3G. Furthermore, the group member removal
operations require the group owner to upload several MB of cryptographic key ma-
terial to the storage provider. With the extended protocol, these performance penal-
ties are decreased signicantly, as a group member removal operation can be car-
ried out within few seconds, at the price of slightly raised computation times for
smaller groups.
5.4 E2E-SDS Using Attribute-Based Encryption
Many SDS approaches proposed in the last few years are based on Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE) for condentiality protection. One important reason for this is
that ABE allows to dedicate a single ciphertext to multiple recipients. On the one
hand, this promises to enable resource-saving SDS systems in terms of ciphertexts
that have to be generated and distributed. On the other hand, some ABE schemes
were shown to exhibit a performance worse than traditional cryptography in small
and articial sharing scenarios [WZSI14]. One objective of this thesis is to evalu-
ate the real-world performance of an ABE-based E2E-SDS protocol in realistic shar-
ing scenarios.
A rst step towards this objective is to identify an ABE scheme that fullls all of
the following requirements: rst, it satises the requirements on E2E-SDS as spec-
ied in Section 5.1, and second, it supports an authorization model that is su-
ciently expressive to be adapted to support named user groups. More specically, the
ABE scheme should be adapted to support the authorization model specied in Sec-
tion 3.1, which is referred to as group-based authorization model in this section.
ese requirements are not fullled by the original proposal for ABE, which was
introduced as Fuzzy IBE in the landmark paper of Sahai and Waters [SW05]. Fuzzy
IBE relies on a central party that is able to decrypt any ciphertext in the system, thus,
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it does not adhere to the denition of E2E-SDS as stated above. While lots of work
has been done to overcome the centralization issue in ABE, other issues regarding,
e.g., policy expressiveness or revocation abilities render many ABE approaches inap-
propriate for E2E-SDS (cf. Section 2.3).erefore, it is necessary to identify an ABE
scheme which addresses all of these issues at the same time.
To identify an ABE scheme that facilitates E2E-SDS while oering an authoriza-
tion model expressive enough to enhance it with support for named user groups, an
evaluation of ABE schemes with regard to these requirements is presented in Sec-
tion 5.4.1.e evaluation yields that only one approach complies with these require-
ments, which is DAC-MACS [YJR+13]. In Section 5.4.2, an overview of DAC-MACS
is provided.
Due to the gap between the attribute-based authorization model of DAC-MACS
and the aforementioned group-based authorization model, group-based authoriza-
tion operations have to bemapped to ABE authorization operations. In Section 5.4.3,
it is shown how the authorization operations of DAC-MACS can be applied or com-
bined to implement a group-based authorization model. Dierent alternatives for
this mapping exist, which are rst compared in an overview, and subsequently ex-
plained in detail with regard to the necessary cryptographic operations.ese map-
ping alternatives build the basis for the performance evaluation presented in Sec-
tion 5.5.
5.4.1 Evaluation of Existing ABE Schemes
Within the last decade, a plethora of ABE approaches has been proposed, which dif-
fer, e.g., in policy expressiveness, revocation functionality, and trust assumptions.
Some ABE schemes were already discussed on a high level in Section 2.3. In this
section, the focus is on a subset of ABE schemes referred to asmulti attribute author-
ity or multi-AA approaches, i.e., dierent AAs manage disjoint parts of the whole
attribute space. e reason for this focus is that single-AA approaches cannot be
considered capable for E2E-SDS as stated in Section 5.1. e results of the analysis
are shown in Table 5.4. e table columns refer to the requirements as introduced
in Section 5.1.e numbering of the requirements is kept throughout this section.
One reason why some multi-AA approaches cannot be employed for E2E-SDS is
that they still rely on one central party that is technically able to decrypt all the cipher-
texts in the system, which contradicts Req.4. An example for this is an early approach
proposed byChase [Cha07] in 2007, where the central authority generates the private
key of every user and AA in the system.e rationale behind this architecture is that
the CA generates a user-dependent value that is required to “personalize” secret keys
to achieve collusion resistance (cf. Section 2.3). Furthermore, the approach only sup-
ports rather inexible access policies: the policy stipulates that the encryptor chooses
a set of attributes from each AA in the system, and a user is only able to decrypt the
ciphertext if from each of these attribute sets, she holds at least a xed number of
attributes. us, the user must be known to each AA in the system. Other ABE
approaches dependent on a central trusted party are [HCL13] and [WLW11], which
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employ a hierarchy of private key generators that is rooted in a fully trusted party.
Many ABE approaches support multiple AAs without the need for a central trusted
party, but lack the possibility to deassign a user from an attribute, a feature usually
referred to as attribute revocation. For example, an improved version of the Chase
approach [CC09] manages to avoid the central trusted party by having the user-
dependent value be calculated by the AAs in a distributed manner. However, the
aforementioned inexible policies remain, and revocation is not supported. Lewko et
al. [LW11] oers more exible policies than [CC09], but also does not support revo-
cation. While Ruj et al. [RNS11] extends [LW11] with revocation capabilities, the ex-
tension only allows to deassign a user from all of her attributes completely and, thus,
cannot oer the granularity demanded in Section 5.1.4. Yang et al. [YJR+14] supports
updating an access policy, but also does not allow to deassign a user from an attribute.
ere are multi-AA approaches that do not rely on a central trusted party and oer
attribute revocation, but there are still issues that render them unusable for E2E-SDS.
For example, Liu et al. [LLYY14] proposed an approach where the revocation lever-
ages a trustedird Party Auditor (TPA). To decrypt a ciphertext, the decryptor has
to send her secret keys to the TPA, which issues the requested decryption token aer
checking that the secret keys are up-to-date.is contradicts the requirements stated
in Section 5.1.4 that revocation should not be enforced by a proxy based on logical ac-
cess control decisions. Other approaches are too inexible regarding the access poli-
cies that can be dened, e.g., the approach proposed by Li et al. [LYZ+13] requires the
user to hold exactly one attribute from each AA in the system.e approach of Yang
et al. [YJ14] fullls most of the requirements for E2E-SDS, but does not allow a user
to act as AA, which does not comply with the requirements stated in Section 5.1.3.
e only approach that fullls all of the requirements for E2E-SDS and provides an
authorization model expressive enough to be adapted to the group-based authoriza-
tion model is DAC-MACS [YJR+13].e DAC-MACS schemes is presented in Sec-
tion 5.4.2. Note that [HXL15] reports an issue in DAC-MACS regarding the back-
ward security of ciphertext updates. However, this feature that is not used by the
mappings alternatives presented in the following.
5.4.2 DAC-MACS Entities and Operations
is thesis refers to a version of DAC-MACS called “Extensive DAC-MACS”, which
was described in [YJR+13]. As DAC-MACS is an instance of ciphertext-policy ABE
(cf. Section 2.3), data owners dene an attribute-based access policy as initial step of
encryption. Onlyusers that hold a set of secret keyswhose attributesmatch the access
policy are able to decrypt the data. More specic, an access policy is a Boolean term
over attributes, for example, “IsCIO ∨ (IsManager ∧ ITDepartment)”. To be
able to decrypt data, a user holds two types of keys: one or more secret keys, where
each secret key is bound to some attributes, and a global user key pair that is attribute-
independent. As the secret keys are customized to the user, they are only useful in
combination with a global user private key.is prevents users from collusion.
e global user key pair is issued by a central Certicate Authority (CA). For this
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Figure 5.6: System model of ABE scheme DAC-MACS. Source: [YJR+13]
purpose, the CA creates and manages an identier for each user, and also certies
that a global user public key belongs to a user with a certain identier.erefore, the
CA has to be trusted by all other parties in the system. Note that the CA is not able
to decrypt arbitrary ciphertexts, as decryption requires secret keys.
Secret keys are issued by Attribute Authorities (AAs). DAC-MACS allows an arbi-
trary number of AAs in the system, and a user can have secret keys from an arbitrary
set of AAs. Each AA manages a part of the whole attribute space, and is responsible
for assigning these attributes to the appropriate users. us, it has to manage user-
attribute bindings for a subset of the users in the system, and data owners have to
trust that these bindings meet their expectations.
All encrypted data is stored on the server. To lower computation time on the user
clients, DAC-MACS also outsources some cryptographic tasks to the server, which
will be discussed in more detail below. Nonetheless, the server does not have to be
fully trusted, but can be assumed as honest-but-curious, i.e., it is interested in reading
the data, but it will carry out DAC-MACS operations as specied.e systemmodel
of DAC-MACS is shown in Figure 5.6.
DAC-MACS comprises the following phases: In the System Initialization phase, the
CA rst generates and publishes some global public parameters. Moreover, the CA
issues a global user key pair to each user. For initialization, each AA generates an
attribute-independent AA key pair, and additionally one attribute key pair for every
attribute the AA manages.
Aer initialization, in the Secret Key Generation phase, the AAs issue secret keys
to users upon authenticated request. Each secret key comprises one component for
each attribute that the key is bound to.
In the Data Encryption phase, data is encrypted by owners according to some ac-
cess policy. For this purpose, the data owner rst has to dene the access policy as
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a Boolean term, and then has to convert this to a matrix representation, where the
matrix contains one row for each attribute that is part of the access policy.e actual
encryption then requires this matrix, the plaintext, the attribute public key of all the
attributes that are involved in the access policy, and the public keys of the manag-
ing AAs. e resulting ciphertext again contains one component for each attribute
involved in the access policy, and is uploaded to the server. DAC-MACS employs hy-
brid encryption, i.e., the actual data is symmetrically encrypted, and the symmetric
data key is encrypted with ABE.
For performance reasons, the computation-intensive operations in the Data De-
cryption phase are carried out by the server. For this purpose, the decrypting user
presents her secret keys to the server, which the server uses to issue a user-specic
decryption token for the requested ciphertext. Using the decryption token and her
global user private key, the recipient is able to decrypt the ciphertext.
Finally, the Attribute Revocation phase is triggered whenever a user is deassigned
an attribute. In this case, the responsible AA generates some key upgrade and ci-
phertext update information, and distributes these to all non-revoked users and the
server, respectively. is way, each user can update the secret key that is bound to
the attribute in question, and the server can update each ciphertext that has an ac-
cess policy which involves the attribute.
e security of DAC-MACS is proven in the random oracle model under the as-
sumption that a special variant of the Decisional Bilinear Die-Hellman (DBDH)
problem is intractable (cf. Section 2.3).e security is proven with regard to a secu-
rity game where the attacker initially has to specify a set of corrupted AAs, whose se-
cret keys aremade available to the attacker. In a rst query phase, the attacker queries
an oracle for secret keys encoding attributes that are managed by non-corrupted
AAs. In the challenge phase, the attacker sends two equal-length messages to the
challenger, together with an access policy that adheres to certain restrictions. e
challenger randomly encrypts one of the messages under the access policy. A second
query phase is appended. Finally, the attacker wins the game if he can guess which
message was encrypted with a non-negligible success probability.
e security of DAC-MACS and RSA cannot be compared directly: First, the secu-
rity of RSA is based on the RSA assumption instead of the DBDH assumption. And
second, the security of RSA with the OAEP padding is proven with regard to, e.g.,
IND-CCA2 [FOPS01], which diers from the security game just described.
5.4.3 Mapping Alternatives
In this subsection, it is shown how the entities and operations of the group-based
authorization model as introduced in Section 3.1 can be mapped to DAC-MACS
entities and operations.
For the entity mapping, group-based users, resource owners and group owners
are mapped to DAC-MACS user, owners and attribute authorities, respectively.e
DAC-MACS CAwill still be required. Note that this does not contradict the require-
ments stated in Section 5.1.3, as in DAC-MACS, the CA cannot issue any attributes,
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Figure 5.7: Overview of alternatives for mapping DAC-MACS to a group-based au-
thorization model. Resource access policies are shown on the le, and user-attribute
assignments on the right.
so it is no central trusted party. e entity mapping directly implies the mapping
for most of the group-based authorization operations. Creating a named user group
maps to creating an attribute in DAC-MACS, and a group owner adding a user to a
named user group means that a secret key for an attribute is issued to the user by the
AA. Removing a user from a named user group means that the attribute revocation
operation is triggered in DAC-MACS.
e group-based authorization model also supports direct user permissions, i.e.,
explicit enumeration of users that are permitted to access a resource without the
involvement of user groups. e necessary authorization operation—grant or deny
access—have no obvious counterpart in DAC-MACS, but it is possible to “emulate”
these operations using DAC-MACS operations.ree alternatives for this mapping
can be considered, which are referred to asmapping alternatives. An overview of the
mapping alternatives is provided in Figure 5.7.
e rst mapping alternative is called self-AA: In this case, every user plays the
role of an AA, and issues a secret key for the attribute IAmu for himself.is means
that for every user, there is an additional attribute in the system, and each of these
attributes is held by only one user, which is comparable to a knownuser identity value
in Identity-Based Encryption (cf. Section 2.3).is attribute can be a part of an access
policy in the encryption step to grant the user access to the respective ciphertext.
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A variant of this is the alternative owner-AA, where the resource owner issues a
secret key for any user she wants to give access to at least one of her resources. e
secret key is bound to the attribute IKnowu, which can be part of an access policy
similar to the self-AA mapping alternative.
Finally, in the entitlements mapping alternative, two additional attributes are de-
ned for each resource: ReadAccessr and ReadWriteAccessr. e resource
owner can grant access to the resource by issuing a secret key to the user that is
bound to one of these attributes. In this case, denying access to the resource is done
by revoking the respective attribute from the user.
As described in the previous section, the decryption and the ciphertext update
steps of DAC-MACS stipulate that some cryptographic operations are carried out
by the server.is contradicts the E2E-SDS requirements on the storage provider as
stated in Section 5.1.3. To cope with this issue, ciphertext updates are skipped com-
pletely. is results in lazy revocation, which complies to the requirements stated
in Section 3.1. For decryption, the generation of decryption tokens is simply moved
from the server to the client of the decrypting user, which does not aect the se-
curity of the protocol.
5.4.4 Mapping Details
In this section, the steps for the dierent group-based authorization operations and
the dierent mapping alternatives are described in detail. A hybrid cryptographic
approach is employed, where DAC-MACS operations are used wherever possible,
and traditional symmetric and asymmetric cryptography in any other case, e.g., to
digitally sign encrypted data.
With each mapping alternative, for initialization, every user registers with the CA
and retrieves a global user key pair. In addition, each useru acts asAA for an attribute
IAmu, which is only held by user u and enables to encrypt data or keys for her only.
For this purpose, user u generates an AA key pair and an attribute key pair for IAmu.
To create a group g, the group owner simply creates an attribute key pair for the
attribute IsMemberg . To add the user u to the group g, the owner issues a secret
key SKu[IsMemberg] for attribute IsMemberg to user u, encrypts it for attribute
IAmu and uploads it. To remove user u from the group, the owner generates a key up-
grade key KUKx for every member x except u, and uploads it to the SP. As explained
in Section 5.4.3, the ciphertext re-encryption feature of DAC-MACS is omitted.
To add a resource r, the resource owner creates a symmetric resource key RKr,
an asymmetric resource signing key pair RSKr, and a symmetric resource signing
master key RSMKr. RSK privr is encrypted using RSMKr. RKr is encrypted either
for ReadAccessr ∨ ReadWriteAccessr in case of entitlements mapping, or
for IAmowner in case of self-AA or owner-AA mapping. A similar procedure ap-
plies to the encrypted resource signing key pair EncRSMK r(RSK privr ) and the attribute
ReadWriteAccessr.
e remaining operations are mainly described in pseudocode.e owner-AA al-
ternative is omitted, as all steps can be derived from the self-AA alternative by replac-
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ing IAmu with IKnowu. e only addition of owner-AA is that the resource owner
creates a secret key for the attributeIKnowu whenu is granted access to one of her re-
sources for the rst time. In the notation used in this section,DisjunctAppend(pola ,b)
disjunctively appends attribute b to access policy pola, and CT(x) denotes an en-
crypted key downloaded from the storage provider.
To grant user u read and write access to resource r, the resource owner carries out
the following operations: 
if (SELF-AA)
Dec(CT(RKr), SKu[IAmowner]);
Dec(CT(RSMKr), SKu[IAmowner]);
polnew = DisjunctAppend(polcurrent ,IAmu)
Enc(RKr)[polnew];
Enc(RSMKr)[polnew];
if (ENTITL)
SecretKeyGen(u)[ReadWriteAccessr] 
Listing 5.1: AddResource operation
To grant group g read and write access to resource r, the necessary actions are in-
dependent of the mapping alternative: 
Dec(CT(RKr), SKu[IAMowner]);
Dec(CT(RSMKr), SKu[IAMowner]);
polnew = DisjunctAppend(polcurrent ,IsMemberg)
Enc(RKr)[polnew];
Enc(RSMKr)[polnew]; 
Listing 5.2: Grant read and write access operation
Denying a user or a group read access to resource r requires the following steps: 
SymKeyGen(RKr);
polnew = IAMowner
if (SELF-AA)
foreach(user u with read access)
polnew = DisjunctAppend(polnew ,IAMu)
foreach(group g with read access)
polnew = DisjunctAppend(polnew ,IsMemberg)
if (ENTITL)
polnew = DisjunctAppend(polnew ,ReadAccessr)
polnew = DisjunctAppend(polnew ,ReadWriteAccessr)
foreach(user u with read access) UpdateKeyGen[ReadAccessr]
foreach(group g with read access)
polnew = DisjunctAppend(polnew ,IsMemberg)
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Enc(RKr)[polnew]; 
Listing 5.3: Deny read access operation
To additionally denywrite access, a new asymmetric resource signing key pairRSK ′r,
and a symmetric resource signingmaster keyRSMK ′r have to be created, and all oper-
ations described above have to be repeated regarding the attributeReadWriteAccessr.
To read the resource r, the user u takes the following actions: 
if (hasReadAccess(r, g))
Dec(CT(RKr), SKu[IsMemberg]);
else
if (SELF-AA) Dec(CT(RKr), SKu[IAMu]);
if (ENTITL) Dec(CT(RKr), SKu[ReadAccessr]);
Dec(r,RKr);
Verify(Sig(r),RSK pubr ); 
Listing 5.4: Read resource operation
For a write access, the writer retrieves the most recent version of RKr, RSMK
′
r and
EncRSMK r(RSK privr ), and decrypts them with the same alternative-dependent key se-
lection logic applied for read operations.e writer encrypts the resource with RKr,
digitally signs it with RSK privr , and uploads both ciphertext and signature.
5.5 Performance of E2E-SDS Using Attribute-Based En-
cryption
In this section, the performance of an SDS protocol based on the ABE schemeDAC-
MACS [YJR+13] is evaluated. In the previous section, it was discussed how the group-
based authorization model that is formalized and instantiated in this thesis (cf. Sec-
tion 3.1) can be mapped to the attribute-based authorization model of DAC-MACS.
ree alternatives for this mapping were identied and described in detail.e per-
formance of thesemapping alternatives is evaluated in the following.e objective of
the performance evaluation is to approach the question whether the aforementioned
advantage of ABE—one ciphertext for multiple recipients—makes ABE usable for
E2E-SDS from a performance point of view.
e performance evaluation yields the average computation time and outgoing net-
work trac that are required on a user client device to carry out the dierent autho-
rization operations such as granting or revoking access to data. For this purpose,
the analytical performance evaluation (cf. Section 4.1) method was used, which can
easily be applied if only averaged results are needed.e method requires to model
each mapping alternative by a set of algebraic expressions, where one expression is
required per mapping alternative, per performance metric, and per authorization
operation. Each algebraic expression combines workload parameters with measure-
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ments taken from concrete devices.
e performance evaluation targets real-world sharing scenarios, thus, the work-
load parameters were extracted from the real-world workloads characterized in Sec-
tion 3.5.ese are the same workloads that were the basis for the performance eval-
uation of SDS protocols based on traditional cryptography (cf. Section 5.3). To get
average values for all necessary workload parameters, samples were taken separately
for each authorization operation type, e.g., one workload parameter is “average size
of a group when a user is removed”, which might dier from “average size of a group
when a user is added”.
To get exemplary computation times for the cryptographic operations, device bench-
marks were implemented and carried out on three devices.ereby, a focus was put
on up-to-date mobile devices, as these devices are used for data sharing by many
users, but, in general, suer from slower computational performance compared to
stationary devices.
To conclude this section, the performance evaluation results are compared with
those of the SDS system based on traditional cryptography that was presented ear-
lier in this chapter.
5.5.1 DAC-MACS Benchmark Results
To get exemplary computation times necessary for the dierent DAC-MACS oper-
ations, benchmarks were created, and ran on three dierent devices. As an exam-
ple for a mobile user device with moderate computing power, a Samsung Galaxy S5
mini (SM-G800F) from 2014 running Android 4.4.2 was chosen. e class of mo-
bile devices with comparably high computing power is represented by a Samsung
Galaxy S6 (SM-G920F) from 2015 running Android 5.1.1. Finally, benchmarks were
run on a Dell Latitude E4310 notebook from 2011 as a reference for an x86 processor.
e benchmarks were implemented using the “Java Pairing-Based Cryptography”3
library. For increased performance, all pairing operations were outsourced to the
C-based PBC4 library.
e benchmarks were conducted with a pairing based on a 1,024 bit base eld and
a 224 bit order elliptic curve subgroup with an embedding degree of 2. In this cong-
uration, NIST considers the DLOG problem that must be solved to attack the ABE
scheme equally hard to the DLOG problem in a eld with 2,048 order5.e bench-
mark results are shown in Table 5.5.
5.5.2 Performance Evaluation Results for Real-World Sharing Sce-
narios
As alreadymentioned, the performance evaluation described in this section was car-
ried out on the basis of the real-world workloads that were characterized in Sec-
3http://gas.dia.unisa.it/projects/jpbc
4https://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/
5http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.
800-56Ar2.pdf
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DAC-MACS operation Galaxy S5 mini Galaxy S6 Dell Latitude E4310
user key pair generation 86 30 15
AA key pair generation 162 60 27
attribute key pair generation 124 44 20
encryption
basis 51 19 21
per-attribute overhead 184 71 30
decryption token generation
basis 155 48 17
per-attribute overhead 217 82 23
decryption 10 2 1
user secret key generation
basis 290 110 55
per-attribute overhead 107 51 20
update key generation
basis 52 20 7
per-user overhead 72 32 13
user secret key update 1 1 1
ciphertext update 79 29 13
Table 5.5: Benchmarks of DAC-MACS operation running times (in milliseconds)
with 1024 bit base eld and 224 bit elliptic curve group order.
tion 3.5. As it was technically not feasible to trace read operations, these had to be syn-
thetically added to the existing workloads. For this purpose, a ratio of read to write
operations of 3 was taken, since this ratio was empirically determined in [LPGM08].
ereby, for each write action, 3 read actions were inserted for a random user and a
random resource this user is permitted to read.
In the following, the average computation time and outgoing network trac that
are required by a client to carry out workload operations are analyzed. e focus
lies on operations that are either frequent or expensive. In the following, the com-
putation times for the Galaxy S5 mini are stated, while the values for Galaxy S6 and
Dell Latitude are added in parentheses. Figure 5.8 provides an overview of the com-
putation times for the all operations whose costs dier for the dierent mapping
alternatives.e plot shows that the choice of the mapping alternative has only mi-
nor inuence on the resource consumption, as, e.g., the computation times of an
operation diers by at most 1 s for dierent mapping alternatives.
Initially generating the necessary keys takes a user 4.1 s (2.0 s, 1.7 s) in every map-
ping alternative. Note that this operation is only required once per user.
emost expensive operation thatwas observedwith regard to the givenworkloads
is removing a user from a group.e computation time of this operation is also inde-
pendent of the mapping alternative: Where the operation took 0.091 s (0.037, 0.014)
in groups up to 20 users and 1.8 s (0.795 s, 0.322 s) in groups from 21 to 200 users, the
required computation time increases to 31 s (14 s, 6 s) in groups from 201 to 2,000
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add resource
allow read direct
allow read for group
allow read write direct
allow read write for group
deny read write direct
deny read write for group
write with direct perm.
write with group perm.
read with direct perm.
read with group perm.
computation time (ms)
owner-AA
entitlements
self-AA
Figure 5.8: Average key management computation time (in seconds) for dierent
operations when the ABE-based E2E-SDS protocol is used (for Samsung Galaxy S5
mini).
users, and nally it takes about 1,605 s (713 s, 290 s) in groups larger than 2,000 users.
e group member removal operation is also the most expensive with regard to
outgoing network trac: When dealing with groups up to 20 users, less than 1 KB of
outgoing trac is needed, and about 28KB for groups up to 200 users. For groups
comprising between 201 and 2,000 users, about 488KB are required, and for groups
larger than 2,000 users, almost 26MB of key material has to be uploaded for group
member removal.
Regarding the denial of access to resources, the workloads contain no operation to
deny read-only access, but contain somedenials of read andwrite access. For allmap-
ping alternatives, the denial of access permissions for a user is more computation-
intensive than for a group. With the user-AA and self-AA mapping alternatives, it
takes 5.6 s (2.6 s, 1.9 s) to deny access permissions for a user and 4.0 s (2.0 s, 1.7 s) to
deny access permissions for a group. With the entitlements mapping alternative, the
same operations take 4.9 s (2.4 s, 1.8 s) and 4.2 s (2.0 s, 1.7 s), respectively.
e computation times for writing resources comprise the time required for the
encryption of the actual data using a symmetric cipher.e computation times de-
pend on whether the writer has direct write permissions, or gets the permissions
implicitly by group membership. In the former case, the computation times consid-
erably dier between the mapping alternatives: Where in the case of owner-AA, 2.4 s
(0.9 s, 0.3 s) are required, it only takes about 1.5 s (0.5 s, 0.2 s) with the entitlement
and 2.0 s (0.7 s, 0.2 s) with the self-AAmapping. In the latter case, the dierences are
more subtle: Write operations take 2.0 s (0.7 s, 0.2 s) with the owner-AA and self-AA
mapping alternatives, and 2.1 s (0.8 s, 0.2 s) with the entitlementmapping alternative.
Finally, the computation times are analyzed for reading resources, which is the
most frequent operation in our workloads, due to the aforementioned read-write ra-
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Figure 5.9: Computation time for group member removal operations. Comparison
of E2E-SDS protocols based on ABE, and based on traditional cryptography.
tio of 3. Again, these computation times depend on whether the reader gets the read
permission directly or by groupmembership. In the former case, with the owner-AA
mapping alternative, the operation takes 1.7 s (0.6 s, 0.2 s), compared to 1.3 s (0.5 s,
0.1 s) with the other mapping alternatives. In the latter case, reading a resource re-
quires about 1.3 s (0.5 s, 0.1 s) with the owner-AA and self-AA mapping alternatives
and 1.4 s (0.5 s, 0.1 s) using the entitlement mapping alternative.
5.5.3 Performance Comparison with Traditional Cryptography-Based
E2E-SDS Protocol
In this section, the performance of the ABE-based protocols described in the pre-
vious section is compared with the resource consumption of a E2E-SDS protocol
solely based on traditional cryptography, i.e., symmetric and asymmetric cryptog-
raphy that produces ciphertexts dedicated to a single recipient only. e latter was
described in Section 5.3.1. For the remainder of this section, these protocols are re-
ferred to as ABE protocol and traditional protocol, respectively.
e estimated performance of the traditional protocol is based on the same work-
loads described in the previous subsection, and on RSA and AES benchmarks taken
from the Samsung Galaxy S5 mini and the Dell Latitude E4310. As the ABE-based
encryption of symmetric keys in the ABE protocol roughly corresponds to the asym-
metric encryption of symmetric keys in the traditional protocol, a comparison of
the computation times required for these operations gives a rst indication of the
protocol performance: Using RSA with 2 048 bit key length, about 875 encryption
operations can be performed on the S5 mini and about 4 225 on the Dell Latitude
per second, whereas using ABE encryption as described in Section 5.5.1, within one
second, a ciphertext can only be generated for about 5 attributes on the S5 mini and
43 attributes on the Dell Latitude (cf. Table 5.5).
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A closer look on the estimation results shows that the traditional protocol requires
less computation time and outgoing network trac than the ABE-based one for al-
most any operation and mapping alternative. Regarding the average computation
time, the traditional protocol outperforms the ABE one by a factor between 1.1 and
18. Considering the outgoing network trac, the traditional protocol outperforms
the ABE protocol by a factor of 2 for creating a new resource, up to a factor of 30 for
granting a user direct read access to a resource.e only operation that is always less
resource-consuming using the ABE protocol is the creation of a new group.
Group member removal operations are analyzed in more depth, as the compari-
son results depend on the group size. Figure 5.9 shows the computation times for
dierent group size ranges. e results are exemplary for the Samsung Galaxy S5
mini, but comparable results are seen for the Dell Latitude. e plot shows that the
ABE-based protocol is faster for small groups with up to 20 members. However, for
larger groups, the traditional crypto protocol outperforms the ABE one: For groups
larger than 2000 members, the traditional crypto protocol only requires 27 s on av-
erage, whereas the ABE protocol needs about 1605 s, resulting in computation times
two orders of magnitude higher.
A comparison of the outgoing network trac required to remove a group member
yields similar results: While for small groups, the ABE protocol only needs to send
77KB as opposed to about 106KB with the traditional one, this ratio changes in fa-
vor of the traditional protocol with larger groups. For groups with more than 2000
members, the ABE protocol requires that almost 26MB of keymaterial has to be sent
on average, while using the traditional protocol, only about 8MB are needed.
5.6 Conclusions and Outlook
e focus of this chapter is on E2E-SDS protocols that support named user groups,
that is, user groups that are managed by a dedicated group owner, and that exist
independently from any permissions on resources. e combination of E2E-SDS
and the support for named user groups implies a set of requirements on the protocol,
which comprise requirements regarding the expressiveness of access control policies,
the trust model, the authorization process, and the revocation of access permissions.
An E2E-SDS protocol protects the condentiality and integrity of the shared data
only with respect to certain attacker models. erefore, in this chapter, attacks on
E2E-SDS protocols were structured with regard to the capabilities of the attacker,
and prerequisites and countermeasures were discussed. In conclusion, for many at-
tacks, countermeasures exist, but these countermeasures require users to hold a local
state, thus, switching the device requires to synchronize the local state. For a fork-
ing attack, it was shown in literature that it is fundamentally impossible to construct
a countermeasure when multiple user are allowed to change the key or resource in
question, and a trusted third party is omitted. In this case, the design of an E2E-SDS
protocol can only strive try to minimize the attack vector for a forking attack, i.e., to
minimize the parts of the key graph that can be forked.
In the remainder of the chapter, the performance of E2E-SDS protocols that are
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based on joint authorization operations was evaluated. ese operations are car-
ried out by at least two dierent users in a collaborative manner, which requires that
the involved users are reachable in the network and able to allocate the necessary
computational resources immediately upon request. is is might be a problem es-
pecially when mobile devices are involved, as these devices may be temporarily lo-
cated in areas with bad network coverage, or it may be undesirable for the device
owner that computing-intensive cryptographic operations are carried out immedi-
ately upon request, maybe because the device becomes less responsive. e E2E-
SDS protocols analyzed in this chapter use joint authorization operations for group
member removal operations. is massively hinders an employment of hierarchies
of named user groups in practice.
e performance evaluations presented in this chapter are carried out by means of
the methods introduced in Chapter 4. e evaluations are based on the real-world
workloads characterized in Section 3.5, and are carried out for a range of mobile
devices manufactured between 2008 and 2015.
As a starting point, the performance of an E2E-SDS protocol was evaluated that
is similar to protocols that are in productive use today. e protocol is solely based
on traditional cryptographic primitives. e performance evaluation of this pro-
tocol shows that with regard to the considered workloads, only minor performance
penalties have to be expected formost of the authorization operations, as the compu-
tation time for these operations is mostly up to some seconds, even on an iPhone 3G
manufactured in 2008. However, major performance penalties hit users that man-
age groupmemberships in large user groups, i.e., user groups with a few thousand or
more members. In this case, the computation times rise to several minutes when re-
moving a user from a group—in the considered workloads, up to 324 seconds on the
iPhone 3G. Furthermore, the group member removal operations require the group
owner to upload several MB of cryptographic key material to the storage provider.
A possible solution to decrease the performance penalties of group membership
management is oered by Group Key Management approaches, which were orig-
inally developed to facilitate an ecient key distribution for secure multicast in a
public network. For this reason, the aforementioned E2E-SDS protocol was extended
with a Group Key Management approach referred to as Logical Key Hierarchy. With
the extendedprotocol, the performance penalties for themanagement of groupmem-
berships in large user groups are decreased signicantly, as a groupmember removal
operation can be carried out within few seconds, at the price of slightly raised com-
putation times for smaller groups. For this reason, a future task is to construct a
“hybrid” E2E-SDS protocol that applies Group KeyManagement approaches only to
user groups beyond a certain size.
Moreover, the introducedperformance evaluationmethodswere applied to anE2E-
SDS protocol based on Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). In a rst step, an ABE
schemewas identied that facilitates E2E-SDSwhile oering an authorizationmodel
expressive enough to enhance it with support for named user groups. For this pur-
pose, dierent ABE schemes were evaluated with regard to the requirements stated
at the beginning of the chapter. Only a single ABE scheme could be identied that
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complies with all of the requirements, which is called DAC-MACS. In a second step,
the attribute-based authorization model of DAC-MACS was mapped to the group-
based authorization model. Due to some degrees of freedom in the mapping, this
resulted in three dierent mapping alternatives.
e performance of the mapping alternatives was evaluated by means of the an-
alytical method, as ABE is not supported by the simulative model without any en-
hancements.e performance evaluation showed that the ABE-based E2E-SDS pro-
tocol exhibits a slightly worse performance than the traditional E2E-SDS protocol.
Nonetheless, the ABE-based E2E-SDS protocol only requires a few seconds of com-
putation time for any authorization operation, except for the groupmember removal
operation. In future work, it should be investigated whether an analog of Group Key
Management approaches could be constructed with ABE schemes to improve the
performance of group member removal operations. is could be achieved if the
underlying ABE scheme supports a hierarchy on the attributes.
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Operations
In this chapter, an E2E-SDS protocol is presented that does not require any joint
authorization operations. Joint authorization operations refer to authorization oper-
ations that are carried out by at least two dierent entities in a collaborative manner.
is kind of operation can only be carried out successfully if the involved users are
reachable in the network and able to allocate the required computational resources
immediately upon request. Depending on the concrete data sharing application, this
is a strong assumption: If mobile devices are involved, these may be temporarily lo-
cated in areas with bad network coverage, for example, like in many airplanes or
trains, or the devices might simply be switched o. Even if the devices are reachable,
it may be undesirable for the device owner that computing-intensive cryptographic
operations are carried out at this point in time, maybe because the device becomes
less responsive. ese drawbacks of joint authorization operations motivated the
design of the E2E-SDS protocol introduced in this chapter.
In Section 6.1, the challenges in designing an E2E-SDS protocol without joint au-
thorization operations are discussed. To prevent an attacker from replacing genuine
keys with forged ones, the keys have to be signed digitally. It is argued that without
joint authorization operations, the set of users that is authorized to sign a certain
key at the storage provider is no longer static, but might change over time. In conse-
quence, the set of public keys that are valid for a certain key signature changes over
time as well. However, the set of valid public keys has to be known to validate a sig-
nature.e totality of valid public keys for every key signature in the system will be
denoted as validity state in this chapter. To achieve E2E-SDS, the validity state has to
be published over an entity that is only semi-trusted (cf. Section 5.1), i.e., that is not
trusted with regard to the condentiality and integrity of any stored data, but only
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with regard to availability. For reasons of simplicity, the validity state might also be
published over the same storage provider that stores the shared data.
e publication of the validity state over a semi-trusted entity rises two challenges:
First, access control on updates of the validity state has to be enforced by crypto-
graphic means. Second, a rollback of the validity state or of signed keys has to be
prevented, even with regard to the fact that multiple users are authorized to generate
key signatures. In Section 5.2, it was shown that freshness guarantees are fundamen-
tally hard to achieve in E2E-SDS with multiple writers.
Section 6.2 provides an overview of the proposed E2E-SDS protocol.e proposed
protocol provides a cryptographic enforcement of updates on the validity state, and
guarantees the freshness of the validity state. However, the freshness of the key sig-
natures is not guaranteed by the protocol, as applicable approaches for preserving
freshness exhibit many drawbacks in practice. e implications of weakening the
freshness guarantees for key signatures are discussed.
To achieve the aforementioned features, the protocol basically encodes the validity
state in a new subgraph of the key graph, a so-called administrative key graph. e
administrative key graph extends the base key graph, which is already known from
the E2E-SDS protocols introduced in the previous chapter. e keys in the admin-
istrative key graph are used to sign the keys in the base key graph, and to validate
the signatures. e edges between the public keys in the administrative key graph
determine whether a public key is authorized for signing a certain key in the base
key graph. Hierarchies of named user groups are supported by the administrative
key graph in a natural way.
In Section 6.3, the dierent operations of the proposed protocol are described in de-
tail.
e chapter is concluded by a performance evaluation of the proposed E2E-SDS
protocol in Section 6.4.e performance evaluation leverages the simulativemethod
introduced in Section 4.2.e rst part of the performance evaluation is carried out
based on real-world workloads.e results show that inmost cases, the performance
of the protocol isworse than the performance of a similar protocol that leverages joint
authorization operations as presented in the previous chapter. However, in most
cases, the dierence is small in absolute terms. Similar to the E2E-SDS protocols
introduced in the previous chapter, the authorization operation types that require the
most computation time and outgoing network trac are group member removals.
e second part of the performance evaluation is a sensitivity analysis of the per-
formance of groupmember removals, especially in sharing scenarios based on group
hierarchies. is analysis is based on synthetic workloads. e results indicate that
the number of memberships of a certain group in other groups is an important fac-
tor for the performance of group member removals.
6.1 Challenges and Problem Statement
In this section, the challenges that arise when designing an E2E-SDS protocol with-
out joint authorization operations are discussed. e implication of avoiding joint
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authorization operations obviously is that only one single user, referred to as actor,
can be involved in an authorization operation. In the following, it is argued that
the restriction on a single actor per authorization operation has implications on the
integrity of cryptographic data structures that are stored at the storage provider.
In Section 5.2, it was shown that especially the integrity of the stored keys is an es-
sential requirement to prevent malicious changes in the SDS system’s authorization
state: Without protecting the integrity of the keys, an attacker might replace genuine
keys with attacker-chosen ones, and trick potential resource writers into using the
forged key for resource encryption. According to the E2E-SDS trust model intro-
duced in Section 5.1, the storage provider is not trusted to guarantee the integrity
of any stored cryptographic data structures. erefore, the integrity of the crypto-
graphic data structures, and especially the integrity of the keys, has to be enforced
by cryptographic means. A common way to protect the integrity of the keys are
digital signatures.
If an SDSprotocol supports the group-based authorizationmodel introduced in Sec-
tion 3.1, in traditional protocols, this will generally cause that dierent types of au-
thorization operations require the generation of the same key: For example, adding
a resource requires the resource owner to generate some kind of resource encryp-
tion key. At the same time, removing a user from a group that has read access on
the resource also requires to re-generate the resource encryption key. Note that in
the case of adding a resource, the resource owner initiates that authorization oper-
ation, while a group member removal is initiated by the group owner. With joint
authorization operations, the group owner is able to outsource the generation of the
resource encryption key to the respective resource owner. Without joint authoriza-
tion operations, this is no longer possible, thus, the group owner itself must generate
and sign the resource encryption key.
A similar argumentation applies in case of hierarchies of named user groups. For
the explanations in the following, if a group is member of another group, the former
will be referred to as member group, while the latter is denoted as host group. With
a naive cryptographic implementation of group hierarchies, the group key related to
a certain group is also known to each user in each member group. erefore, af-
ter removing a user from a member group, the group key of any host group must
be renewed. Without joint authorization operations, the renewing and signing of
all of these group keys has to be carried out by the group owner that initiated the
group member removal.
In consequence, supporting named user groups while omitting joint authorization
operations leads to situations where more than one user is allowed to generate and
sign a certain resource or group key.e set of allowed users is dynamic, and changes
whenever a group is granted or denied access on a resource, or when a group is added
or removed as member of another group.is also applies to the set of key pairs that
is valid to generate and validate the signature of a certain key, i.e., the validity state.
erefore, to enable the validation of the key signatures, the validity state has to be
published, and its integrity has to be protected.
In summary, the validity state has to be published under the following circum-
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stances:
1. e E2E-SDSprotocol protects the integrity of keys stored at the storage provider
by cryptographic means.
2. e E2E-SDS protocol omits joint authorization operations.
3. e E2E-SDS protocol supports named user groups or even hierarchies of
named user groups.
Due to the requirements of E2E-SDS, the validity state has to be stored at an entity
that is only assumed to be semi-trusted. For the sake of simplicity, is it assumed
that the validity state is stored on the same storage provider that holds the shared
data itself. is brings up two challenges: First, the validity state must be updated
by resource and group owners over time. As the storage provider is not trusted to
protect the integrity of the validity state, a cryptographic mechanism has to be built
that enforces access control on the validity state.
Second, it should be prevented that the validity state or the key signatures are
“rolled back” to an older version.is is especially hard with regard to the fact that
multiple users are authorized to generate signatures for a certain key. As already dis-
cussed in Section 2.2, preserving the freshness of data that can be written bymultiple
users is a fundamental problem if no trusted entity is present.
In summary, the problem that is addressed in this chapter can be stated as follows:
“Build an E2E-SDS protocol that realizes a group-based authoriza-
tionmodel and cryptographically enforces the integrity of the keys stored
at the storage provider without employing joint authorization opera-
tions.”
6.2 Protocol Overview and Design Decisions
In this section, an E2E-SDS protocol is introduced that supports the group-based
authorization model described in Section 3.1 while avoiding joint authorization op-
erations. First, an overview of the protocol is provided, where it is shown how the
validity state can be encoded and published as administrative key graph.ereaer,
the freshness of the validity state and the key signatures is discussed as a major chal-
lenge in protocol design. At the end to this section, some issues are discussed that
arise when the protocol is to be deployed in the real world.
6.2.1 Administrative Key Graph: Basic Idea
In the previous section, it was argued that the rst challenge in the protocol design
is to provide the validity state, i.e., the set of public keys that are valid for signing a
certain key, only by using a semi-trusted storage provider.e integrity of the validity
state must be guaranteed, and cryptographic processes must be established to update
the state. e validity state including the cryptographic access control enforcement
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should be constructed in a way that supports hierarchies of named user groups, i.e.,
a user group can be member of another user group.
e protocol addresses this challenge by encoding the validity state as a cascade
of keys and signatures. is mechanism is inspired by the cascades of public keys
employed by Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs, cf. Section 2.2). e cascade of keys
and signatures built by the protocol matches the denition of a key graph as given
in Section 4.2.1. For this reason, the cascade will be referred to as administrative key
graph, and the keys within the administrative key graph as administrative keys for
the remainder of this chapter.
e administrative keys are used to sign the keys in the base key graph, i.e., the
integrity of the base key graph is enforced by means of the administrative key graph.
e base key graph is similar to the key graph used by the E2E-SDS protocols that
were introduced in the previous chapter: It comprises all the keys and lockboxes that
are required for the decryption of resources.
Note that the administrative and the base key graph are denoted as distinct key
graphs for the sake of brevity and clearness of the explanations. In fact, they simply
form two parts of the overall key graph of the protocol.
More specically, an administrative key is used to sign the binding of a key in the
base key graph, i.e., a base key, to its function within the protocol. An example for
a function within the protocol is “resource encryption for resource r”. Every base
key and every administrative key in the protocol is related to a function within the
protocol: While the base key fullls the function in the protocol, the administrative
key attests that the base key is intended to fulll the function.e base keys assigned
to a certain function change over time, as, for example, a resource encryption key
might have to be renewed. On the other hand, the administrative key related to
a certain function is xed.
Just as the binding of a base key has to be signed to prevent key forgery, the binding
of an administrative key to its function has to be signed as well. e latter binding
must be signed by a user that is trusted to generate keys for the respective protocol
function. For example, the resource owner of resource r attests that a certain ad-
ministrative key is related to the function “resource encryption for resource r”. e
establishment of trust in a certain user to sign a certain administrative key is not part
of the protocol, but has to be done up front. is is similar to the establishment of
trust in a root certicate authority when a PKI is used.
e administrative key can be used to sign the binding of a base key to its function.
However, the permission to sign this binding can also be “delegated” to other keys
by means of the administrative key graph. For this purpose, administrative keys can
be connected by signatures.ese signatures carry the following semantics: Assume
that administrative key AK1 was used to generate a signature of administrative key
AK2.is signature causes that AK2 “inherits the permissions” of AK1: If AK1 can be
used to sign a certain base key, then AK2 can also be used to sign this base key.
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Figure 6.1: Sketch of relation between administrative and base key graph aer gen-
eration of resource and group keys. Blue solid edges indicate the encryption of the
end key with the starting key, while green stroked edges indicate a signature of the
end key with the starting key.
6.2.2 Application of Administrative Key Graph
In this section, it is shownhow the administrative key graph can be leveraged to build
an E2E-SDS protocol that supports named user groups.
For the sake of simplicity, the further explanations are simplied to two functions
within the protocol: a resource encryption key RK is used to encrypt and decrypt a
certain resource, while a group key GK is distributed to every member of a named
user group. In consequence, the administrative key graph comprises one adminis-
trative resource encryption key AdminRK for every resource, and one administrative
group key AdminGK for every group.
e explanations in this section are based on a running example, which comprises
resources r1 and r2 with resource owners RO1 and RO2, and groups g1, g2 and g3 with
group owners GO1, GO2 and GO3, respectively.
e state of the key graph aer the initial generation of resource and group keys is
visualized in Figure 6.1. Each resource encryption key and each group key is bound
to its function by a signature with the respective administrative key. Each adminis-
trative key, in turn, is bound to its function by a signature with the user key pair. In
the example, each administrative group key is signed by the owner of the respective
group, and each administrative resource encryption key is signed by the respective
resource owner.
A signature of an administrative key graph with another administrative key is gen-
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Figure 6.2: Administrative and base key graph aer group access is granted.
erated in two cases: rst, when a group is granted access to a resource, the admin-
istrative resource encryption key is used to sign the administrative group key. is
allow the group owner to renew the resource encryption key upon group member
removal. Second, when a group is added as member of a host group, the adminis-
trative group key of the host group is used to sign the administrative group key of
the member group.is way, the owner of the member group can renew the group
key of the host group upon group member removal.
In the running example, group g3 is granted read access on both resources, and
group g2 is granted read access on resource r1. Furthermore, group g1 is added as a
member of group g2 and of group g3. e state of the key graph aer these autho-
rization operations is depicted in Figure 6.2.
Let’s assume that GO1 removes a user from group g1. As discussed in Section 2.2,
removing a groupmember requires to renew all keys that are inferable by the group in
the key graph, as the removed groupmember might have cached some or all of these
keys. In the example, amember of group g1 can infer the keys of the groups g2 and g3.
Furthermore, amember of g1 can infer the resource encryption keys for resources r1
and r2.us,GO1 renews the group keys of g1, g2 and g3, and the resource encryption
keys for r1 and r2. Aer the key renewal, GO1 signs all of the keys with the admin-
istrative group key of group g1. In Figure 6.3, the state of the key graph aer the
group member removal is shown.
In general, removing a user from a group g requires to renew the group keys of
groups that g is member of, either directly or transitively.ese groups are referred
to as descendants of group g in the group hierarchy. Furthermore, removing a user
from a group g requires to renew the resource encryption keys of all resources that
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Figure 6.3: Administrative and base key graph aer a user was removed from
group g1.
are accessible to at least one of the descendants of g. Depending on the workload,
this might result in heavy computational costs and signicant network trac, which
will be evaluated later in this chapter.
e administrative key graph can now be used to validate a key signature. If, for
example, the signature of the resource encryption key of resource r2 should be vali-
dated, the validator checks the administrative key graph for a path from the admin-
istrative resource encryption key of resource r2 to the administrative group key of
group g1. In the example, this path is given with the administrative group key of
group g3 as intermediate node.
6.2.3 Freshness of Validity State and Key Signatures
As already discussed, the validity state, which is encoded in the administrative key
graph by the proposed protocol, changes over time.is requires that signatures re-
lated to the administrative key graph have to be expired. For this purpose, it is not
sucient to delete the signatures from the storage provider, as the signatures could
simply be restored by everyone who has write access to the storage provider. is
way, revoked permissions can be restored, which was discussed as rollback attack
in Section 5.2. is attack should be prevented, i.e., the freshness of the signatures
should be preserved.
In this section, it will be discussed how the freshness of each the dierent signa-
tures related to the administrative key graph can be protected. For this purpose,
three types of signatures have to be distinguished: First, signatures of the binding
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of an administrative key to its function, which are generated with the user key pair
of the owner of the key. Second, signatures of one administrative key with another
administrative key. And third, signatures of the binding of a base key to its function,
generated with an administrative key.
e rst signature type, which binds administrative keys to its function, does not
have to be renewed at all. e reason for this is that administrative keys are never
changed in the proposed protocol, i.e., the administrative key assigned to a certain
function is never renewed.
For the second type of signatures—the signature of an administrative keys with
another one—a periodic refreshment of signatures can be applied.ese signatures
have to be expired whenever the delegation permission represented by the signature
is revoked. For this purpose, an expiration date is incorporated into each signature,
and the refreshing user stores a ngerprint of the last signed state on her user device.
Before the signature expires, the refreshing user checks whether the local ngerprint
equals the ngerprint of the state on the storage provider. If this is the case, the
signature is refreshed. e periodic refreshment has to be carried out by the user
that generated the signature in the rst place. For example, when a resource owner
grants access to a group, she signs the respective administrative group key with the
administrative resource key, as shown in the previous section. From there on, the
resource owner is responsible for refreshing the signature periodically.
e third type of signatures, which are generated with an administrative key to
sign the binding of a base key to its function, has to be expired whenever the base
key is renewed. is way, the old base key that was signed with the administrative
key is invalidated.e main dierence to the other types of signatures is that possi-
bly multiple users are authorized to generate these signatures.is results from the
support for named user groups while omitting joint authorization operations, which
was already discussed in detail. Regarding the example in the previous section, the
resource encryption key of resource r1 can be signed by group owners GO1, GO2 and
GO3, and resource owner RO1.
Since multiple users are allowed to generate signatures of the third type, periodic
resigning cannot be employed. e reason for this is that the validity of a signa-
ture cannot be checked by comparing the signed value on the storage provider with
the signed value stored locally, as the value on the storage provider may have been
changed by another legitimate user in the meantime.
In fact, it is a fundamental problem to prevent any kind of rollback attack when
multiple users share data without at least one trusted entity. is problem was al-
ready discussed in Section 5.2. e best freshness guarantee that can be given un-
der these circumstances is fork consistency, which is intuitively described as follows:
“A le system with fork consistency might conceal users’ actions from each other,
but if it does, users get divided into groups and the members of one group can no
longer see any of another group’s le system operations.” [MS02] In the context of
the protocol, this means that an attacker with read and write access to the storage
provider is always able to provide dierent views of the key graph or the resources to
dierent users. However, aer forking the views, the attacker could never rollback
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any modication of the key graph or the resources, and she could never join these
views again without detection.
While approaches were proposed that ensure fork consistency, these approaches
exhibit major limitations. For example, they might cause a potentially huge amount
of network trac that quadratically grows in size with the number of clients that
share a certain resource, or they require that all users are honest, which contradicts
the trust model described in Section 5.1. A further limitation of all of these proto-
cols is that every user has to store some information on his client in order to check
the validity of the data on the storage provider. On the opposite, for the periodic
signature renewal described above, only resource and group owner have to store val-
idation information locally.is may especially by an issue if a user employs multi-
ple client devices for data sharing, as the validation information has to be synced
between these clients.
Because of themajor limitations of the approaches that ensure fork consistency, the
proposed protocol omits securing signatures from administrative keys to base keys
against rollback attacks altogether. Obviously, this tradeo has a negative impact on
the security of the protocol: An attacker with read and write access to the storage
provider cannot only fork, but additionally roll back the lockboxes or resources for
a user who was already oered or has even downloaded a more recent version of the
lockboxes or resources. For example, it is possible that a resource owner that has
revoked write permissions for a user can also be provided with data that the revoked
user has written, although she was not allowed to do so.
While this can be a serious vulnerability of the protocol in some scenarios, rollback
attacks are much harder if some of the users store a copy of the resources locally, e.g.,
because SDS is implemented as a Sync&Share service. e impact of local caching
on the feasibility of rollback attacks was discussed in Section 5.2. In summary, a
rollback attack on the key graph also requires a rollback of resources in most cases,
which can be detected by a Sync&Share client. Nonetheless, a rollback attack can
be successful if the attacker collaborates with a user that was revoked write access to
a certain resource. In this case, the rollback attack can be targeted at restoring the
write permissions of the malicious user on the resource. If the resource is updated
by the malicious user immediately aer the rollback, this cannot be detected even
when Sync&Share is employed.
6.2.4 Implementation Discussion
In this section, some issues are discussed that have to be considered before the pro-
tocol can be employed in practice.
First, the question arises whether the keys should be signed before or aer they are
encrypted, i.e., whether keys or lockboxes should be signed. ese two alternatives
are known as sign-then-encrypt and encrypt-then-sign, respectively.e security im-
plications of the alternatives are discussed in Section 2.2. From a performance per-
spective, it is better to sign the keys before encryption: Keys oen are encryptedmul-
tiple times with dierent other keys, i.e., multiple lockboxes that encrypt the same
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key exist.us, if the keys would be signed aer encryption, a signature would have
to be generated for each of these lockboxes, instead of just a single signature with
sign-then-encrypt.
To make a signature available to the users, it has to be put on the storage provider,
together with some auxiliary information. is information includes at least the
function of the signed key within the protocol, and the public key that can be used to
validate the signature.e signature and the auxiliary information can be compiled
within one data structure, and this data structure can be addressed by the function
within the protocol that was signed, e.g., “signature of encryption key of resource r”.
An important question is how users can be enabled to traverse the group hierarchy.
e protocol requires this to be done, e.g., when a group member must retrieve the
group key of some descendant group to read or write a resource, as the descendant
group was granted access to the resource, and the group member leverages her indi-
rect membership of the descendant group. As another example, a group owner has
to be able to identify all descendants of her group to renew all of their group keys
aer a group member removal. Traversing the group hierarchy is also necessary to
validate signatures:e validation of base key graph signatures requires to traverse
the administrative key graph, in this key graph closely reects the group hierarchy.
One solution for this issue is to have the storage provider oer facilities for group
hierarchy traversal. From a security point of view, this does not provide any attack
vectors:ere is no point in pretending an edge in the group hierarchy that does not
exist, as this edge is not reected in the key graph. On the other hand, an attacker
could pretend that an edge in the group hierarchy does not exist; however, this would
only prevent some users from reading or writing resources, but has no implications
for the condentiality or integrity of the resources.
Just as for SDS protocols that leverage joint authorization operations, the perfor-
mance of processing group member removal events can be increased by extending
the protocol with Group Key Management approaches (cf. Section 2.2). For the per-
formance evaluation presented in the next section, the protocol was extended with
a Logical Key Hierarchy for each group. Note that employing a Group Key Manage-
ment approach with auxiliary keys requires that the group owner is able to retrieve
every auxiliary key. At the same time, the other group members are only allowed to
retrieve a subset of the auxiliary keys. In combination with the support for group hi-
erarchies, this poses a new challenge: A group ownerwhowants to remove amember
from her group must be enabled to retrieve every auxiliary key of every descendant
group. For this purpose, the key graph is extended by a further part, which will not
be described in detail here.
6.3 Protocol Details
In this section, the cryptographic operations necessary to process the dierent au-
thorization operation types are listed as pseudocode. For the sake of simplicity, some
steps are omitted in the listings:
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abbreviation description
UKu asymmetric user key pair of user u
GKg asymmetric group key pair of group g
PKp asymmetric key pair of principal p, which is either a user or
a group
RKr symmetric resource encryption key for resource r
RSKr asymmetric resource signing key pair for resource r
AdminRKr asymmetric administrative key pair used to sign the RK for
resource r
AdminRSKr asymmetric administrative key pair used to sign the RSK for
resource r
AdminGKg asymmetric administrative key pair used to sign the GK for
group g
Table 6.1: Naming conventions for cryptographic data structures used in the E2E-
SDS protocol.
– As an RSA public key of a given length cannot be used to encrypt an RSA
private key of the same length (cf. Section 2.2), symmetric keys are used as
“intermediate keys”, i.e., a public key is used to encrypt a symmetric key, which
in turn encrypts a private key.ese intermediate symmetric keys are omitted.
– Aer downloading an encrypted key, the signature of this key must be vali-
dated, which may require to traverse the administrative key graph. Signature
validation is omitted in the listings.
– Group Key Management using a Logical Key Hierarchy is omitted, as well as
the group rekeying key graph introduced in the previous section.
However, each of these steps is implemented in the simulationmodel that was used
for the performance evaluation.
e abbreviations used in the listing are shown in Table 6.1.e symbol ↑ appended
to the generation of some cryptographic data structure means that the structure is
uploaded on the storage provider aer the generation.e symbol ↓ prepended to a
decryption means that the cryptographic data structure has to be downloaded from
the storage provider before decryption. 
// add user u
// generate user key pair
UKu = GenAsymKeyPair(PP) 
Listing 6.1: AddUser operation
Adding a user simply requires to generate the asymmetric user key pair.
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 
// add resource r
// generate resource encryption key and signing key pair
RKr = GenSymKey(PP)
RSKr = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
// generate and upload lockboxes for resource encryption
key and signing key pair
Locked(RKr , u) = EncAsym(RKr ,UKpubu ) ↑
Locked(RSKr , u) = EncAsym(RSKr ,UKpubu ) ↑
// generate administrative keys
AdminRKr = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
AdminRSKr = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
// generate and upload lockboxes for administrative keys
Locked(AdminRKr , u) = EncAsym(AdminRKr ,UKpubu ) ↑
Locked(AdminRSKr , u) = EncAsym(AdminRSKr ,UKpubu ) ↑
// sign resource encryption key and signing key pair with
administrative keys
Sign(Idr&RKr ,AdminRKr) ↑
Sign(Idr&RSKr ,AdminRSKr) ↑
// sign administrative key pairs with user private key
Sign(Idr&AdminRKr ,UKu) ↑
Sign(Idr&AdminRSKr ,UKu) ↑ 
Listing 6.2: AddResource operation
Processing an AddResource authorization operation involves the generation of a
symmetric encryption key and an asymmetric signing key pair. In addition, the ad-
ministrative key pairs for the resource have to be generated: One administrative key
pair is used to sign the binding of the encryption key to its function, while another
administrative key pair is necessary to sign the binding of the resource signing key
pair to its function. All of the generated keys and key pairs are encrypted with the
user public key of the resource owner, and uploaded to the storage provider. 
// allow read and write access for user or group a
// download and decrypt lockboxes for resource encryption
key and signing key pair↓ RKr = DecAsym(Locked(RKr , u),UKprivu )↓ RSKr = DecAsym(Locked(RSKr , u),UKprivu )
// generate and upload lockboxes for resource encryption
key and signing key pair
Locked(RKr , a) = EncAsym(RKr ,UKpuba ) ↑
Locked(RSKr , a) = EncAsym(RSKr ,UKpuba ) ↑
if (IsGroup(a))
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// download and decrypt lockboxes for administrative
resource keys↓ AdminRKr = DecAsym(Locked(AdminRKr , u),UKprivu )↓ AdminRSKr = DecAsym(Locked(AdminRSKr , u),UKprivu )
// sign administrative group key with admin resource keys
Sign(Idg&GKg ,AdminRKr) ↑
Sign(Idg&GKg ,AdminRSKr) ↑ 
Listing 6.3: AllowReadWrite operation
To grant a user or a group read and write access to a resource, the encrypted re-
source signing key pair and encryption key are downloaded from the storage provider.
ese keys are encrypted with the public key of the user or the group that should get
access. If access is granted to a group, this has to be reected in the administra-
tive key graph. For this purpose, the administrative group key is signed with both
administrative keys of the resource. 
// deny read and write access for user or group a
// generate new resource encryption key and new signing key
pair
RKr = GenSymKey(PP)
RSKr = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
// download and decrypt lockboxes for administrative
resource keys↓ AdminRKr = DecAsym(Locked(AdminRKr , u),UKprivu )↓ AdminRSKr = DecAsym(Locked(AdminRSKr , u),UKprivu )
// sign new resource encryption key and new signing key
pair with administrative keys
Sign(Idr&RKr ,AdminRKr) ↑
Sign(Idr&RSKr ,AdminRSKr) ↑
// for all remaining readers:
foreach(a in GetPrincipalsWithReadPermission(r))
// generate and upload lockboxes for new resource
encryption key
Locked(RKr , a) = EncAsym(RKr , PKpuba ) ↑
// for all remaining writers:
foreach(a in GetPrincipalsWithReadWritePermission(r))
// generate and upload lockboxes for new signing key pair
Locked(RSKr , a) = EncAsym(RSKr , PKpuba ) ↑ 
Listing 6.4: DenyReadWrite operation
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To deny read and write access to a user or a group, the resource encryption key and
the resource signing key pair have to be renewed.e new encryption key is signed
with the administrative resource encryption key, and encrypted with the public keys
of all remaining reader. Similar to this, the new signing key pair is signed with the
administrative resource signing key, and encrypted with the public keys of all re-
maining writers. If access was denied to a group, the signatures of the group ad-
ministrative key generated with either of the administrative resource keys must be
removed from the storage provider. 
// add group g
// generate group key pair
GKg = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
// generate and upload lockbox for group key pair
Locked(GKg , u) = EncAsym(GKg ,UKpubu ) ↑
// generate administrative group key
AdminGKg = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
// generate and upload lockbox for administrative group key
pair
Locked(AdminGKg , u) = EncAsym(AdminGKg ,UKpubu ) ↑
// sign group key pair with administrative group key
Sign(Idg&GKg ,AdminGKg) ↑
// sign administrative group key pair with user private key
Sign(Idg&AdminGKg ,UKu) ↑ 
Listing 6.5: AddGroup operation
e addition of a group requires to generate a group key pair, and an adminis-
trative group key pair. e group key pair is signed with the administrative group
key. Both key pairs are encrypted with the public key of the group owner, and up-
loaded to the storage provider. 
// add member p to group g
// download and decrypt lockbox for group key pair↓ GKg = DecAsym(Locked(GKg , u),UKprivu )
// generate and upload lockbox for group key pair for
principal p
Locked(GKg , p) = EncAsym(GKg , PKpubp ) ↑
if (IsGroup(p))
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// sign group key pair with administrative group
key
Sign(Idp&GKp,AdminGKg) ↑ 
Listing 6.6: AddMemberToGroup operation
A user or group can be added to a group simply by encrypting the group key pair
with the new member’s public key. If a group is added, the administrative key graph
has to be extended by signing the administrative group key of the added group with
the administrative group key of the host group. 
// remove principal p from group g
// generate new group key pair
GKg = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
// download and decrypt lockboxes for administrative group
keys↓ AdminGKg = DecAsym(Locked(AdminGKg , u),UKprivu )
// sign group key pair with administrative group key
Sign(Idg&GKg ,AdminGKg) ↑
// for all remaining group members:
foreach(a in GetGroupMembers(g))
// generate and upload lockbox for group key pair
Locked(GKg , p) = EncAsym(GKg , PKpubp ) ↑
if (IsGroup(a))
// recursively rekey descendant groups
foreach(d in GetDescendantGroups(g))
RekeyGroup(d,g)
// rekey all resources that the group has read
access to
foreach(r in GetReadAccessibleResources(g))
RekeyResourceRead(r,g)
// rekey all resources that the group has read and
write access to
foreach(r in GetReadWriteAccessibleResources(g))
RekeyResourceReadWrite(r,g) 
Listing 6.7: RemoveMemberFromGroup operation
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Removing a member from a group can be expected to be the most expensive and
complex operation. For this purpose, a new group key pair has to be generated and
signed with the administrative group key. is new group key pair is distributed to
all remaining group members by encrypting it with the public keys of these mem-
bers. If the removed member is a group, the signature of the removed group’s ad-
ministrative key generated with that of the hosting group must be deleted from the
storage provider. As already discussed in the previous section, the group keys of all
descendant groups must also be renewed, which is shown in Listing 6.8. Finally, all
resources that the group is allowed to read or write must be rekeyed. e rekeying
process is shown in Listing 6.9 for the case that the group has read and write access. 
// rekey group d
// rekeying process initiated by group owner of group g
// generate new group key pair
GKd = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
// sign group key pair with administrative group key of
group g
Sign(Idd&GKd ,AdminGKg) ↑
// for all remaining group members:
foreach(a in GetGroupMembers(d))
// generate and upload lockbox for group key pair
Locked(GKd , p) = EncAsym(GKd , PKpubp ) ↑
// rekey all resources that the group has read access to
foreach(r in GetReadAccessibleResources(d))
RekeyResourceRead(r,g)
// rekey all resources that the group has read and write
access to
foreach(r in GetReadWriteAccessibleResources(d))
RekeyResourceReadWrite(r,g) 
Listing 6.8: RekeyGroup operation that is used as subprocedure within
RemoveMemberFromGroup
Rekeying a group is similar to removing a member from the group:e group key
pair is renewed, and the new key pair is distributed to all group members. However,
the new group key pair is not signed with the administrative group key of the group
that is to be rekeyed. Instead, it is signed with the administrative key of the group
that a member was removed from, i.e., whose group owner initiated the rekeying
process in the rst place. 
// rekey resource r
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// rekeying process initiated by group owner of group g
// generate new resource encryption key and new signing key
pair
RKr = GenSymKey(PP)
RSKr = GenAsymKeyPair(PP)
// sign new resource encryption key and new signing key
pair with administrative key of group g
Sign(Idr&RKr ,AdminGKg) ↑
Sign(Idr&RSKr ,AdminGKg) ↑
// for all resource readers:
foreach(a in GetPrincipalsWithReadPermission(r))
// generate and upload lockboxes for new resource
encryption key
Locked(RKr , a) = EncAsym(RKr , PKpuba ) ↑
// for all resource writers:
foreach(a in GetPrincipalsWithReadWritePermission(r))
// generate and upload lockboxes for new signing key pair
Locked(RSKr , a) = EncAsym(RSKr , PKpuba ) ↑ 
Listing 6.9: RekeyResourceReadWrite operation
To rekey a resource, almost the same cryptographic operations are necessary as
when denying access to the resource: e resource encryption key and signing key
pair are renewed, and distributed to all users and groups who have access to the re-
source. e new keys are not signed with the administrative keys of the resource,
but with the administrative group key of the group owner that carries out the rekey-
ing process. 
// resource r is written
// if user u has direct read and write access to resource r
if (HasDirectReadWriteAccess(u, r))
// download and decrypt lockboxes for resource
encryption key and signing key pair↓ RKr = DecAsym(Locked(RKr , u),UKprivu )↓ RSKr = DecAsym(Locked(RSKr , u),UKprivu )
// if user u has read and write access to resource r via
group membership
else
// iterate over path in group hierarchy;
// start at a group that user u is member of
// end at a group with write access to resource r
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for(g1 to gn in GetWriteGroupPath(u, r))↓ GKgi+1 = DecAsym(Locked(GKgi+1 , gi),GKprivgi )
// download and decrypt lockboxes for resource
encryption key and signing key pair↓ RKr = DecAsym(Locked(RKr , gn),GKprivgn )↓ RSKr = DecAsym(Locked(RSKr , gn),GKprivgn )
// encrypt resource and upload
Locked(r) = EncSym(r,RKr) ↑
// sign resource and upload signature
Sign(r,RSKr) ↑ 
Listing 6.10: WriteData operation
To be able to write a resource, the user rst retrieves the resource encryption key
and the resource signing key pair. If the user has was granted access to a resource
implicitly by a group membership, she has to traverse the group hierarchy from a
group she is member of to the group that was granted access. While traversing the
group hierarchy, the group key pair of one group is used to decrypted the group key
pair of the next group. With the last group key pair, the resource encryption key
and signing key pair can be decrypted. Finally, the resource is encrypted with the
encryption key, and signed with the signing key pair.
6.4 Performance Evaluation Results
In this section, the performance of the E2E-SDS protocol introduced in this chapter
is evaluated. In the rst part, the performance is evaluated with regard to real-world
workloads. As these workloads contain only a small number of the most resource-
consuming events, i.e.,RemoveUserFromGroup andRemoveGroupFromGroup events,
synthetic workloads are used to carry out a sensitivity analysis in the second part
of this section.
6.4.1 Performance Evaluation Results for Real-World Sharing Sce-
narios
To get an indication of the real-world employability of the protocol, its performance
is evaluated with regard to real-world workloads. e performance evaluation fo-
cuses on the extended version of the protocol that leverages a Logical Key Hierarchy
for group key management (cf. Section 5.3.1). Furthermore, the performance evalu-
ation only considers lazy revocation (cf. Section 2.2).
e workloads used for the evaluation were characterized in Section 3.5. For the
performance evaluation, the same method is used as for the performance evaluation
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of the E2E-SDS protocols working with joint authorization operations, which was
presented in Section 5.3.e device-dependent computation costs for cryptographic
operations, which were measured with micro benchmarks, are reused. us, the
evaluation is based on the assumption that RSA with 2 048 bit keys and AES with
256 bit keys is used.
e protocol described in this chapter can be applied both for workloads that con-
tain group hierarchies, and for workloads without group hierarchies. However, with
regard to workloads that do not contain any group hierarchies, the performance
of the protocol is not substantially dierent from the performance of the extended
protocol presented in Section 5.3. In fact, the computation time and network traf-
c required for processing an authorization operation increase by a constant value,
regardless of the authorization operation type. us, no simulations were carried
out based on workloads without group hierarchies. Unfortunately, the majority of
the workloads characterized in Section 3.5 does not contain any group hierarchies.
erefore, the protocol was only simulated with regard to 13 workloads.
authorization operation type computation time incoming
network
trac
outgoing
network
trac
AddResource 6.24 s (6.28 s; 7.68 s) 0 21 KB
AllowRead 0.11 s (0.14 s; 0.97 s) 6.4 KB 1KB
AllowReadWrite 0.22 s (0.27 s; 1.93 s) 21 KB 2KB
AddGroup 5.44 s (5.65 s; 12.47 s) 0.7 KB 27KB
Table 6.2: Performance of authorization operation types with constant computation
times and network trac.e computation times are given for a Dell Latitude E4310,
a Samsung Galaxy S5 mini, and an iPhone 3G.
e performance evaluation results for authorization operation types that require
a constant computation time and cause constant network trac are shown in Ta-
ble 6.2. In this section, the computation times are given for a Dell Latitude E4310,
and the computation times for a Samsung Galaxy S5 mini and an iPhone 3G are ap-
pended in parentheses. In relative terms, the computation times are signicantly
higher than for the E2E-SDS protocols that leverage joint authorization operations.
is is caused by the generation of additional RSA key pairs, which constitute the
administrative key graph.
e computation times for processing AddUserToGroup and AddGroupToGroup
events depends on whether the key hierarchy of the group has to be extended. On
average, adding a user to a group takes 0.13 s (0.16 s; 1.12 s). To add a group to another
group, 0.19 s (0.23 s; 1.64 s) are required on average.
e performance of processing a DenyRead or DenyReadWrite event is not con-
stant, but depends on the number of users and groups that have read or write access
to the resource in question. e average computation time to process a DenyRead-
Write event is 1.66 s (1.70 s; 2.95 s). Using the extended E2E-SDS protocol introduced
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in the last chapter, processing a DenyReadWrite event only takes 1.54 s (1.56 s; 1.93 s)
in average, which is obviously slightly less for the Dell Laptop and the Galaxy S5
mini, and about 35% less for the iPhone. However, in absolute terms, the required
computation time is still not too large.
emost interesting authorization operation types areRemoveUserFromGroup and
RemoveGroupFromGroup on the one hand, since the processing of these event types
works completely dierent from that in the E2E-SDS protocols based on joint au-
thorization operations, and potentially requires a lot of resources. As already shown,
these event types occur only rarely in the real-world workloads. Because of the small
sample size, synthetic workloads are used to assess the sensitivity of the performance
with regard to certain workload parameters, which is presented in the next subsec-
tion. Nonetheless, the real-world results might give a rst indication for the employ-
ability of the protocol. Removing a user from a group takes 38 s (40 s; 99 s) in average,
and a maximum of 911 s (935 s; 1608 s) was observed. e removal of a group from
another group takes 48 s (56 s; 320 s) on average, which is slightlymore than for a user
removal at the Dell laptop and the Samsung Galaxy S5 mini smartphone, and about
two times more on the iPhone 3G.e higher computation times for the removal
of a group can be explained by the necessary renewal of the key hierarchies of all
descendant groups, which is omitted in case of a user removal. Besides lots of sym-
metric cryptographic operations, the key hierarchy renewal requires one asymmetric
encryption per group member.ese asymmetric operations takes a comparatively
long time, especially on the old iPhone.
e incomingnetwork trac volume for processing aRemoveUserFromGroup event
is 0.45MB on average, with amaximumof 10.43MB. For processing aRemoveGroup-
FromGroup event, only 0.22MB of incoming network trac are required on average.
e reason for this dierence is that removing a user from a group requires to fetch
a part of the key hierarchy of each group from the storage provider. On the other
hand, to remove a group from another group, the key hierarchies of all descendant
groups are deleted, and rebuilt from scratch.
e outgoing network trac for removing a user from a group is 0.31MB on av-
erage, the maximum is 5.58MB. With an average of 0.47MB, the outgoing network
trac generatedwhen removing a group fromanother group is slightly higher, which
is due to the key hierarchy renewal for the descendant groups.
e last event type that is considered within this performance evaluation areWrite-
Data events. e processing of these events diers from that of E2E-SDS protocols
with joint authorization operations, as it requires the validation of signatureswith the
help of the administrative key graph. As already discussed in Section 5.3, the costs of
processing aWriteData event can be partitioned into costs that depend on the size of
the resource written, and costs that are independent of this size.e latter is referred
to as key management costs, and only these costs are considered in this section.e
average key management computation time for writing data is 0.12 s (0.15 s; 1.09 s).
ese computation times are only slightly higher than with the SDS protocols using
joint authorization operations. However, the comparatively low computation times
can be explained by the fact that in the real-world workloads, users never need to
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leverage indirect group memberships to get write permissions. If the users had to
traverse the group hierarchy, additional asymmetric cryptographic operations had
to be carried out. e incoming network trac is 31 KB on average, but would also
increase if writers had to traverse the group hierarchy.
6.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
As the performance evaluation results for real-world workloads showed, process-
ing RemoveUserFromGroup and RemoveGroupFromGroup events requires a lot more
computation time than processing other authorization operation types. is is a
consequence of a key property of the protocol introduced in this chapter: All crypto-
graphic operations that are necessary to enforce a groupmember removal are carried
out by the group owner initiating the removal. However, as the real-world workloads
collected for this thesis only comprise a small number ofRemoveUserFromGroup and
RemoveGroupFromGroup events, the inuence of the workload on the performance
cannot be assessed comprehensively and systematically. For this reason, the sensi-
tivity analysis presented in this section is based on synthetic workloads, which were
generated according to the method introduced in Section 3.6.
For the sensitivity analysis, the workload parameters are varied that obviously in-
uence the performance of processing RemoveUserFromGroup and RemoveGroup-
FromGroup events. An analysis of the protocol description in Section 6.3 shows that
from the workload parameters listed in Section 3.4, the parameters users per group,
group members per group, and group memberships per group are most likely to have
an impact on the performance. Since group members per group and group member-
ships per group depend on each other, only one of these parameters is varied, which
was arbitrarily chosen to be group memberships per group.
eworkload generationmethod allows to dene theworkload parameters as prob-
ability distributions. e approach taken to vary the workload parameters is to ap-
proximate the frequency distribution of the real-world parameter with a well-known
probability distribution by curve tting, and then vary the parameters of this prob-
ability distribution. e distribution parameters are varied in a way that the mean
of the distribution takes some predened values.
e real-world samples taken for group members per group and group memberships
per group can both be tted to a Gamma distribution, which is characterized by two
distribution parameters, k and θ. As varying either k or θ changes the mean of the
Gamma distribution, one degree of freedom is le for the parametrization of the
Gamma distribution to reach a given mean. In general, two dierent Gamma distri-
bution parametrizationswere chosen per targetmean value andworkload parameter.
However, for some distribution parametrizations, the target mean of the distribution
and the actual average of the generated workload strongly dier, so this parametriza-
tions had to be omitted in the further analysis.
e experimental setup follows a full factorial design with regard to the means of
the parameters users per group and group memberships per group. Because of large
simulation running times, especially when the average number of group member-
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Figure 6.4: Sensitivity of the average computation time for group member removal
operations.e simulations are based on synthetic workloads.
ships per group rises above 3, only a small value space could be explored. As pre-
sented in Section 3.5, a group that is part of the real-world workloads has 36 user
members and 1 group membership in average. Based on these real-world averages,
the target means for the parameter distributions were chosen as 18, 36 and 72 for
the parameter users per group, and as 1, 2 and 3 for the parameter group member-
ships per group.
e inuence of the workload parameter on the performance of processing the
group member removal events is a priori expected as follows: e parameter users
per group is expected to have only a minor impact on the performance of the Re-
moveUserFromGroup event, since the performance of renewing a group key depends
only logarithmically on the group size. In addition, a larger group size only increases
the number of necessary symmetric cryptographic operations, which are cheap in
comparison to asymmetric ones.e parameter users per group is expected to have
a larger impact on the performance of the RemoveGroupFromGroup event, as in this
case, the key hierarchies of all descendant groups must be renewed. is requires
not only a lot of symmetric cryptographic operations, but also one asymmetric en-
cryption for each group member.us, the performance should linearly depend on
the total number of group members of all descendant groups.
e inuence of the parameter group memberships per group is much harder to
estimate: is parameter can be expected to positively correlate with the number
of descendants per group, which determines the number of groups that have to be
rekeyed aer a groupmember removal. However, this dependency is hard to quantify
in general. In literature, no hints on this dependency could be found.
Figure 6.4 shows the average computation time necessary to process aRemoveUser-
FromGroup event for dierent means of users per group and group memberships per
group. It can be observed that the parameter group memberships per group has a
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Figure 6.5: Sensitivity of the average computation time for removing a group from
another group.e simulations are based on synthetic workloads.
large impact on the computation times, leading to a superlinear rise. e impact
of the parameter users per group can hardly be assessed from the simulation results:
While increasing this parameter leads to a small rise in the computation times for
group memberships per group = 2, as it was expected, it shows a dierent behavior
for other values of group memberships per group. e reason for these ambiguous
results is that due to the potentially large simulation runtime, only few workloads
could be simulated.
In Figure 6.5, the average computation times required to process a RemoveGroup-
FromGroup event are plotted.e results also show that higher values of groupmem-
berships per group yield a superlinear rise of the computation times. In addition, the
plot indicates that the parameter users per group also has a substantial impact on
the computation times. However, this impact cannot be clearly quantied from the
simulation results, for the reason already mentioned above.
e trends that can be observed in the simulation results for incoming and outgo-
ing trac are very similar to those just presented, and do not provide any additional
insights. For this reason, these results are omitted here.
In conclusion, the sensitivity analysis shows that the workload parameter group
memberships per group has a major impact on the performance of group member
removals, as increasing this parameter results in a superlinear rise of the compu-
tation times, the incoming and the outgoing network trac. While the sensitivity
analysis indicates that the parameter users per group also substantially inuences the
performance of the RemoveGroupFromGroup event, further simulations would be
necessary to get more signicant results.
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6.5 Conclusions and Outlook
In this chapter, anE2E-SDSprotocolwas introduced that supports nameduser groups,
but workswithout the need for joint authorization operations between users. For this
purpose, the protocol leverages an administrative key graph as an additional part of
the key graph.is way, the protocol does not require any additional cryptographic
primitives, compared to the traditional E2E-SDS protocols using joint authorization
operations (cf. Section 5.3.1). With the administrative key graph, the support for
group hierarchies could be added to the protocol in a straight forward manner.
e major challenge in the E2E-SDS protocol design is ensuring the freshness of
the signatures that are part of the administrative key graph. If only one single user
is authorized to generate a certain signature, this signature can be refreshed by the
user periodically. However, it was shown that the support for named user groups
while omitting joint authorization operations implies that there are signatures that
are potentially generated by multiple users. In this case, the best notion of freshness
that can be achieved is fork consistency. Since existing solutions to ensure fork con-
sistency have several drawbacks in practice, e.g., a huge network trac overhead, the
protocol does not ensure the freshness of signatures that can be generated by multi-
ple users. First, this allows an attacker who has read and write access on the storage
provider to roll back resources to an earlier version. However, this attack can be de-
tected if the resources are cached locally, e.g., if Sync&Share is used. Second, if the
attacker additionally collaborates with a user that had write access to a resource in
the past, a rollback attack can enable the revoked user to regain write access to the
resource. If the resource is then written immediately aer the rollback, the attack
cannot be detected even when caching the resources locally.
e performance of the E2E-SDSprotocolwas evaluated based on real-worldwork-
loads.e evaluation shows that in relative terms, the computation times are signif-
icantly higher than those of the traditional E2E-SDS protocols based on joint autho-
rization operations. However, in absolute terms, the computation times are mostly
in the range of only a few seconds. For example, although adding a resource is ex-
pensive compared to most of the other authorization operation types, it only takes
between 6 and 8 seconds on average. Similar to the E2E-SDS protocols based on
joint authorization operations, the most expensive authorization operation types are
RemoveUserFromGroup and RemoveGroupFromGroup events, which require com-
putation times that are a magnitude larger than for other authorization operation
types, e.g., 38 s on average using the Dell laptop. While the outgoing network trac
generated by these event types is also a magnitude larger than the trac caused by
the other event types, it is still below 0.5MB on average.
To assess the sensitivity of the performance of the expensive group member re-
movals against changes in workload parameters, a sensitivity analysis was carried
out.is analysis was based on synthetic workloads, which were generated accord-
ing to the method introduced in Section 3.6.e analysis results show that the per-
formance highly depends on the workload parameter group memberships per group,
which has a superlinear inuence on the performance for small values. In addition,
the results show that the parameter users per group also has a signicant inuence
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on the performance, as it can be expected from analyzing the operations carried out
by the protocol. However, the results do not show a clear trend.is is probably due
to the comparatively small number of workloads that were simulated.
As future work, mechanisms to hinder rollback attacks could be designed and in-
tegrated into the protocol. Although, e.g., the SUNDR le system [LKMS03] of-
fers fork consistency, i.e., the strongest notion of freshness that can be achieved in a
multi-writer setting with only a semi-trusted storage provider, SUNDR does hardly
scale with regard to the generated network trac. When designing a mechanism
that hinders rollback attacks, possibly a trade-o has to be made between the degree
to which rollback attacks are still possible, e.g., the time frame within which can be
rolled back, and the resulting performance penalties.
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e research object of this thesis are protocols that enable End-to-End Secure Data
Sharing (E2E-SDS). E2E-SDS uses client-side cryptography to provide condential
and integer data sharing without a trusted entity outside the group of sharing users.
us, the major part of authorization and access control enforcement is carried out
solely by the users. However, the chances that E2E-SDS is accepted by potential
users depend on the loss in user comfort that these systems bring along. Besides
some other aspects, this means that the authorization models the users are famil-
iar with should be retained, and the performance penalties on the users’ devices
should be negligible.
Methodological Challenges and Corresponding Contributions
is thesis addresses the question how to evaluate the real-world performance of
E2E-SDS protocols. In literature, the performance of such protocols was prevalently
evaluatedwith analyses of the asymptotic behavior. Two challenges for the evaluation
of the real-world performance were identied and addressed in this thesis.
e rst challenge lies in the coarse-grained modeling that asymptotic analyses
deliberately strive to achieve, but that abstracts from E2E-SDS protocol details that
potentially have a major impact on the real-world performance. is challenge is
addressed in the thesis by introducing two performance evaluation methods: an an-
alytical and a simulative method. Bothmethods are based on workloads, which con-
stitute a basic sharing and usage model, i.e., a formalization of the sharing and usage
behavior of the users in the system. e methods can be used to estimate the com-
putation time and the incoming and outgoing network trac required on a user’s
client device by the protocol under study.
e analytical method can be considered a natural extension of asymptotic anal-
yses. e method models the protocol as a set of algebraic expressions, with one
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expression per workload event type and per performance metric. e performance
is evaluated by populating the expression with concrete costs of cryptographic op-
erations on a certain device, and with concrete values for the workload parameters.
e analytical method does not require fully specied workloads, but is based on
more abstract workload parameters. Moreover, the performance evaluation model
directly reects the inuence of a workload parameter on the performance.
e major limitations of the analytical method are, rst, that the workload param-
eters involved in the algebraic expressions must be known or be estimable up front.
Second, the analytical method is much harder to apply if an algebraic expression in-
volves two or more workload parameters that cannot be assumed to be independent.
In this case, either the expression has to be populated with joint frequency distri-
butions, which are harder to estimate than univariate ones, or the evaluation has to
be based on probability distributions that may be mathematically cumbersome to
calculate with. e former option can be considered a step towards a simulative
performance evaluation.
e simulative performance evaluation method introduced in this thesis leverages
the key graph as a unied level of abstraction for E2E-SDS protocols. A key graph
represents the state of a E2E-SDS systems in terms of cryptographic data structures,
such as keys, lockboxes and digital signatures, and the links between these data struc-
tures. On this abstraction level, an E2E-SDS protocol is specied by the way it ma-
nipulates the key graph when processing a workload event. Although the concept
of a key graph was already introduced in literature, the concept was extended in this
thesis to be able to infer the protocol performance from key graph changes. Opposed
to the analytical method, the simulative method requires fully specied workloads.
Moreover, deriving the relations between workload parameters and the performance
by inspecting the protocol model is harder than with the analytical method. Further-
more, the simulative method can only be applied to E2E-SDS protocols that retain
to keys, lockboxes and signatures as cryptographic data structures.
e performance evaluations of E2E-SDS protocols that were carried out for this
thesis could not have all been based on only one of the two methods, so the unique
features of both methods were relevant for the thesis. e reasons for this will be
discussed shortly.
e second challenge for evaluating the real-world performance is that the knowl-
edge of the sharing and usage model of the E2E-SDS system is oen incomplete, i.e.,
it is unclear which values a given workload parameter typically takes in a real-world
setting. In this thesis, this challenge is addressed by providing a characterization of
real-worldworkloads.eseworkloadswere generated from traces of two real-world
sharing services running at Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT): an e-learning
and a groupware platform. While these workloads cannot be claimed to be represen-
tative, a performance evaluation based on these workloads at least gives some rough
indication on the signicance of the performance penalties. e characterization
might provide some guidance on the values or distributions to choose for unknown
workload parameters when using the analytical performance evaluation method.
In many cases, the sharing models cannot be obtained by observing real-world
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sharing systems. In these cases, it is assumed that a domain expert could at least
provide an estimation for some workload parameters regarding the E2E-SDS system
under study. In this thesis, estimated workload parameters serve as a target that syn-
thetic workloads should adhere to. Synthetic workloads can be directly used as input
for the simulative performance evaluation method, or can be characterized with re-
gard to workload parameters that are required as input of the analytical method.
e presented workload generationmethod prohibits that sets of dependent work-
load parameters are completely specied, and therefore avoids conicting require-
ments on the generatedworkload.e workload generation problem includes a fam-
ily of graph generation problems, whose members dier on the set of workload pa-
rameters that is specied. In this thesis, it was proven that certain instances of this
graph generation problem are NP-hard problems. ese NP-hard workload gener-
ation problem instances have in common that at least one transitive parameter is
specied, i.e., a parameter that reects indirect relations between users and the re-
sources that are accessible to the users.
Contributions with Regard to the Application of Methods
e presented set of methods is employed in this thesis to evaluate the performance
of both existing and novel E2E-SDS protocols. e performance evaluations are
based on the real-world workloads, and are carried out for a range of mobile de-
vices manufactured between 2008 and 2015. All of the evaluated protocols have in
common that they support named user groups, that is, user groups that are managed
by a dedicated group owner, and that exists independently from any permissions on
resources.is feature is oered by many data sharing services that are in use today,
for example, by the distributed le systems NFSv4 and CIFS.
As a starting point, the performance of an E2E-SDS protocol was evaluated that
is similar to protocols that are in productive use today. e protocol is based on
traditional cryptographic primitives, i.e., symmetric and asymmetric cryptography
that produces ciphertexts dedicated to a single recipient only.
e performance evaluation of this protocol shows that with regard to the consid-
ered workloads, only minor performance penalties have to be expected for most of
the authorization operations, as the computation time for these operations is mostly
up to some seconds, even on older hardware. However, major performance penalties
hit users that manage groupmemberships in large user groups, i.e., user groups with
a few thousand or more members. In this case, the computation times rise to sev-
eral minutes when removing a user from a group, and the group member removal
operations require the group owner to upload several MB of cryptographic key ma-
terial to the storage provider.
A possible solution to decrease the performance penalties of group membership
management is oered by Group Key Management approaches, which were orig-
inally developed to facilitate an ecient key distribution for secure multicast in a
public network. By extending the aforementioned E2E-SDS protocol with a suitable
Group Key Management approach, the performance penalties for the management
of group memberships in large user groups are decreased signicantly, as a group
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member removal operation can be carried out within few seconds on the consid-
ered hardware.
Moreover, the introducedperformance evaluationmethodswere applied to anE2E-
SDS protocol based on Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE). On the one hand, ABE
promises to enable resource-saving SDS systems in terms of ciphertexts that have to
be generated and distributed. On the other hand, some ABE schemes were shown
to exhibit a performance worse than traditional cryptography, at least in small and
articial sharing scenarios. In a rst step, an ABE scheme was identied that facil-
itates E2E-SDS, which conicts with the need for a central trusted entity that many
ABE schemes bring along. In a second step, the attribute-based authorization model
of a suitable ABE scheme was mapped to the group-based authorization model.e
performance of dierent mapping variants was evaluated by means of the analytical
method, as ABE is not supported by the simulative model without any enhance-
ments. e performance evaluation showed that the ABE-based E2E-SDS protocol
exhibits a slightly worse performance than the traditional E2E-SDS protocol. How-
ever, this might change in future if more ecient implementations of pairing op-
erations are made available. Nonetheless, the ABE-based E2E-SDS protocol only
requires a few seconds of computation time for any authorization operation on the
considered hardware, except for the group member removal operation.
Finally, a novel E2E-SDS protocol was presented that omits joint authorization op-
erations.ese operations are carried out by at least two dierent users in a collab-
orative manner, which requires that the involved users are reachable in the network
and able to allocate the necessary computational resources immediately upon re-
quest.is might be a problem especially whenmobile devices are involved, as these
devices may be temporarily located in areas with bad network coverage, or it may
be undesirable for the device owner that computing-intensive cryptographic opera-
tions are carried out immediately upon request, maybe because the device becomes
less responsive. e E2E-SDS protocols mentioned so far need joint authorization
operations for group member removal operations. is massively hinders an em-
ployment of hierarchies of named user groups in practice.
e proposed E2E-SDS protocol overcomes these drawbacks. However, omitting
joint authorization operations implies that parts of the access control state must be
altered bymultiple writers. Unfortunately, it was shown that freshness guarantees are
fundamentally hard to achieve in E2E-SDS with multiple writers.e best notion of
freshness that can be achieved in this case is denoted as fork consistency, and exist-
ing mechanisms that ensure fork consistency impose heavy performance penalties.
Furthermore, these mechanisms require each user to hold state information locally
on the client device. For this reason, the proposed protocol only realizes a more
relaxed notion of freshness.is might pose a vulnerability with respect to rollback
attacks on the resources, which is only relevant when local caching of the shared data
is avoided. However, if the attacker additionally manages to collaborate with a user
that had write access to a resource in the past, the write access to this resource can
be restored by a rollback attack without being detected.
e performance evaluation of the proposed E2E-SDS protocol was carried out
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with the simulative method, as the performance of groupmember removals is deter-
mined by multiple workload parameters that cannot be assumed to be independent.
e evaluation shows that in relative terms, the computation times are signicantly
higher than those of the traditional E2E-SDS protocols that use joint authorization
operations. However, in absolute terms, the computation times are mostly in the
range of only a few seconds on the considered hardware. For example, although
adding a resource is expensive compared to most of the authorization operations, it
only takes between 6 and 8 seconds on average. Again, the most expensive autho-
rization operations are group member removals, especially when group hierarchies
are involved.ese operations require computation times that are amagnitude larger
than for other authorization operations, e.g., 38 s on average using a laptop from 2011.
A sensitivity analysis regarding the performance of group member removals shows
that the performance highly depends on the workload parameter groupmemberships
per group, which has a superlinear inuence on the performance.
Conclusions and Outlook
To conclude, the performance evaluations carried out in this thesis indicate that E2E-
SDSwith joint authorization operations causes onlymoderate performance penalties
on current consumer devices. However, joint authorization operations constitute a
major obstacle for the adoption of E2E-SDS, especially in conjunction with mobile
user devices.erefore, the practical applicability of E2E-SDS with joint authoriza-
tion operations is limited to special scenarios. For example, joint authorization oper-
ations can be used in scenarios where dedicated cryptographic devices are available
that are always ready to carry out cryptographic operations with a short or no delay.
is might apply to a network of sensors and actors. e performance evaluation
methods introduced in this thesis could easily be applied to the case of data sharing
in sensor networks. However, additional work had to be carried out for identifying
realistic workloads, and benchmarking the hardware involved.
In this thesis, a novel E2E-SDS protocol was presented that omits joint authoriza-
tion operations, which opens up an attack vector for a comparatively powerful at-
tacker. While omitting joint authorization operations leads to performance penalties,
these penalties are moderate in absolute terms for most authorization operations.
However, major performance impacts have to be expectedwhen the sharing scenario
includes large hierarchies of named user groups. It can be assumed that large group
hierarchies will be rarely met in personal sharing scenarios, but are rather limited to
institutional sharing scenarios. However, this assumption could only be supported
or refuted by tracing and characterizing more sharing scenarios. e performance
penalties can be circumvented by using stationary devices for computing-intensive
authorization operations. While this might be rather accepted in institutional shar-
ing scenarios than in personal ones, it limits the usability of the system in any case.
e security of the novel E2E-SDS protocol could be improved by incorporating
mechanisms that guarantee fork consistency. However, these mechanisms further
lower the performance of the system. Furthermore, themechanisms require the user
devices to hold a local state, thus, switching the device requires to synchronize the
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local state. As a result, strengthening the security of the proposed protocol limits
its usability.
ese observations lead to the conclusion that unless new cryptographic techniques
are designed, a further hardening of E2E-SDS requires a considerable price to be paid
in terms of performance or usability. is raises the question whether it is sensible
to further harden data sharing against attacks from or on the storage provider at all.
is question gains further importance by the observation that the user device itself
oers a potentially big attack surface, which is likely to be targeted by an economi-
cally aware attacker as supposed weakest link in the “security chain”.
As rst implication, this observation stresses the importance of client device secu-
rity as research focus.is includes hardening the hardware and operation systems
against attacks, verifying that third-party apps behave benevolent, and oer conve-
nient means for the user to grant permissions to apps or other users. A strongly
secured client device is also important for the application of usage control, i.e., to
control the usage of media aer it was downloaded on the client device. e cou-
pling or unication of keymanagementmechanisms that are required for both usage
control and E2E-SDS constitutes a possible starting point for future work.
As second implication, from an economic perspective, it might be reasonable to
even increase the trust that has to be put in the storage provider in order to improve
performance or usability. For example, lots of recent SDS protocols increase the
client-side performance by outsourcing cryptographic tasks to the storage provider.
As another example, both shared data and cryptographic keys can be fragmented,
and distributed onmultiple storage providers that are trusted not to collaborate. Lots
of similarmechanismswere proposed in recent years. It would be desirable to be pro-
vided with means to combine these mechanisms, and to be able to make statements
about the performance, security or robustness of the resulting system.e key-graph
based method proposed in this thesis might be adaptable to support this task.
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